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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In modern times, legitimacy appears as the main and continuous concern of all 
political communities, especially from the point of view of liberal theory and 
practice – for governments, it divides between obedience and unrest; for 
subjects, it divides between freedom and oppression. If governments hope to 
contain legitimacy inside law, following in this, consciously or not, Max Weber, 
who has argued that “today the most common form of legitimacy is the belief in 
legality,” then political events have consistently disproved that possibility.1 This 
is clearly manifest in cases, where lawful action by authorities, despite its 
lawfulness, induces unrest of its subjects. Examples of such cases are abound in 
politics. In Estonia, we could recall the events surrounding the displacements of 
the World War II monument in Lihula in 2004 and the Bronze Soldier 
monument in 2007. Both of these monuments, the first of which was erected by 
the local authority of Lihula parish to commemorate soldiers who died fighting 
for Estonian independence in the Second World War, and the second by the Red 
Army in 1947, named as “Monument to the Liberators of Tallinn,” were 
displaced by force on the orders of Estonian government. In the case of the 
monument of Lihula, the government’s appeal to legality in defence of its action 
is strikingly clear; it was claimed that the monument was erected on state land 
(a local graveyard) without consultation with its owner.2 Nevertheless, the 
action of the state was perceived as violence, which justified (from the 
viewpoint of interested groups in society) a violent response, leading to the 
unrest.  
Such and similar events keep repeating themselves in different circum-
stances over and over again, like in the case of the Bronze Soldier monument 
three years later, but also, for example, in the Arab Spring uprisings in 2010. 
Whatever deeper socio-economic reasons underlie the protests that eventually 
spread over many Arab countries in Northern-Africa and around the Persian 
Gulf, they started from an almost inconspicuous act of law enforcement in 
Tunisia: a municipal inspector confiscated the wares of a young man, identified 
as Mohammed Bouazizi, who sold, without a permit, fruits and vegetables at a 
roadside stand.3 This must have been a routine procedure for the inspector, but 
in that case, the young man, being unemployed without any hope of finding a 
job, and left without any means of earning income as a result, doused himself 
with gasoline and set himself afire. This radical protest of one person against 
injustice triggered protests and unrest on the national level, and beyond, and led 
                                                                          
1  Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (Berkeley: 
University of California Press), p. 37. 
2  See the transcript of the press conference of Estonian government on the 3rd of September, 
2004: http://valitsus.ee/et/uudised/pressikonverentsid/stenogrammid/6279/valitsuse-pressi-
konverentsi-stenogramm-03092004. 
3  See BBC on-line news from January 5, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-
12120228. 
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to the change in government in several countries. We could add into this line of 
examples also the suburban riots, for example, in France 2005 and 2007, or in 
Sweden 2013, which follow the same pattern. 
Ultimately, these unrests were not about this or that particular action, 
decision or statute, and they cannot be explained by the failure of one or another 
person in applying the law rightfully. Rather, an act by the government that is 
perceived as violent in relation to the people, whom the government is supposed 
to represent, calls into question the government’s right to rule in its entirety 
(though, whether the unrest evolves to include the whole society or remains 
marginalised depends on concrete circumstances). The possibility of such 
events shows that legitimacy cannot be reduced to law or legality (or power, or 
order), and legitimacy continues to be an important issue, to the explication of 
which this thesis hopes to give its contribution. 
“What is legitimacy?” is a question traditionally asked in any research into 
the concept or manifestations of legitimacy. The answers have been divergent 
for at least two reasons: firstly, due to their origin in different disciplines that 
have all taken legitimacy to be their matter of concern, like political science, 
law, political philosophy, sociology, political anthropology; and secondly, due 
to differences in theoretical approaches. Before these differences will be 
outlined, it is only proper to start the thesis with pointing out what seems to be a 
minimal agreement on legitimacy. Jean-Marc Coicaud’s statement in the 
beginning of his book Legitimacy and Politics is emblematic in this respect: 
“Despite these [differences], there exists a common ground for understanding: 
the idea of legitimacy concerns first and foremost the right to govern. 
Legitimacy is the recognition of the right to govern.”4 Much in the same way, 
Dolf Sternberger starts his entry on legitimacy in International Encyclopedia of 
the Social Sciences: “Legitimacy is the foundation of such governmental power 
as is exercised both with a consciousness on the government’s part that it has a 
right to govern and with some recognition by the governed of that right.”5 Thus, 
what forms the basis of shared understanding is that legitimacy is related to 
someone’s right to govern someone else. 
Aside from this recognition of a common object of study in the formula 
“right to rule,” the academic community is divided over how the question “what 
is legitimacy” is to be handled. In the first part of the introduction, I trace some 
of the basic controversies in this respect to give the reader a general idea of the 
theoretical discussions surrounding the concept of legitimacy. It also forms a 
background to the formulation of the research question in the second part of the 
chapter. This structure of the introduction is justified by the fact that, even if 
this thesis is a study into the concept of legitimacy, it does not directly engage 
                                                                          
4  Jean-Marc Coicaud, Legitimacy and Politics: A Contribution to the Study of Political 
Right and Political Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 10. 
5  Dolf Sternberger, “Legitimacy,” in D. L. Sills, et al. (eds), International Encyclopedia of 
the Social Sciences, Vol. 9 (New York: The Macmillan Company & the Free Press, 1968), 
p. 244. 
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with these debates, because it questions their very starting point in the question 
“what is legitimacy?”. This means, among other things, that the opening 
examples of how law cannot control legitimacy were not intended to signal the 
theme of the research in the legality-legitimacy relationship, for the relationship 
remains governed by the question “what is legitimacy?”, but simply to 
demonstrate the relevance of the problem of legitimacy.6 As I will explicate 
later in this chapter, what interests me in this thesis is a gap not between law 
and legitimacy, but in legitimacy itself. Questioning the “is” of legitimacy 
means that this thesis seeks to deconstruct, and it seeks to arrive at a 
deconstructed “concept” of legitimacy (which I call in this thesis, in order to 
indicate to the paradigm it originates from, a post-structuralist “concept” of 
legitimacy). It must be warned ahead that the thesis aims at demonstrating that 
legitimacy is not a concept at all, but it functions as a Derridean infrastructure. 
In short, the thesis argues that legitimacy is resigning (rather a “movement” 
than a concept), which synthesises in itself two opposite meanings of resigning 
and re-signing. However, this would be the very end result of the argument 
proposed in this thesis, and the explication of the “logic” and meaning of 
resigning can take place only gradually in the course of the thesis. Due to the 
deconstructive approach I use, which will be introduced later in this chapter, I 
do not apply “resigning” to the discourse on legitimacy, but I read it out from it. 
For that reason, also, the exact research question will be explained not in the 
beginning, but in the course of this whole first chapter alternatingly moving 
between the formulation of the question and “methodology” of deconstruction, 
for in this project, perhaps more than in any other, the research question does 
not precede the approach, but grows out of it (or, with it). 
 
 
1.1 Background discussions: “What is legitimacy?”7 
The most basic division in answering “what is legitimacy?” emanates from the 
difference between empirical or descriptive and normative approaches to 
legitimacy. The empirical approach seeks “to explain why or when people … 
                                                                          
6  The legality-legitimacy relationship is an important issue, especially in legal philosophy. 
In very broad strokes, the main discussion focuses on the question whether there is an 
intimate link between legitimacy and legality (which is the argument of the Natural Law 
School) or there is not (the view of Legal Positivism). See David Dyzenhaus, Legality and 
Legitimacy: Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen, and Hermann Heller in Weimar (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997). 
7  The following section, as said above, gives background information on legitimacy, but it 
should not be considered as a literature review for the thesis. Due to the discrepancy which 
we will soon see unwinding between the beginning of the thesis and its ends, this section, it 
can be said, belongs neither inside nor outside the thesis – it seems at the same time 
necessary as an introduction, but also irrelevant from the perspective of what will come. I 
hope that the position of the following section will become clearer by the end of this 
introductory chapter. 
10 
obey, respect, or show allegiance to a particular government, regime, state, 
policy or institution. Or, conversely, why or when do they revolt, disobey, or act 
disloyally?”8 Perhaps the most well-known empirical-descriptive take on 
legitimacy is Max Weber’s theory, which states that legitimacy consists in 
belief in legitimacy: “The modern position of political associations rests on the 
prestige bestowed upon them by the belief, held by their members, in a specific 
consecration: the ‘legitimacy’ of that social action which is ordered and 
regulated by them.”9 According to Weber, this belief in legitimacy has sources 
either in charisma, in the tradition, or in the rational-legal value. 
Inside the empirical approach there is sometimes a distinction made between 
subjective and objective strands; for example, José Guilherme Merquior 
considers authors like Carl Joachim Friedrich, Seymour Martin Lipset and 
David Easton as belonging to the subjective strand, for they base legitimacy on 
the conviction of the ruled.10 Their similarity is clearly discernible from their 
respective definitions of legitimacy: for Friedrich, legitimacy is “the question of 
fact whether a given rulership is believed to be based on good title by most men 
subject to it;”11 for Lipset it is “the capacity of the system to engender and 
maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most 
appropriate ones for the society;”12 and for Easton, legitimacy describes “the 
conviction on the part of the member that it is right and proper … to accept and 
obey the authorities and to abide by the requirements of the regime.”13 In 
contrast to these views, Merquior refers to Stillmann’s definition of legitimacy 
as representing the objectivist stance: “a government is legitimate if and only if 
the results of governmental output are compatible with the value pattern of the 
society.”14 Stillman’s approach is objective in the sense that it emphasises a 
certain congruence between government’s actions and the system of values and 
beliefs of society. 
Robin Stryker offers a more contemporary summary of empirical legitimacy, 
categorising possible definitions in this approach, firstly, into “attitudinal 
approval of rules,” which equates legitimacy to “attachment, loyalty, allegiance, 
                                                                          
8  Christopher Ansell, “Legitimacy: Political,” in N. J. Smelser, P. B. Baltes, et al. (eds), 
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2001), 
p. 8704. 
9  Weber, Economy and Society, pp. 903–4. 
10  José Guilherme Merquior, Rousseau and Weber: Two Studies in the Theory of 
Legitimacy (New York and London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 4–5; see also Weber, Economy 
and Society, p. 33. 
11  Carl Friedrich, Man and His Government: An Empirical Theory of Politics (New York: 
McGraw Hill, 1963), p. 234. 
12  Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (New York: Anchor 
Books, 1963), p. 64. 
13  David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (Chicago and London: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 278. 
14  Peter G. Stillman, “The Concept of Legitimacy,” Polity, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Autumn 1974), 
p. 39. 
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and a ‘favourable affective orientation’,” secondly, into “behavioural consent to 
rules,” and thirdly, into “cognitive orientation to binding rules,” which allows 
for rules that are recognised as collectively binding still not to be personally 
supported rules.15 
Besides the empirical approach to legitimacy, there is also a normative 
approach that seeks “to identify the standards by which a regime or action must 
be judged if it is to be regarded as legitimate.”16 Merquior asks in this vein: 
“What is legitimacy, after all, but the experience of the validity of a given 
normative order?”17 The conceptual distinction, on which much of the nor-
mative theory is based upon, is between de facto or effective and legitimate 
authority, which allows us to conceive the task of the theory in terms of a 
justification of authority. Inside this approach several strands and theories can 
be identified. In the following, I refer to five such views. 
One of the strands of normative thinking on legitimacy circles around the 
idea of consent, which was brought into significance already by John Locke, 
and developed further by, for example, A. John Simmons.18 The basic argument 
in this conception is that legitimacy is conferred to a political authority only 
upon the consent of its subjects. Another approach to legitimacy is the so-called 
“democratic legitimacy,” which argues that on the assumption of the shared 
world where people have to make decisions how to live together, legitimacy is a 
function of the decision making process akin to democratic one with its ways to 
consider different opinions and interests.19 There are also several strands related 
to concrete influential thinkers. For example, John Rawls proposes a consensus-
type conception of legitimacy. A standard quote on Rawls’ take on legitimacy is 
as follows: “Political power is legitimate only when it is exercised in accord-
ance with a constitution (written or unwritten) the essentials of which all 
citizens, as reasonable and rational, can endorse in the light of their common 
human reason.”20 Rawls relates here legitimacy to a (overlapping) consensus 
achieved on the basis of reasonableness of the members of society. Ronald 
Dworkin’s theory is called the “associative obligations” approach. Dworkin 
                                                                          
15  Robin Stryker, “Rules, Resources, and Legitimacy Processes: Some implications for 
Social Conflict, Order, and Change,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 99, No. 4 
(January 1994), p. 856–7. See also George M. Thomas, Henry A. Walker, Morris Zelditch, 
Jr., “Legitimacy and Collective Action,” Social Forces, Vol. 65, No. 2 (Dec., 1986), pp. 
378–404. 
16  Ansell, “Legitimacy: Political,” p. 8704. 
17  Merquior, Rousseau and Weber, p. 8. 
18  See John Locke, Two Treatises of Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2003); also, A. John Simmons, Moral 
Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), espe-
cially, pp. 122–157. 
19  See Thomas Christiano, “The Authority of Democracy,” The Journal of Political 
Philosophy, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2004), pp. 266–290. 
20  John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. by E. Kelly (Cambridge, Mass. and 
London: The Belknap Press, 2001), p. 41. 
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states four conditions that generate obligations irrespective of whether the 
association that corresponds to these conditions is voluntary or what are the 
disagreements on principles: members of community “must regard the group’s 
responsibilities as special …, personal …, as flowing from a more general 
responsibility each has of concern for the well-being of others in the group …, 
[and as reflecting] equal concern for all members.”21 In some sense, Dworkin 
sets here different associations like family, friendship and political society on 
the same footing. The last type of conception of legitimacy, to which I refer 
here, is Joseph Raz’s instrumental approach:  
 
The normal way to establish that a person has authority over another involves 
showing that the alleged subject is likely to better comply with the reasons which 
apply to him (other than the alleged authoritative directive) if he accepts the 
directives of the alleged authority as authoritatively binding and tries to follow 
them, rather than by trying to follow the reasons which apply to him directly.22 
 
In other words, what Raz says here is that an authority is legitimate if it gives 
orders to its subjects to do things that they have reasons to do anyway. 
As it can be seen, the normative approach is more extensively employed by 
political and legal philosophers, who often consider the alternative of the 
empirical approach to legitimacy as deeply deficient for its implicit relativism. 
For example, Leslie Green contends: “It is absurd to say, as some political 
scientists do, that a state is legitimate if it is believed to be legitimate by its 
citizens; for what are we to suppose they believe in believing that?”23 Wilfried 
Hinsch adds an additional difference from the empirical approach, arguing that 
if legitimacy is conferred to an institution on claims emanating from the nor-
mative approach, then it entails morally binding consequences, rather than being 
a mere report on what is believed.24 
The tensions between empirical and normative approaches to legitimacy 
have, in turn, inspired a third movement that seeks to overcome their antithetic 
nature. Roughly speaking, there are two strategies to achieve this: the first one 
proposes a new third approach above the two; the other assigns to either of these 
two concepts its own sphere of application. The first route is pursued, for 
example, by Jürgen Habermas, who considers both the empirical and the 
normative approaches deficient, and advocates his own third view:  
 
[The empiricist concept of legitimation] can be employed in the social sciences 
but is unsatisfactory because it abstracts from the systematic weight of grounds 
for validity; [the normativist concept of legitimation] would be satisfactory in 
                                                                          
21  Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Oxford: Hart, 1998), pp. 199–200. 
22  Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), p. 53. 
23  Leslie Green, The Authority of the State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 5. 
24  Wilfried Hinsch, “Legitimacy and Justice: A Conceptual and Functional Clarification,” 
in J. Kühnelt (ed.) Political Legitimization without Morality? (Dordrecht and London Sprin-
ger, 2008), p. 41. 
4
13 
this regard but is untenable because of the metaphysical context in which it is 
embedded. I would like, therefore, to propose a third concept of legitimation, 
which I shall call the “reconstructive”.25 
 
The term “reconstructive” refers here to “the procedures and presuppositions 
under which justifications can have the power to produce consensus.”26 In his 
Legitimation Crisis, Habermas argues that without the consideration of mecha-
nisms of consensus production, all possible grounds for a belief in legitimacy in 
an empirical sense would “have only psychological significance;” in such case, 
“whether such grounds can sufficiently stabilise a given belief in legitimacy 
depends on the institutionalized prejudices and observable behavioural 
dispositions of the group in question.”27 On the other hand, proceeding from 
certain determinable conditions of consensus, allows any validity claim on 
which the belief in legitimacy is based to “be tested and criticised independently 
of the psychological effect of these [claims].”28 These conditions are, for 
Habermas, intrinsic to the structure of communication itself: “Participants in 
argumentation cannot avoid the presupposition that … the structure of their 
communication rules out all external or internal coercion other that the force of 
the better argument and thereby also neutralises all motives other than that of 
the cooperative search for truth.”29 All in all, Habermas is able to conclude that 
“only the rules and communicative presuppositions that make it possible to 
distinguish an accord or agreement among free and equals from a contingent or 
forced consensus have legitimating force today.”30 Such an approach, then, on 
the one hand, moves beyond grounding legitimacy on a belief, but at the same 
time, in offering grounds for validity, it deduces them from the rules of 
communication itself and avoids any metaphysical references.31 
The other strategy to deal with the empirical and the normative dichotomy is 
to demonstrate the utility of both concepts of legitimacy in their own disci-
plinary spheres of application. This strategy can be exemplified by David 
Beetham’s account of legitimacy. Beetham makes the distinction between the 
moral or political philosopher for whom “power is legitimate where the rules 
governing it are justifiable according to rationally defensible normative prin-
ciples” and the social scientist, whose concern is to identify “the empirical 
consequences that legitimacy has for the character of power relations, for the 
                                                                          
25  Jürgen Habermas, “Legitimation Problems in the Modern State,” in his Communication 
and the Evolution of Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979), p. 204. 
26  Ibid., p. 205. 
27  Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), p. 97. 
28  Ibid. 
29  Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (Cambridge, MA: 
the MIT Press, 1995), p. 87–8. 
30  Habermas, “Legitimation Problems in the Modern State,” p. 188. 
31  For Habermas’ approach to legitimacy in the context of the philosophy of law, see 
Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law 
and Democracy (Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 1997). 
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different ways in which they are organised, and for the extent to which the 
powerful can actually count on the obedience or support of those subordinate to 
them.”32 In other words, the social scientist is concerned with explaining, rather 
than setting up normative standards. This is to say that even if there are 
differences between the normative and the empirical approaches to legitimacy, 
they should not be taken as conflictive, but as having different purposes. Fur-
thermore, on some higher level of explanation, their positions even converge: 
 
When it comes to explaining, not people’s behaviour, but legitimacy itself, and 
how the beliefs and the consent that comprise it are maintained and reproduced 
within established relations of power, the social scientist … is compelled to 
adopt a standpoint that transcends these self-confirming processes of 
legitimation. … And this position is identical to that of the normative 
philosopher who has to stand outside all power relations to establish 
philosophically valid principles of legitimacy, and to identify the conditions 
under which consent to power rules is truly voluntary because it is unconstrained 
by their effects.33 
 
A similar approach to Beetham’s is echoed in Richard H. Fallon’s analytical 
distinction between different concepts of legitimacy, depending on types of 
criteria used to judge on it. Relating these types of criteria back to the disci-
plines they originate from, Fallon discriminates between legal legitimacy, i.e. 
lawfulness; sociological legitimacy, i.e. when “the relevant public regards it [a 
regime, an institution or a decision] as justified, appropriate, or otherwise 
deserving of support for reasons beyond fear of sanction or mere hope for 
personal award;” and moral legitimacy, which refers to “moral justifiability or 
respect-worthiness.”34 Fallon clearly assigns to every concept its own task to 
fulfil, and even if it is possible to conceive of an “overall legitimacy”, Fallon 
opines that “there is a real risk that the terminology would obscure the 
ultimately moral or ethical character of the underlying judgment.”35 
These different approaches to legitimacy have been outlined here in order to 
give the reader a more general understanding of the background of the subject 
matter of the thesis. However, the thesis does not directly engage with these 
debates and sets itself upon an entirely different route, which aims at ques-
tioning the starting point of these debates in the question “what is legitimacy?”. 
The following section clarifies the research question of the thesis and explains 
what has led to the formulation of such a problem. 
 
                                                                          
32  David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave, 
1991), p. 5. 
33  Ibid., p. 246. 
34  Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “Legitimacy and the Constitution,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 
118, No. 6 (April 2005), pp. 1794–7. 
35  Ibid., p. 1851. 
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1.2 The research question 
This thesis is motivated by an observation of a specific trait of legitimacy’s 
effects in society. For example, Rodney Barker, discussing the work of Lipset, 
notes: “Legitimacy as a term is used when its absence is identified rather than 
when its presence is described. It is the normal and unremarked characteristic of 
liberal democratic societies, and is, like the air we breathe, only commented 
upon when it turns nasty.”36 Also, Habermas makes a similar remark, saying 
“historically as well as analytically, the concept is used above all in situations in 
which the legitimacy of an order is disputed, in which, as we say, legitimation 
problems arise.”37 However, even if noticed, the consequences of this trait or 
“movement” of legitimacy are not properly spelled out. In other words, what 
should be noticed here is that if legitimacy is said to be present, then in fact, 
what is present is what legitimacy is attributed to, i.e., in most general terms, a 
political order or a system of laws, whereas legitimacy itself remains not a 
tangible object. Though, on the other hand, if legitimacy is said not to be in 
existence, then there is a demand for legitimacy as if it were something 
absolutely essential for the political order. Hence, legitimacy seems to “exist” in 
its self-erasure, because if an order is assumed to be legitimate and it comes into 
existence, appearing to function by its own laws and logic, then legitimacy is 
not considered to be withdrawn from that order, but is assumed to be present. It 
seems to be a paradox; legitimacy is present in its non-presence.  
That legitimacy is not with an order or a law, but always slides under it, so 
that what exists is simply this order or this law, follows from the fact that 
legitimacy has no control over what it makes possible. Even if the founding act 
of law of laws is grounded on certain principles or criteria that allow con-
firmation of its legitimacy (by determining a belief in it or existence of certain 
normative standards), then the presence of these criteria at the founding of the 
law, does not predetermine their following in every subsequent application of 
the law; in other words, before the application of the law, it cannot be said 
whether it corresponds to the criteria that determine legitimacy in that particular 
community or not. This is because the application of the law cannot function as 
an automatically released script, but as a repetition of law. This gap in law is 
also referred to by Jacques Derrida in the context of his discussion of law and 
justice:  
 
If the act [of decision] simply consists of applying a rule, of enacting a program 
or effecting a calculation, we might say that it is legal, that it conforms to law, … 
but we would be wrong to say that the decision was just. To be just, the decision 
of a judge, for example, must not only follow the rule of law or a general law, 
but must also assume it, approve it, confirm its value, by a reinstituting act of 
                                                                          
36  Rodney Barker, Political Legitimacy and the State (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 
p. 76. 
37  Habermas, “Legitimation Problems in the Modern State,” pp. 178–9. 
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interpretation, as if ultimately nothing previously existed of the law, as if the 
judge himself invented the law in every case.38 
 
In order to be just, according to this interpretation, one needs to do both at the 
same time – to follow prescriptions and rules, and to certain extent betray them, 
or to suspend them for a reinterpretation and reinvention could be possible. In 
other words, there is a gap between law and justice. However, this also means 
that in the invention of law, the possibility of misinterpretations is imminent; 
there is no guarantee and there is no law that the application of law would 
comply – because of a reinterpretation or of a new context – to what has author-
ised it. 
This might also explain the emphasis on the formula “belief in legitimacy” 
in the history of legitimacy theory: if at one moment an agreement on the 
presence of legitimacy has been reached, then any moment thereafter it needs to 
be as if “believed in,” for legitimacy is not something “present” in itself – what 
is present, is, depending on a context of discussion, a law, power, an order, etc. 
(that functions by its own logic).  
The traditional discourse on legitimacy overrides the “movement” of erasure 
in legitimacy, because, proceeding from the question “what is?”, it necessarily 
excludes the non-presence (“is not”) of legitimacy from its concept. The other 
side of this exclusion is that it turns legitimacy into an “evaluative concept” 
(Lipset), or a “contestable validity claim” (Habermas), for it can intervene only 
after the fact.39 In this interpretation, it appears that the role of legitimacy is to 
mark the relation of correspondence between a certain empirically or norma-
tively deduced value and action(s) of the government.40 The label “legitimate” 
is a positive evaluation (or a test result) that these two sides of value and action 
coincide, grounding in such a way a voluntary obedience to an order or to a 
system of laws. In this way, legitimacy does not stand as a condition of law and 
order, as producing them, on the contrary, its intervention presumes that there is 
a law and an order in operation, which will be later evaluated. 
What concurs with this passive evaluation is that legitimacy has no means to 
exclude manipulation – every government seeks legitimacy to preserve its right 
to rule, and in doing that, it can trick its subjects to believe into its legitimacy. 
Even if normative standards are established, it is always possible to create an 
impression of pursuance of values underlying judgements on legitimacy in that 
community. 
For the reasons that become clear immediately after, I point out that this 
critique of the concept of legitimacy parallels with Jacques Derrida’s critique of 
                                                                          
38  Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’,” Cardozo Law 
Review, Vol. 11, No. 5–6 (July–August, 1990), p. 961. 
39  Lipset, Political Man, p. 64; Habermas, “Legitimation Problems in the Modern State,” 
p. 178. 
40  See, for example, Lipset, Political Man, p. 64: “Groups regard a political system as 
legitimate or illegitimate according to the way in which its values fit with theirs.”  
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the concept of the sign in structuralist linguistics. The structuralist idea of 
language will be introduced in a more elaborate manner in the next section of 
this chapter, but here it suffices to say that the sign of structural linguistics is 
comprised in two sides – the signifier (a sound pattern) and the signified (a 
concept), whereby the signification and the meaning becomes possible on the 
union of these two halves. This is very similar to how legitimacy, as it was 
outlined above, functions on the field of politics. In the same way as legitimacy 
is the union of concrete actions or expressions of the state and the values 
(whether contained in people’s beliefs or settled by the philosophical argument), 
the sign emerges in the union of the “material” side and the “ideal” side, 
producing a meaning, in the same manner as legitimacy produces an order. In 
that case, the critique Derrida launches against such a concept of the sign can be 
equally applied to legitimacy:  
 
By asking “What is the sign in general?,” we raise the question of the sign to an 
ontological plane, we pretend to assign a fundamental or regional place to 
signification in an ontology. This would be a classical procedure. One would 
subject sign to truth, language to being, speech to thought, and writing to speech. 
To say that there could be a truth for the sign in general, does this not suppose 
that the sign is not the possibility of truth, does not constitute it, but is satisfied to 
signify it – to reproduce, incarnate, secondarily inscribe, or refer to it?41 
 
This is the same objection that is raised against the concept of legitimacy above: 
legitimacy is reduced to signification of a political order, but it does not create 
it. This reduction is an inevitable outcome if one starts with the question “what 
is?,” because no answer to this question is able to account for the movement of 
legitimacy delineated above, where legitimacy is not present in what it makes 
possible.42 In order to give to legitimacy its potential productive role, the 
concept of legitimacy must be able to contain its negative dimension or non-
presence, i.e. its erasure in what it makes possible. This can be done only by 
challenging the very form of the question of “what is legitimacy?”. Legitimacy 
that proceeds from the question “what is?,” if it wants to appear intervening into 
the political order, has to put the value it is based upon into the position of a 
metaphysical outside, an absolute presence (of God, for example). In contrast to 
this, I ask in this thesis, paraphrasing here Derrida’s similar question on the 
sign: Is not legitimacy something other than a being – the sole “thing” which, 
not being a thing, does not fall under the question “what is…?” but on the 
                                                                          
41  Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena: And Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of 
Signs (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 24. 
42  In this respect, Derrida says on the sign: “the formal essence of the signified is 
presence. … This is the inevitable response as soon as one asks: ‘what is the sign?,’ that is to 
say, when one submits the sign to the question of essence, to the ‘ti esti’.” Jacques Derrida, 
Of Grammatology (Baltimore & London: the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 18.  
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contrary, should the occasion arise, produces “politics” in this way as the 
empire of the ti esti?43 
With this question I have set myself on the path of deconstructive strategy, 
which, as it will be argued and demonstrated in the course of the thesis, allows 
to account for the non-presence in the present. I will explicate deconstruction as 
an approach and paradigm of this thesis more closely in the methodology 
section of this chapter. 
Thus, in so far as the concept of legitimacy that accounts for the movement 
of its erasure in what it makes possible is a deconstructed concept of legitimacy, 
it is the task of the thesis to arrive at such deconstruction of legitimacy and to 
formulate (underlining its paradigm of origin) a post-structuralist “concept” of 
legitimacy. The best starting point for such deconstructive analysis of legiti-
macy is to follow contradictions that the current concept of legitimacy must 
necessarily generate. If it is that the movement of erasure in legitimacy has been 
so far approached over the question “what is?,” which leads, as it has been 
argued, to the inability to account for the dimension of negativity with its 
“connotations of alterity, the non-rational and unrepresentable,” as Diana Coole 
puts it, then it has to result in certain paradoxes and contradictions in the current 
understanding of legitimacy.44  
One of these paradoxes has plagued legitimacy from the very moment it 
turned into a problem of political theory. The beginning of legitimacy as a 
distinct problem can be traced back to the seventeenth century, when beliefs 
that the rule of some over others is “the divinely, naturally or ontologically 
ordained state of human affairs” start to wane and give view to the standpoint 
that “human beings … are, by nature or before God, free and equal in at least 
one respect: no human being has natural or divinely ordained authority to rule 
them.”45 From that moment on, any government is understood as requiring 
justification. However, if legitimacy cannot be related to some extramundane 
source of authority, i.e. it is not conferred by some absolute standard, then it 
immediately poses a problem, a paradox, which was clearly discerned already 
by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who nearly 250 years ago defined the great problem 
of politics as “how to find a form of government which sets the law above 
man.”46 Rousseau was among those who transformed legitimacy into an urgent 
question for political theory by developing the concept of “popular 
                                                                          
43  Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, p. 25. 
44  Diana Coole, Negativity and Politics: Dionysus and Dialectics from Kant to Post-
structuralism (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 1. 
45  Richard E. Flathman, “Legitimacy,” in R. E. Goodin, P. Pettit and T. Pogge (eds), A 
Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy (Malden, Oxford, Chichester: Blackwell, 
2007), p. 678. 
46  Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Lettre à M. le Marquis de Mirabeau (Tryre, le 26 juillet 1767),” 
in C. E. Vaughan (ed.) The Political Writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1915), p. 160: “le grand problème en politique…: Trouver une 
forme de Gouvernement qui mette la Loi au-dessus de l’homme.” 
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sovereignty,” which derived legitimacy of power from the people.47 Never-
theless, perhaps the clearest formulation of this conundrum can be found in 
Abbé Sieyès’s writings for the French Revolution in 1789,48 which is well 
encapsulated by Hannah Arendt as follows: “Those who get together to 
constitute a new government are themselves unconstitutional, that is, they have 
no authority to do what they set out to achieve.”49 In other words, the consti-
tution that is instituted by a constitutive assembly also creates, on the moment 
of its being signed or becoming effective, its own subjects, and therefore, its 
own authority, i.e. as if retrospectively. If so, the question poses itself how can a 
voluntarily obeyed legitimate legal order emerge under these circumstances? In 
this thesis, I take this paradox as a starting point in questioning of the concept of 
legitimacy, and by tracing different solutions to it, I hope to arrive at the 
formulation of the post-structuralist “concept” of legitimacy.50 In the next 
section, before I outline the structure of the thesis, the approach of this enquiry 
into the paradox of legitimacy is further explicated. The structure of the thesis is 
in this case directly dependent upon its “methodology,” and therefore, for a 
better appreciation of the composition of the text, the methodology part is 
introduced first.  
 
 
1.3 Methodological Considerations:  
the Paradigm and Theoretical Assumptions 
1.3.1 From Structuralism to Post-Structuralism 
In engaging with the idea of legitimacy as delineated above, this thesis proceeds 
from the post-structuralist paradigm of thought. The term “post-structuralist 
paradigm” is used here in a rather loose sense, because post-structuralism does 
not constitute a unified theory, and theorists who are considered to be working 
                                                                          
47  See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and The First and Second Discourses, 
ed. Susan Dunn (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002). 
48  See Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, Political writings: Including the Debate between Sieyès 
and Tom Paine in 1791, ed. M. Sonenscher (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Pub-
lishing Company, 2003). 
49  Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (London: Penguins Books, 1990), pp. 183–4. See also 
Emmanuel Sieyès, Qu’est-ce que le Tiers état? Édition critique avec une introduction et des 
notes par Roberto Zapperi (Genève: Libraire Droz, 1970), p. 184: “ce ne seroit pas à ce 
corps constitué à prononcer sur un différend qui touche à sa constitution. Il y auroit à cela 
une pétition de principes, un cercle vicieux.” 
50  It is worth pointing out that posing the question in such a way means that the argument is 
developed in the context of democracies in the post-metaphysical situation (whatever are the 
implications of the outcome of the argument). This allows the imbrication of legitimacy and 
founding (which are conceptually, nevertheless, kept separated by the fact that not all 
polities are democracies in a post-metaphysical context). 
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in this tradition remain remarkably different in their theoretical positions.51 
However, it is possible to elicit some basic ideas that could function as a 
common core of the post-structuralist movement. In this introductory chapter, I 
will outline the basic features of the post-structuralist concept of language, 
focusing on the relationship between language and reality. In a sense, this 
relationship is well captured by Derrida’s often misinterpreted catchphrase 
“there is nothing outside of the text [there is no outside-text; il n’y a pas de 
hors-texte],”52 which is also echoed in Laclau’s and Mouffe’s similar statement: 
“Our analysis rejects the distinction between discursive and non-discursive 
practices … every object is constituted as an object of discourse.”53 But in order 
to unravel these statements, and with that the post-structuralist concept of 
language, it is necessary to make a detour over structuralism, because post-
structuralism remains, as already the name indicates, intimately connected to 
structuralism, sharing with it many of its most basic assumptions. According to 
John Sturrock: “Post-structuralism is not ‘post’ in the sense of having killed 
Structuralism off, it is ‘post’ only in the sense of coming after and of seeking to 
extend Structuralism in its rightful direction.”54  
The ground for what later becomes known as “structuralism” is laid with the 
founding of the so-called “structural linguistics”55 by Ferdinand de Saussure 
(1857–1913).56 Saussure established that the object of study in linguistics is the 
linguistic sign, which is “not a link between a thing and a name, but between a 
concept and a sound pattern,” i.e. between the signifier (a material or sensory 
sound-image) and the signified (an ideal concept).57 This was a revolutionary 
idea that starts to subvert the humanist or essentialist concept of language, 
according to which language was principally representational, i.e. a transparent 
                                                                          
51  For example, Jonathan Culler, commenting on differences within the post-structuralist 
camp, concludes: “Structuralists generally resemble post-structuralists more closely than 
many post-structuralists resemble one another.” Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction: Theory 
and Criticism after Structuralism (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1982), p. 30. 
52  Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 158. 
53  Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics (London & New York: Verso, 2001), p. 107. 
54  John Sturrock, Structuralism, 2nd ed. (Malden (MA), Oxford, Melbourne, Berlin: Black-
well, 2003), pp. 122–3. 
55  The term “structural” in linguistics was taken into use not before the First Congress of 
Slavic Philologists has taken place in 1929, which became the inauguration event of 
Linguistic Circle of Prague. Saussure used the term “system” of signs, rather than that of 
“structure.” See, Émile Benveniste, “‘Structure’ in linguistics,” in his Problems in General 
Linguistics (Coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami Press, 1971), pp. 79–83; originally 
published in R. Bastide (ed.), Sens et usages du terme “structure” dans les sciences 
humaines et sociales (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1962), pp. 31–39. 
56  Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics (London: Duckworth, 1983). The 
original publication: 1916. 
57  Ibid., p. 66. 
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means to describe the “outer” world and our perceptions of it.58 The revolution 
Saussure initiated is based on two basic principles. First, the linguistic sign is 
arbitrary, meaning that the relationship between the signifier and the signified is 
not natural. For example, there is nothing in the sound-image “sister” that 
naturally binds it to the concept of sister. The second principle states that the 
signifier has a linear nature, which means that all elements in language appear 
in time, and therefore, they succeed one another, forming a chain.59 These two 
principles together account for the differential nature of language, which pur-
ports that the meaning of a term emerges in its difference from other terms; for 
example, the meaning of the term “mother” is determined by concepts like 
“father,” “child,” “uncle,” etc. The fact that this system of differences is said to 
apply to all language causes further radical consequences: 
 
In the language itself, there are only differences. Even more important than that 
is the fact that, although in general a difference presupposes positive terms 
between which the difference holds, in a language there are only differences, and 
no positive terms. Whether we take the signification or the signal, the language 
includes neither ideas nor sounds existing prior to the linguistic system, but only 
conceptual and phonetic differences arising out of that system.60 
 
On the basis of these ideas, Saussure is able to argue that “in itself, thought is 
like a swirling cloud, where no shape is intrinsically determinate. No ideas are 
established in advance, and nothing is distinct, before the introduction of 
linguistic structure.”61 Saussure summarises his findings into a simple but revo-
lutionary formula: “the language is a form and not a substance;” i.e. it consists 
of differences.62  
In principle, the movement that became later known as “structuralism” owes 
its birth to the ideas put forward by Saussure. Jonathan Culler observes:  
 
Indeed, what is now called “structuralism” arose when anthropologists, literary 
critics, and others saw that the example of linguistics could help to justify what 
they sought to do in their own disciplines; and as they began to take linguistics as 
                                                                          
58  See also, David Howarth, Discourse (Buckingham & Philadelphia: Open University 
press, 2000), pp. 16–34; Mary Klages, Literary Theory: A Guide for the Perplexed (London 
& New York: Continuum, 2006), pp. 47–52. 
59  See, Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, pp. 65–7. 
60  Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, p. 118. (Here and throughout the thesis italics 
used in quotes is original, if not stated otherwise.) 
61  Ibid., p. 110; “Prise en elle-même, la pensée est comme une nébuleuse où rien n’est 
nécessairement délimité. Il n’y a pas d’idées préétablies, et rien n’est distinct avant 
l’apparition de la langue.” Ferdinand de Saussure, Cours de linguistique générale, édition 
critique préparée par Tullio de Mauro (Paris: Payot, 1973), p. 155. 
62  Ibid., p. 120 / p. 169: “la langue est une forme et non une substance.” 
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a model they realised that they were in fact developing the semiology which 
Saussure had so long ago proposed.63 
 
The appropriation of the ideas of structural linguistics in social sciences can be 
traced back to the first publication of Claude Lévi-Strauss Les Structures 
élémentaires de la parenté (The Elementary Structures of Kinship) in 1949, and 
to his major work Anthropologie structurale (Structural Anthropology) in 1958, 
in which he compared the structural linguist with the anthropologist on grounds 
that “like phonemes, kinship terms are elements of meaning; like phonemes, 
they acquire meaning only if they are integrated into systems,” and declared that 
“structural linguistics will certainly play the same renovating role with respect 
to the social sciences that nuclear physics, for example, has played for the 
physical sciences.”64 In psychoanalysis, the influence of structuralist ideas 
amounted to a new strand of psychoanalysis, which sought to rehabilitate “in-
terest in the functions of speech and in the field of language.” It was Jacques 
Lacan, who made this call in his paper “The Function and Field of Speech and 
Language in Psychoanalysis” to the Rome Congress (Congrès des Psy-
chanalystes de langue français) in 1953.65 Four years later, in 1957, he 
formulated his famous slogan “unconscious is structured like a language” in 
“The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious or Reason since Freud.”66 
Post-structuralism fully subscribes to the idea of language as a pure form 
without positive terms. However, it should be clarified, that if there was a 
revolutionary potential assigned to Saussure’s theory of the linguistic sign, it 
was done in relation to “the fundamental nature which he attributed to it,” rather 
than how Saussure actually defined it.67 This is because Saussure’s definition of 
the sign suffered from several inconsistencies that undermined his theory’s 
radical novelty and logical conclusion. Therefore, post-structuralism’s attitude 
towards Saussure’s theory remains ambivalent; on the one hand, it partially 
agrees with and draws from this theory, on the other hand, it criticises Saussure 
and diverges from his theory.68 For example, Sturrock’s definition of post-
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structuralism reflects well this uneasy relation: “Post-structuralism is a critique 
of Structuralism conducted from within: that is, it turns certain Structuralism’s 
arguments against itself and points to certain fundamental inconsistencies in 
their method which Structuralists have ignored.”69 In the following, four 
criticisms of Saussure’s theory of the sign will be briefly discussed to outline 
the basic tenets of the post-structuralist concept of language. The first three 
criticisms, which focus on formality of language, the subject behind language, 
and the potential scope of structuralist analysis, albeit taken over by post-
structuralism, can be considered as belonging to the internal development of 
structuralism itself; the final criticism concerning the stability and completeness 
of any structure marks the turn from structuralism to post-structuralism. 
The first critique, and perhaps the most principal one, follows from the 
acknowledgement by structuralists themselves of the fact that Saussure’s 
conceptualisation of the sign is not able to sustain the formal character of 
language. Émile Benveniste was the first to point out that the usage of (and the 
idea behind) the term “arbitrary” by Saussure does not in fact exclude a 
“natural” relationship between the signified and the signifier via a third term, 
via reality itself.70 Saussure explains the interdependence between the arbitrary 
nature of the sign and the differential nature of language as follows:  
 
No particular configuration of sounds is more aptly suited to express a given 
message than any other such configuration. So it is clearly the case – indeed, it 
must be the case – that no linguistic item can ever be based, ultimately, upon 
anything other than its non-coincidence with the rest. Here the terms arbitrary 
and differential are two correlative properties.71  
 
In other words, as there is no natural relationship between the signified and the 
signifier, the meaning is created by differences between signs. But the problem 
is that Saussure inadvertently establishes the arbitrariness between the signified 
and the signifier in relation to a “steady” ground, which is the reality itself. 
When Saussure exemplifies the arbitrariness in language by referring to the fact 
that the “ox” is signified differently in different languages,72 Benveniste points 
out that it is the ox as a real thing that is signified here. This means that the 
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logy, p. 44. 
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differential or relative character of language cannot follow from arbitrariness, 
because it does not rule out “an externally imposed element” as Saussure 
supposes.73 On the contrary, the relational character of language follows from 
the necessary relationship between the signified and the signifier; in the words 
of Benveniste: “The concept (the ‘signified’) bœuf is perforce identical in my 
consciousness with the sound sequence (the ‘signifier’) böf. … The mind does 
not contain empty forms, concepts without names.”74 In other words, it is 
precisely the necessary coincidence of the signifier and the signified that 
justifies leaving out “the conformity of the sign to reality.”75 Then, however, if 
to follow Saussure’s characterisation of the nature of the sign as a purely formal 
entity, the differentiation between the signified and the signifier becomes 
impossible to maintain. The problem is later solved by Louis Hjelmslev and the 
Copenhagen linguistic school, who split the word into smaller units 
(glossemes), in which case the common reference point of the signified and the 
signifier is eliminated.76 
Saussure’s incomplete separation of the signified and the signifier also leads 
to positing the human mind or the subject as pre-existing in relation to 
language. Although Saussure introduces the distinction between language and 
speech, or la langue and parole, with the purpose to separate what is essential 
and formal from what is accidental and contingent in language, which allows 
him to determine the specific object of linguistic research, he is unable to 
maintain this distinction. Saussure states: “Language is not a function of the 
speaker; it is a product that is passively assimilated by the individual… Speak-
ing, on the contrary, is an individual act. It is wilful and intellectual.”77 But 
already in this quote, there is “an individual,” that is a subject with con-
sciousness and intentions existing prior to language, having a task to link 
together the signified and the signifier, and ultimately the sign and the reality. 
Later, when the difficulties of Saussure in developing a formal concept of 
language were overcome, the subject also lost its camouflaged presence in the 
structuralist analysis, which was most famously pronounced by Roland Barthes 
in his essay “The death of the author” (1967).78 
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75  Ibid., p. 47. 
76  See also Ernesto Laclau, “Identity and hegemony: the role of universality in the 
constitution of political logics,” in J. Butler, E. Laclau, S. Žižek (eds.), Contingency, 
Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left (London: Verso, 2000), p. 69. 
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English translation in Image, Music, Text (London: Fontana, 1977). “The death of the 
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The third criticism is directed at Saussure’s inability to extend linguistic 
analysis to discourse. Saussure classifies linguistic units longer than sentences 
under the term “speech,” which means that any combination of sentences 
depends solely on the will and wishes of individual speakers, and therefore 
discourse could not be analysed by recourse to a regular system. Saussure 
explains: “But we must realise that in the syntagm there is no clear-cut 
boundary between the language fact, which is a sign of collective usage, and the 
fact that belongs to speaking and depends on individual freedom.”79 This 
certainly became a major obstacle in developing a science of semiology that he 
hoped would follow his theory.80 
Lastly, for Saussure, language (la langue) is always assumed by a linguist as 
a complete or closed structure, where meanings of signs are already determined. 
This is related to his distinction between synchronic (functional whole) and 
diachronic (historical evolution) dimensions of language, whereby la langue 
belongs into the synchronic and la parole into the diachronic dimension. This 
also means that Saussure is not able to analyse language in the process of 
production, but only as a finished product.81 But even more importantly, it 
might be argued, that the system or structure acquires a function of a trans-
cendental ground, which underlies the inconstant surface, i.e. the fully 
constituted system takes priority over the differential system that Saussure 
wishes to propose. Objections to this sort of essentialism became cornerstones 
of post-structuralist paradigm. 
The first major attack on the idea of the complete and self-sufficient 
structure is launched by Derrida in the lecture “Structure, Sign and Play in the 
Discourse of the Human Sciences” at John Hopkins University in 1966. 
According to Derrida, every structure is organised around a centre, which 
arrests the freeplay of structure’s elements. The closed structure of language (la 
langue) in structural linguistics depends on the absolute presence of the sign, 
i.e. on the unity of the signifier and the signified. This relationship between the 
signifier and the signified is what Derrida seeks to dismantle. He identifies two 
ways in which one can do that: 
 
There are two heterogeneous ways of erasing the difference between the signifier 
and the signified: one, the classic way, consists in reducing or deriving the 
signifier, that is to say, ultimately in submitting the sign to thought; the other, the 
one we are using there against the first one, consists in putting into question the 
system in which the preceding reduction functioned: first and foremost, the 
opposition between the sensible and the intelligible.82 
 
                                                                          
79  Ibid., p. 123. 
80  See ibid., pp. 15–17. 
81  See also Howarth, Discourse, p. 30. 
82  Jacques Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” in 
his Writing and Difference (New York and London: Routledge, 2005), p. 355. 
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Without going deeper into the deconstructive strategy itself, which is dealt with 
in the next section, the solution Derrida and post-structuralism in general offers, 
is treating the signified as another signifier: “the signified … is always already 
in the position of the signifier.”83 The similar move is performed, for example, 
by Lacan: “it is in the substitution of signifier for signifier that an effect of 
signification is produced.”84 In other words, the meaning appears now in the 
interplay between signifiers themselves, not in the union of the signifier and the 
signified. It is important to notice, that the signified, however, cannot be 
entirely effaced, because without the signified, the signifier would not exist as 
well, or as Derrida puts it: “This does not, by simple inversion, mean that the 
signifier is fundamental or primary. … The signifier will never by rights pre-
cede the signified, in which case it would no longer be a signifier and the 
‘signifying’ signifier would no longer have a possible signified.”85 Hence, the 
critique of the presence of the sign must retain the signifier-signified distinction, 
but nevertheless be able to destabilise it. Lacan achieves this by moving the 
signified into the realm of the Real, which is the field of the non-symbolisable 
and therefore ungraspable for the consciousness; in the case of Derrida, the 
arrival of the signified is indefinitely deferred (by the movement of différance). 
Said differently, the notion Derrida sets in opposition to the presence and the 
stability of the sign is that of the “play,” the play of signifiers, which seeks to 
“destroy the entire conceptuality organised around the concept of the sign 
(signifier and signified, expression and content, and so on).”86 According to 
Derrida, structuralism did not measure up to the idea of differentiality, which it 
invented, and it could not entirely give up the idea of the transcendental 
signified: 
 
Turned towards the lost or impossible presence of the absent origin, this 
structuralist thematic of broken immediacy is therefore the saddened, negative, 
nostalgic, guilty, Rousseauistic side of the thinking of play whose other side 
would be the Nietzschean affirmation, that is the joyous affirmation of the play 
of the world and of the innocence of becoming, the affirmation of a world of 
signs without fault, without truth, and without origin which is offered to an 
active interpretation.87  
 
In sum, post-structuralism builds on criticisms of structuralism, and, in trying to 
find solutions to them, it takes structuralism to its radical conclusion, and finally 
surpasses it. In its most general sense, post-structuralism (together with struc-
turalism) argues that meaning in language is not established by the correspon-
dence between a word or a name and a “real” object in the world, rather it is 
                                                                          
83  Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 73. 
84  Lacan, Écrits, p. 164. 
85  Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 324, fn. 9. 
86  Ibid. 
87  Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play,” p. 369. 
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created inside language itself; “reality” is produced by/in language, not the other 
way around. This means that, since thinking can occur only in language, our 
understanding must also be mediated and structured by language. As opposed to 
structuralism, post-structuralism dismantles the idea of language’s static 
coherence.  
The perspective that language is constitutive of “reality” requires at least one 
further clarification. The structuralist and post-structuralist views on language 
do not deny the existence of the reality external to language, which would 
reduce these perspectives to some sort of idealism. A widely quoted explanation 
of this from Laclau’s and Mouffe’s book Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 
deserves to be repeated here: 
 
The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to 
do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the realism/idealism 
opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly 
exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But 
whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of “natural 
phenomena” or “expressions of the wrath of God” depends upon the structuring 
of a discursive field. What is denied is not that such objects exist externally to 
thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as 
objects outside any discursive conditions of emergence.88 
 
In other words, if there are objects and facts out there, they appear to human 
beings in interpretation, i.e. always already being interpreted one or another 
way. 
 
1.3.2 Deconstruction 
The word “considerations” in the title of this chapter was intended to signal a 
certain indecision about talking about methodology. The thesis, indeed, follows 
a deconstructive “strategy,” but deconstruction, as Derrida explicitly states, “is 
not a method and cannot be transformed into one,” for it precludes an autono-
mous subject as well as the essence of the object, which would be presupposed 
by any traditional methodology.89 In addition, “deconstruction is neither an 
analysis nor a critique,” because it does not attempt to dissolve a structure into 
simpler “original” elements.90  
These “features” of deconstruction follow from the very nature of what de-
construction aims to achieve or to account for, i.e. to show, as is one way to put 
it, that no concept that in the traditional philosophical discourse is determined in 
opposition to another completely exterior concept can avoid including the 
other’s trace in itself. In other words, deconstruction tries to think the openness 
                                                                          
88  Laclau & Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, p. 108. 
89  Derrida, “Letter to a Japanese Friend,” p. 3. 
90  Ibid. 
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to the other (concept, for example, but also in general). This means that it has to 
account for oppositions without annulment their confrontation. However, in that 
case, as Gasché puts it, if deconstruction “is not a practice in search of an 
essence, ground, or unity beyond all singular and opposite terms,”91 then: 
 
[its way of synthesising] must not be of the nature of the opposites for which it 
accounts; otherwise it would belong to the order of what it comes to explain. 
With regard to the traditional and canonical oppositions of presence and absence, 
of being and nothingness, … [it] must not be described in terms of these bipolar 
oppositions, or of other oppositions derivative of them.92 
 
This is the reason why there cannot be given a straight answer to the question 
“what is deconstruction,” as also Derrida warns, “all sentences of the type ‘de-
construction is X’ or ‘deconstruction is not X’ a priori miss the point, which is 
to say that they are at least false.”93 
Nevertheless, even if “no path leads around in a circle toward a first step, nor 
proceeds from the simple to the complex, nor leads from a beginning to an end,” 
what is left for deconstruction is not just a sort of free play, but “a certain 
marching order.”94 This allows to explicate deconstruction as a specific strategy 
of reading, which aims at textual aporias and contradictions produced by the 
unthought dimension of otherness in the traditional philosophy. Such reading 
can be characterised by two different “logics” – that of “double bind” and 
“double gesture.” 
The “double bind” consists, on the one hand, in a very close reading of the 
text – in highest faithfulness possible towards the text. On the other hand, it 
consists in an eventual betrayal of the text, which occurs, paradoxically, because 
of the very faithfulness to the text. The “double gesture” explains how this 
betrayal comes about; in its close reading of the text, the deconstructive reading 
aims, first, to highlight and reverse the hierarchies and oppositions found in the 
text, and second, to show how previously subordinate elements are in fact 
constitutive of the very unity of the text. By doing that, the deconstructive 
reading reveals textual aporias, certain “blind spots,” which are not governed by 
the conceptual framework of the text, but which are responsible for the 
possibility and simultaneously, impossibility of the unity of the text. Derrida 
explains this as follows: 
 
 
                                                                          
91  Rodolphe Gasché, The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 142. 
92  Ibid., p. 148. 
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By means of this double play, marked in certain decisive places by an erasure 
which allows what it obliterates to be read, violently inscribing within the text 
that which attempted to govern it from without, I try to respect as rigorously as 
possible the internal, regulated play of philosophemes or epistemes by making 
them slide – without mistreating them – to the point of their non-pertinence, their 
exhaustion, their closure.95 
 
Here, Derrida also stresses that this arriving at a “blind spot,” i.e. at the point of 
non-pertinence, exhaustion and closure, is achieved by the means of the text 
itself, by revealing its internal play: whatever it is a deconstructive reading 
wants to accomplish, it does it with what is already taking place in the text. 
This takes us to another important moment of deconstructive reading: its aim 
is not to solve the aporia or to close the undecidability involved in it, but 
precisely the opposite, to do “justice” to the aporia by maintaining it, for it is 
insurmountable – “an aporia is a non-road.”96 In other words, deconstruction 
aims to direct us to the experience of the impossible, which is achieved by a sort 
of synthesis that does not solve the contradictions and aporias it has detected – 
these syntheses can be called, with some caution I explain below, as 
“infrastructures.” By definition of Rodolphe Gasché, who has brought the term 
into a wider usage, “infrastructures are ‘grounds’ by means of which de-
construction attempts to account for the ‘contradictions’,”97 or, put differently, it 
is “the formal rule that each time regulates differently the play of the 
contradictions in question.”98 
For example, one of the earliest infrastructures invented by Derrida is 
différance, which is said to describe “sameness which is not identical.”99 There 
is no such word in French as différance; it is invented by replacing “e” in the 
word “différence” with “a,” but this difference is inaudible in speech. It is the 
same and different at the same time, or to put it differently, this difference never 
arrives as an identity, but is always postponed, deferred. Equally, as its identity 
is deferred, it differs. In this sense, différance is more like a movement than a 
word; it is differentiation, differing itself; i.e. differing that produces all 
differences (remaining non-present at the same time). This movement will be 
explicated much more thoroughly on the basis of several other infrastructures in 
the course of the text. 
Infrastructures would not be able to function as they are intended, i.e. to 
account for the other as other in the same, if they could be just applied to the 
text from the outside. Therefore, Derrida further delimits deconstruction: 
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It must also be made clear that deconstruction is not even an act or an operation. 
… Deconstruction takes place, it is an event that does not await the deliberation, 
consciousness, or organization of a subject, or even of modernity. It deconstructs 
itself. It can be deconstructed.100  
 
This means that deconstruction is always already in progress; deconstruction is 
not something applied on the text, but it is to be “noticed” and accounted for as 
already happening to the text. Therefore, also, infrastructures are always bound 
to the contexts of particular texts where they are born, which is emphasised by 
Derrida in the following quote from “Letter to a Japanese friend”: 
 
For me … the word [deconstruction] has interest only within a certain context, 
where it replaces and lets itself be determined by such other words as “ecriture,” 
“trace,” “différance,” “supplement,” “hymen,” “pharmakon,” “marge,” 
“entame,” “parergon,” etc. By definition, the list can never be closed, and I have 
cited only names, which is inadequate and done only for reasons of economy. In 
fact I should have cited the sentences and the interlinking of sentences which in 
their turn determine these names in some of my texts.101  
 
In other words, “deconstruction does not exist somewhere, pure, proper, self-
identical, outside of its inscriptions in conflictual and differentiated contexts; it 
‘is’ only what it does and what is done with it, there where it takes place.”102 
This, however, poses a problem to the usage of the term “infrastructures,” for it 
means that infrastructures cannot exist as a generality – there cannot be a con-
cept of infrastructure, and Derrida clearly warns about its misuse: 
 
The word infrastructure troubles me a bit, even though I did use it myself for 
pedagogical and analogical purposes, at the time of Of Grammatology, in a very 
specific rhetorical and demonstrative context, and even though I understand what 
justifies the strategic use of it proposed by Gasché (and I talked to him about it). 
In an analysis of “literary” writing, you do of course have to take account of the 
most “general” structures (I don’t dare say “fundamental,” “originary,” 
“transcendental,” “ontological,” or “infra-structural,” and I think it has to be 
avoided) of textuality in general.103 
 
This thesis, nevertheless, follows Gasché’s usage of the term infrastructure, 
being at the same time well aware of its strategic purposes; in Gasché’s words: 
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“Infrastructures are only ‘general and formal predicative structures’ that 
represent the ‘common root’ for all predicates characterising opposing terms. 
This explains why infrastructures cannot be concepts, but rather have the status 
of ‘philosophical quasi-concepts’.”104  
Despite that infrastructures are always already at work in the text and they 
are not generalizable grounds, which means that they cannot be applied to the 
text as a method, yet, as much as deconstruction does not produce its effects 
internally, but it has to be incised, or inscribed, as Gasché puts it, deconstruction 
is not just a “non-method.”105 Lasse Thomassen has aptly summarised the 
possibility of deconstruction as a method:  
 
We should think of deconstruction in terms of rearticulation. It is not a set of 
procedures or techniques to be applied, as if it were a given method applied to an 
object from the outside. Rather, we are dealing with a relation of rearticulation, 
where deconstruction as a method is not given prior to its particular uses. … on 
one hand, deconstruction cannot be applied because it is not given as a method 
prior to its applications; on the other hand, deconstruction can only be applied 
because it only exists through its particular applications, and does not exist 
independently of these.106 
 
This means that if deconstruction is followed in this thesis as an approach, then 
it has to repeat or reinvent deconstruction in its course; the “method” of this 
research is not separable from its aim. Therefore, this thesis follows de-
constructive “strategy” in the double sense of the term: it follows deconstruction 
in its analysis of legitimacy, but it also follows deconstruction itself in order to 
give account for its own movement, its conditions of possibility. In this sense, 
the aspects of deconstruction that have been brought up here in a preliminary 
fashion to explain the approach and the paradigm of this thesis, will be duly 
unfolded, explicated and engaged with in the course of the whole thesis. 
 
 
1.4 The Structure of the Thesis 
As much as the deconstructive approach employed in this enquiry directly 
affects the way how it is structured, I outline (perhaps unconventionally) the 
structure of the thesis here after the methodology section. There are two 
different “logics” that determine the trajectory of the thesis. Firstly, the thesis 
evolves through the analysis and comparison of certain exemplary accounts of 
the paradox of founding in the non-foundationalist perspective. But secondly, 
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due to the research question and the approach chosen, this linear structure of the 
thesis, which moves forward from paragraph to paragraph upon the completion 
and closure of a task at hand, is complicated by another, non-linear structure – a 
repetition. Next, I unfold these considerations more closely. 
As it was noted above, this thesis, in aiming at deconstructed “concept” of 
legitimacy, takes its lead from the paradox generated by the traditional under-
standing of legitimacy. Namely, the thesis proceeds by the analysis of the 
paradox of the “vicious circle” embedded in the founding act of any (re-
publican) constitution or state. The question how to establish a fundamental law 
or “law of the land” without recourse to an extramundane source, to use 
Arendt’s phrase, from which all other laws gather their authority and which can 
rely upon voluntary obedience of those who are under it, is the problem of 
legitimacy per se, at least as modernity has learned to know it.107 The following 
discussion of this paradox of the founding act concentrates on what has become 
an exemplary and paradigmatic case of such act in the current academic 
literature, namely on the Declaration of Independence of America (hereafter the 
Declaration). From the point of view of political theory, the Declaration largely 
owes such exemplary status to two original contemporary commentaries on it 
with their own ways to deal with the “vicious circle,” and which have evoked, 
in turn, a lot of response from other theorists. These two commentaries belong 
to the already above cited, Hannah Arendt in On Revolution and to Jacques 
Derrida in “Declarations of Independence.”108 
There is a rather substantial secondary literature on both authors’ analyses of 
the Declaration in association with some other authors or taken separately, most 
relevant of which find their way into the current thesis as well.109 But in 
addition, the reading of these two authors – Arendt and Derrida – together, in 
comparison (or in opposition), as I also intend to do, has its history in the 
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academic literature. Such comparison can be traced back to Bonnie Honig’s 
seminal article “Declarations of Independence: Arendt and Derrida on the 
Problem of Founding a Republic” published in 1991.110 Another reading on the 
same subject comes five years later in 1996 from David Ingram: “Novus Ordo 
Seclorum: The Trial of (Post)Modernity or the Tale of Two Revolutions.”111 
From these two texts, I clearly remain more indebted to Honig’s post-struc-
turally inclined reading than Ingram’s hermeneutical interpretation. Above all, I 
accept the analytical “space” of constatives and performatives in which Honig’s 
interpretation moves. Honig takes these concepts from the text of Derrida and 
then applies these to Arendt’s text, creating thereby a certain common ground of 
comparison. However, Derrida’s reference to these concepts passingly in the 
text of 1976 on the Declaration draws on a closer and earlier analysis of them in 
the conference paper on John L. Austin’s speech act theory, later published as 
the article “Signature Event Context.”112 As the theory of performatives and 
constatives to certain extent pertains to the argument of the thesis, I return to it 
for a fuller exposition later in the second chapter.  
Now, it is through the analysis of these two accounts of the paradox 
embedded in the republican founding act that I hope to reveal a different, so far 
still hidden role of legitimacy (if there is such a thing) in the act of founding and 
in the sphere of the political in general. The analysis of these accounts proceeds 
by close reading of relevant texts, some of which were mentioned above, and it 
grows into engagement with philosophies of mentioned authors, i.e. above all 
with Arendt and Derrida, but also with some auxiliary authors like John Austin, 
Bonnie Honig, and Walter Benjamin. However, these authors in themselves are 
not the subject matter of the thesis. Even if the thesis re-interprets some of the 
aspects of their philosophies, it is not the aim of the thesis to deal with their 
philosophical systems as a whole. The thesis concentrates on specific texts 
chosen in view of the research question, which is about arriving at the post-
structuralist “concept” of legitimacy, and it engages with these authors’ theories 
only with this purpose in mind. In other words, I compare their specific inter-
pretations and play them against each other to displace the ground of thinking 
on legitimacy. 
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This analysis and comparison constitutes the linear and manifest structure of 
the thesis with its division into chapters that will be outlined in the end of this 
section. However, as said above, the deconstructive approach complicates this 
linear structure; it is not simply an analysis or a critique, which is applied to 
these texts. Rather, what the deconstructive approach aims at is to reveal 
something that is latently already operating in these texts, which can be 
glimpsed only by a certain displacement of their inner structure. The displace-
ment, however, cannot be introduced from the outside of the text, but is 
achieved by following the inner logics of the texts in discussion, as Derrida puts 
it, by following “the internal, regulated play of philosophemes or epistemes by 
making them slide – without mistreating them – to the point of their non-
pertinence, their exhaustion, their closure.”113 
This complication poses a problem for the structure of the analysis. On the 
one hand, the analysis and comparison cannot be applied after some full 
exposition of the accounts of Arendt and Derrida, but has to take place concur-
rently with the evolvement of their interpretations, for if legitimacy is to be 
approached prior to the question “what is?,” then only in this way it is possible 
to postpone or suspend the arrival of their (full) argument, which allows us to 
see alternative routes of thinking inside their texts. On the other hand, as much 
as the analysis needs to trace movements inside their texts, it can take place 
only after some full exposition of their theories, which gives a sense of the 
whole in which these movements take place. In order to overcome the difficulty, 
the thesis is structured, in addition to the linear structure, by another principle of 
structuration – by a ternary repetition. Each of the three repetitions in some 
sense presents the whole argument of the discussed authors on a “solution” of 
the paradox, but nevertheless, without aspiring to offer a complete account, and 
in this sense as if postponing the beginning or the arrival of the argument. 
The first repetition is the “repetition of the same,” i.e. the most faithful 
following possible, with a slightest possible interpretation by me, of the course 
of the arguments in the discussed accounts of the paradox of the “vicious 
circle.” It is separable from the second repetition only analytically, and it serves 
to give to the reader a preliminary understanding of the problem. In itself, it 
would be impossible, for there is no text without an interpretation. In order to 
make this repetition more admissible, I have followed the texts very closely, and 
where possible, have let authors to speak themselves by quoting them directly. 
The second repetition is the “repetition of the same with a difference.” It 
consists in setting the arguments of these accounts into an interpretative 
framework of somebody who has already analysed them. In engaging with such 
interpretations, I arrive at another level of understanding of the accounts 
repeated in the first repetition, and here, comparisons of different accounts 
become possible. 
                                                                          
113  Derrida, Positions, p. 5. 
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The third repetition repeats to displace the discussed accounts in the first and 
the second repetition, so that an alternative route of thinking is revealed, which 
replaces the previous repetitions by its own repetition, which, in some sense, 
remains repeating in their stead, but also showing how “repetitions with a 
difference” become possible in the first place. 
Even if the repetitive movement in the thesis should make reading of the text 
easier for the reader, it also requires some additional patience, because the main 
line of argument arrives to its proper form and meaning only in the very end of 
the text. 
The “inner” structure of the thesis in its ternary repetition is not exactly 
traceable to particular chapters, but the linear structure certainly is, and in the 
following, I will briefly introduce the basic division of the thesis into chapters. 
As it was already stated above, this thesis proceeds by examining and 
comparing two accounts of an exemplary case of a republican founding act, 
namely Arendt’s and Derrida’s interpretations of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence of United States of America. Both Arendt and Derrida utilise in passim 
the term “legitimacy,” but not in the deconstructive sense. My plan is to play 
accounts of Arendt and Derrida against each other so that Arendt’s account 
reveals an unfinished route in Derrida’s thought on legitimacy, and Derrida’s 
deconstruction, in turn, exposes inadequacy of Arendt’s conceptualisation of 
legitimacy. The division of the thesis into two parts, in addition to chapters, 
follows this line of thought; the first part consists of a reading of Arendt against 
(but also into) Derrida, and the second is a demonstration of how deconstruction 
deals with the “vicious circle,” which is a reading of Derrida against Arendt 
(above all Arendt, but also Benjamin). However, such comparison of these 
authors passes through several stages, for it requires several auxiliary tasks to be 
completed before conclusions can be drawn, and therefore, the thesis is also 
divided into five chapters (excluding Introduction and Summary). 
The second chapter gives a preliminary outline of both authors’ accounts of 
the Declaration and the problem of the “vicious circle” in it. It also explicates 
John Austin’s theory of performatives and constatives, which forms the 
common ground of comparison between Arendt and Derrida. 
In order to use Arendt’s analysis of the Declaration to displace Derrida’s 
account on legitimacy, it cannot stand merely in opposition to the latter, but has 
to be able to intervene into it on the basis of some essential similarity that goes 
further than the established common ground of comparison. An important 
interpretation that stands on this way is Bonnie Honig’s account on these 
authors, which sets Arendt and Derrida against each other to the detriment of 
the former. The third chapter critically examines Honig’s comparison of Arendt 
and Derrida on the Declaration and points out some inconsistences in her 
reading of Arendt, which allows for the thesis to move on with another take on 
Arendt as well as to look for another concept of violence to theorise resistance 
to the founding act. The theme of resistance (and of violence) springs up in the 
analysis, since in order to think of the republican founding act that does not rely 
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on any absolute source of authority, one must be able to think resistance (or 
“augmentation,” as Arendt terms it) to the founding act as already part of the 
same founding act, for otherwise, it would turn into the same absolute begin-
ning, from which it wishes to distance itself. The concept of violence in play in 
Honig’s account is elucidated in this third chapter on the basis of Walter 
Benjamin’s analysis of violence, but it is found to be insufficient to theorise the 
resistance in the founding act. 
In the fourth chapter, I reinterpret Arendt’s theory by rendering it differently 
in terms of performatives and constatives. This reinterpretation reveals that 
Arendt addresses a more radical violence or rupture (which cannot be put in the 
service of the existing founding act), than the undecidable violence concep-
tualised in the previous chapter. Besides, such reading of Arendt’s theory, 
which is much more in line with Derrida’s, allows it to be used in situating the 
radical violence in Derrida’s account of the Declaration. This displaces 
Derrida’s analysis, so that its limits become apparent, and a possibility emerges 
to take the unfinished route of thinking to arrive at a post-structuralist “concept” 
of legitimacy. Although, the chapter 4 delineates the conditions of a 
deconstructive intervention and establishes what is called “radical violence” as a 
necessary condition to think the republican founding act, the question how to 
think the radical violence aporetically is addressed in the following chapter. The 
chapter 4 concludes the first part in which Arendt’s account was read to 
displace Derrida’s interpretation. 
The second part of the thesis places under scrutiny different ways how 
radical violence is addressed by the authors already mentioned. Thus, the fifths 
chapter examines how radical violence is accounted for by Walter Benjamin 
and Hannah Arendt. The general theme of these analyses is to read Derrida 
against Arendt (and Benjamin) to show, in turn, the limits of their accounts 
compared to the deconstructive approach. 
The sixths chapter delineates the deconstructive approach on radical 
violence, which clears the way to move beyond Arendt’s and Derrida’s treat-
ments of legitimacy. While remaining on the ground of Arendt’s thought on 
legitimacy and of Derrida’s thinking of how to account the other as other, the 
thesis proposes a “concept” of legitimacy, which functions like a Derridean 
infrastructure. In explicating the deconstructive accounting, I also engage in 
this chapter with Noah Horwitz’s and Ernesto Laclau’s mistakes of decon-
struction.  
The seventh chapter summarises the thesis by delineating the whole course 
of the argument up to its conclusion that legitimacy “is” resigning. 
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PART I 
Chapter 2: The Paradox of Founding 
At first sight, the aim of this thesis – to advance a post-structuralist “concept” of 
legitimacy – might seem to be a kind of oxymoron. The term “legitimacy” does 
not stand out as having any deconstructive or other notable role to play in post-
structuralist discourse on law and politics. Rather, the whole attention is focused 
on the difference between law and justice, and the difference is subsumed under 
the term calculability. For example, Derrida states in “Force of Law”: “Law is 
the element of calculation, and it is just that there be law, but justice is 
incalculable, it requires us to calculate with the incalculable.”114 In other words, 
justice is addressed to the singularity, which no calculable rule can comprehend. 
And in this discrimination, legitimacy appears to be left to the side of law, as 
also Jiří Přibáň has observed, “legitimacy, according to Derrida, belongs to the 
sphere of the calculable and therefore is closer to law than justice.”115 In line 
with this observation, we find in Derrida the term “legitimacy” inserted into the 
same semantically related series of terms as “law,” “legality,” “rules,” 
“prescriptions,” and others like these. For instance, in “Force of Law” Derrida 
offers an extended list of “calculables”: “the exercise of justice as law or right, 
legitimacy or legality, stabilisable and statutory, calculable, a system of regu-
lated and coded prescriptions…,” or in another place, “the deconstructibility of 
law (droit), of legality, legitimacy or legitimation.”116 Such usage, as far as I 
know, has not been contended by other authors writing in this tradition, which 
only seems to confirm that legitimacy is something to be deconstructed, rather 
than something that partakes in its advancement. 
Still, there are some doubts raised about such calculable legitimacy from the 
side of jurisprudence. For example, Jiří Přibáň expresses hesitation on such 
merging of legitimacy and legality: “legitimacy, however, does not seem to be 
of the same genre as legality. … it is tied in some way to the notion of 
justice.”117 He goes on in his article to propose an idea to understand legitimacy 
as a narrative or narratives about justice that take place between incalculable 
justice and calculable laws: 
 
Legitimacy is a realization of justice in the form of narrative which, unlike law, 
cannot be immediately backed by state force or violence and belongs to the 
sphere of opinion, narrative rules, and rhetoric skills. … The legitimacy of law 
grows from the very sphere of difference between calculable law and 
incalculable justice; it grows as an effort to bridge a seemingly infinite gap 
                                                                          
114  Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’,” Cardozo Law 
Review, Vol. 11, No. 5-6 (1989–90), p. 947. 
115  Jiří Přibáň, “Beyond Procedural Legitimation: Legality and Its ‘Infictions’,” Journal of 
Law and Society, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Sept., 1997), p. 341. 
116  Derrida, Force of Law, p. 959, 945, respectively. 
117  Přibáň, “Beyond Procedural Legitimation,” p. 341. 
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between the ethical demands of justice, articulated from the singularity of 
individual being, and the impersonal system of general legal rules and 
procedure.118 
 
Although, the idea in Přibáň’s article remains, in my mind, on the level of a 
proposal in need of further elaboration, its basic recognition that “it is not 
possible to legitimate law merely by some transformation of the incalculable 
justice into the procedures of the autopoietic legal system,” does not stand too 
far from the starting point of the thesis.119 
One thing has become clear from the above: if there is any deconstructivist 
take on legitimacy, then it presumes demonstrating an intrinsic undecidability of 
legitimacy (i.e. an aporetic nature of legitimacy) and untangling it from its 
association with the order of the calculable. 
The previous chapter has already explicated how the task will be tackled. In 
this first part of the thesis, I embark on the comparison between Arendt and 
Derrida with an aim to find a way to read Arendt’s account of the Declaration 
against and into Derrida’s interpretation. In other words, by comparing their 
accounts, counterposing their disagreements, which I will do in a fruitful 
engagement with Honig’s similar endeavour, I hope to displace the ground on 
which legitimacy is thought and find a gap which reveals a different functioning 
of legitimacy. 
In that, my approach in this part of the thesis is more similar to Ingram’s, 
who clearly reads Arendt against Derrida (but not vice versa). However, while 
he contrasts these two authors, I read Arendt much more (as if) into Derrida. In 
doing so, still, I refrain from taking Arendt as a post-structuralist avant la lettre, 
which is the verdict of Ingram on Honig’s reading, which, I think, is unjustified, 
and makes sense only from Ingram’s negative perspective on deconstructive 
arguments in this debate.120 If eventually, I am able to point out the limitation of 
Derrida’s analysis in “Declarations of Independence,” I do not deny it having its 
aim and purpose, which it might fully also achieve, but only that it cannot be 
used, at least without some bending, to theorise resistance to or intervention into 
the law (of the land) as such, as Honig claims.121 In this “gap” of the argument 
in Honig (as well as in Derrida), I would like to carve out a space for the 
undecidable legitimacy. 
However, first of all this chapter proceeds to give an introductory synopsis 
of the paradox of founding through a close reading of the commentaries of 
Arendt and Derrida on the Declaration. 
 
 
 
                                                                          
118  Ibid., p. 342. 
119  Ibid. 
120  Ingram, Novus Ordo Seclorum, p. 248. 
121  Honig, “Declarations,” p. 108. 
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2.1 Arendt on the Paradox of Founding 
The paradox of founding consists, in fact, in two paradoxes, as Arendt puts it: 
there are “two vicious circles, the one apparently inherent in human law-
making, and the other inherent in the petitio principii which attends every new 
beginning, that is, politically speaking, in the very task of foundation.”122 The 
first of them concerns “the need of all positive, man-made laws for an external 
source to bestow legality upon them and to transcend as a ‘higher law’ the 
legislative act itself.”123 In other words, the act of a group of people to 
voluntarily agree to put themselves under the law, creating thereby a new politi-
cal entity, cannot take place under the law it creates (or any other ordinary law), 
because if it were, it would not be as free and voluntary as it should be for the 
people to agree on it. This, in turn, leads to a certain regression where the 
authority to oblige submission to the law so created is derived from some 
external, more universal “higher law.”124 
The other vicious circle concerns not legality (validity, authority in Arendt’s 
usage) but power: the power of those who constitute an independent entity is 
unconstitutional, because the legitimacy of this power to achieve what it is set 
to achieve emerges only after its deed; so, it seems there can be no legitimacy to 
institute an entity.125 This discrimination between the two circles proves 
important in Arendt’s account, but not so much in Derrida’s, in which case both 
are referred to as “Sieyès’s vicious circle” in this thesis. 
According to Arendt, the act of founding a political institution becomes a 
problem only in modern times. Historically, the paradox of founding accom-
panies the emergence of revolutions on the political scene, being thus the herald 
of a whole new era. Arendt contrasts revolutions of modern times to what could 
be called “restorations” or “renovations” of pre-modern times; the latter might 
have been rebellious, but could not be deemed possible without professed 
attempts at “the recovery of ancient liberties” and/or “the reinstitution of lost 
authority and lost power.”126  
Revolutions, on the other hand, are characterised by (more or less conscious) 
creation of new laws and founding of an entirely new body politic. This new era 
became possible in the background of the process of secularisation, i.e. “the 
emancipation of secular power from the authority of the Church.”127 Arendt 
                                                                          
122  Arendt, On Revolution, p. 161. The name “vicious circle” refers here to Sieyès’s 
formulation, as cited in Introduction, fn. 49. 
123  Ibid. 
124  The infinite regress itself is technically not a paradox, for there is nothing logically 
contradictory in it, but in the context of the founding act, it still can be taken as one, for the 
states are founded and the infinite regression contradicts this possibility. 
125  David Ingram dubs the problems involved in these two vicious circles as the problems of 
“prepolitical” and “preconstitutional” legitimations, respectively. See Ingram, Novus Ordo 
Seclorum, p. 221, 223. 
126  Arendt, On Revolution, p. 155; see also, p. 37. 
127  Ibid., p. 159. 
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notes that the first result of the process of secularisation was European 
absolutism, which is defined by “the existence of an absolute sovereign whose 
will is the source of both power and law.”128 However, absolutism, although 
having departed from the sanctifying and authorising support of the Church, 
still managed to evade the founding problem:  
 
It is as though absolutism were attempting to solve this problem of authority 
without having recourse to the revolutionary means of a new foundation; it 
solved the problem, in other words, within the given frame of reference in which 
the legitimacy of rule in general, and the authority of secular law and power in 
particular, had always been justified by relating them to an absolute source 
which itself was not of this world.129  
 
But by the time of the modern revolutions,  
 
with the necessity of making new laws and of founding a new body politic, 
former “solutions” – such as the hope that custom would function as a “higher 
law” because of a “transcendental quality” ascribed to “its vast antiquity,” or the 
belief that the exalted position of the monarch as such would surround the whole 
government sphere with an aura of sanctity … stood now revealed as facile 
expedients and subterfuges.130 
 
Hence, the modern revolutions, of which Arendt compares the French Revo-
lution of 1789 and the American Revolution of 1776, had to face the paradox of 
founding in its full sense. 
In order to succeed, both revolutions, the French as well as American, had to 
find the means to overcome the “vicious circle.” But their different ways of 
resolving the paradox explains, and this is the meaning of the comparison for 
Arendt, why the French Revolution ended in bloody violence and the American 
one founded a republic. Abbé Sieyès’s theory, the guiding theory of the French 
Revolution, remained too much embedded in the absolutistic tradition it grew 
out from.131 The absolute monarch of France “was the source of both law and 
power, and it was this identical origin that made law powerful and power 
legitimate.”132 Sieyès followed this model by simply replacing the sovereignty 
of the king with the sovereignty of the nation, so that, as Arendt puts it, “both 
power and law were anchored in the nation, or rather in the will of the nation, 
which itself remained outside and above all governments and all law.”133  
                                                                          
128  Ibid. 
129  Ibid., p. 160. 
130  Ibid., p. 162. 
131  See Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, “What is the Third Estate,” in his Political writings: 
Including the Debate between Sieyès and Tom Paine in 1791, ed. M. Sonenscher 
(Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2003), pp. 94–162. 
132  Arendt, On Revolution, p. 156. 
133  Ibid., p. 163. 
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One thing that follows, for Arendt, from deriving power and law from the 
selfsame source is that it could in no circumstances lead to the founding of the 
republic, because it would only amount to the rule of men (or of majority, in 
this case), not to the rule of laws. But secondly, it also caused the demise of the 
revolution. The key here is, as Arendt puts it, that the revolution “threw the 
whole French nation into a ‘state of nature’; it dissolved automatically the 
political structure of the country as well as the bonds among its inhabitants, 
which had rested not on mutual promise but on the various privileges accorded 
to each other and estate of society.”134 For Arendt, the existence of power, 
which springs from mutual promises, was of utmost importance for the success 
of a revolution. But in the case of the French Revolution, it happened that  
 
the chaos of unrepresented and unpurified opinions, because there existed no 
medium to pass them through, crystallised into a variety of conflicting mass 
sentiments under the pressure of emergency, waiting for a “strong man” to 
mould them into an unanimous “public opinion,” which spelled death to all 
opinions.135  
 
In other words, the sovereign power that the revolution wanted to locate in the 
people was in fact simply a “natural force” (not mediated by mutual promises as 
in the American Revolution), which under conditions of the revolution became 
unleashed as a mere violence. As the law was derived from the same place as 
power, there was no one with means to check the violence, because “like the 
absolute prince, the nation, in terms of public law, could do no wrong because it 
was the new vicar of God on earth.”136 Therefore, as the French Revolution 
could not distinguish between power and violence, it eventually was swept 
away by “the natural force of the multitude.”137 
It is an entirely different story with the other side of Arendt’s comparison – 
with the American Revolution. Arendt claims that what failed in the French 
Revolution – the founding of the republic – succeeded in the American Revo-
lution. It means that in Arendt’s opinion the Founding Fathers overcame the 
paradox of the vicious circle and the lack of authority in establishing new 
political institutions. Above all, of course, the discussion of the American 
Revolution reveals Arendt’s own answer to the vicious circle. 
According to Arendt, the main difference between the French and American 
revolutions is that the “framers of the American constitutions … [did not] 
derive law and power from the same origin. The seat of power to them was the 
people, but the source of law was to become the Constitution,” which, in turn, 
made conceivable that the constitution “remained binding for the body politic to 
                                                                          
134  Ibid., p. 180. 
135  Ibid., p. 228. 
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137  See ibid., p. 181. 
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which it gave birth.”138 Several fortunate factors, as Arendt observes, were 
conducive to this development, above all, the absence of mass poverty (in 
contrast to the situation in France) and the practice of self-government, or the 
rule of “limited monarchy.”139 
An important consequence of this in the context of our exposition is that 
these factors simplified the paradox of founding for the American Revolution; 
instead of two “vicious circles,” it had to deal with only one: “the chief problem 
of the American Revolution … turned out to be the establishment and foun-
dation not of power but of authority.”140 According to Arendt, the problem of 
power did not surface in America because “the people of the colonies, prior to 
their conflict with England, were organized in self-governing bodies,” and, as 
much these bodies were based upon mutual promises and covenants, they were 
scaffoldings for power, not for “natural force” or violence.141  
Essential for an understanding of Arendt’s argument here is her differen-
tiation between a “consent” and a “promise,” which is also another way of 
casting the difference between the French and American Revolutions: “the act 
of consent, accompanied by each individual person in his isolation, stands 
indeed only ‘in the Presence of God’, the act of mutual promise is by definition 
enacted ‘in the presence of one another’.”142 Thus, the consent is intrinsically 
related to the search for the absolute, which characterised above all the French 
Revolution, but the promise has no need for such sanction, and it was the way 
of the American Revolution. As Arendt says, for “the men of American Revo-
lution … power came into being when and where people would get together and 
bind themselves through promises, covenants, and mutual pledges.”143 As a 
result of the presence of power in the people, “the revolution … did not throw 
them into a state of nature, [so] that there never was any serious questioning of 
the pouvoir constituant of those who framed the state constitutions and, 
eventually, the Constitution of the United States.”144 
Even if the “vicious circle” of power was not a problem for the American 
Revolution, the other one of authority remained to be solved; in Arendt’s words,  
 
while power, rooted in a people that had bound itself by mutual promises and 
lived in bodies constituted by compact, was enough “to go through a revolution” 
(without unleashing the boundless violence of the multitudes), it was by no 
means enough to establish a “perpetual union,” that is, to found a new 
authority.145 
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The task, which proves to be “the most troublesome of all,” was to find 
authority for the laws of the new state, and thereby also to ground the act of 
founding, without relying on any absolute that stands outside the human realm.  
It is clear that the Founding Fathers wavered here – they certainly brought 
into the Declaration references to absolutes, like “nature’s God” or “self-evident 
truths,” which is acknowledged also by Arendt.146 The situation is somewhat 
puzzling. The Founding Fathers faced the “vicious circle” and underwent all the 
troubles in finding authority, the troubles that were caused by the secularisation 
of the political scene and the departure from religious authority or from abso-
lutism, but after experiencing all the weight of the problem, they as if return to 
find reassurance from absolutes. As much as the aim was to found a republic, an 
absolute cannot be a possible ground for it in Arendt’s view, because it would 
destroy all openness of the public realm which is the defining feature of any 
republic. Arendt argues that the absolute is, 
 
a truth that needs no agreement since, because of its self-evidence, it compels 
without argumentative demonstration or political persuasion. By virtue of being 
self-evident, these truths are pre-rational – they inform reason but are not its 
product – and since their self-evidence puts them beyond disclosure and 
argument, they are in a sense no less compelling than “despotic power” and no 
less absolute than the revealed truths of religion or the axiomatic verities of 
mathematics.147  
 
Arendt’s solution here is to demonstrate that the very spirit of the deed of 
founding in the case of the American Revolution diverges from the words or the 
form it was cast. She apologetically blames the influence of traditions when she 
remarks:  
 
The curious fact that the men of the revolutions were prompted into their 
desperate search for an absolute the very moment they had been forced to act 
might well be, at least partly, influenced by the age-old thought-customs of 
Western men, according to which each completely new beginning needs an 
absolute from which it springs and by which it is “explained”.148  
 
But above all, what counters their leaning on absolutes, and what eventually 
leads to their way out from the vicious circle is, in Arendt’s mind, their 
conscious intent “to imitate the Roman example and to emulate the Roman 
spirit.”149 Arendt draws attention to the interrelation of foundation and aug-
mentation in the Roman concept of authority. In fact, as Arendt notes, the 
etymological root of auctoritas, authority, is augere, to augment and increase. 
The Romans thought that members of the Roman Senate have their authority 
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only by virtue of their being a reincarnation of the spirit of the founding fathers, 
so that by every following generation the spirit of foundation was augmented 
and increased. Arendt argues:  
 
The very concept of Roman authority suggests that the act of foundation 
inevitably develops its own stability and permanence, and authority in this 
context is nothing more or less than a kind of necessary “augmentation” by 
virtue of which all innovations and changes remain tied back to the foundation 
which, at the same time, they augment and increase.150 
 
Hence, recalling the Roman concept, augmentation can be understood as 
invoking in people a sense of being part in the founding act through the possi-
bility to amend and improve the constitution so founded. The very spirit (or 
content) that guides augmentation lies within the first act of beginning, as 
Arendt explains,  
 
what saves the act of beginning from its own arbitrariness is that it carries its 
own principle within itself, or, to be more precise, that beginning and principle, 
principium and principle, are not only related to each other, but are coeval. The 
absolute from which the beginning is to derive its own validity and which must 
save it, as it were, from its inherent arbitrariness is the principle which, together 
with it, makes its appearance in the world.151  
 
In the case of the American Revolution (as a republican revolution) this prin-
ciple is a mutual promise and common deliberation. So, in relying on her 
account of augmentation and principle, Arendt is able to conclude:  
 
The very fact that the men of the American Revolution thought of themselves as 
“founders” indicates the extent to which they must have known that it would be 
the act of foundation itself, rather than an Immortal Legislator or self-evident 
truth or any other transcendent, transmundane source, which eventually would 
became the fountain of authority in the new body politic. From this it follows 
that it is futile to search for an absolute to break the vicious circle in which all 
beginning is inevitably caught, because this “absolute” lies in the very act of 
beginning itself.152  
 
What Arendt depicts here as the answer to the “vicious circle” by the Founding 
Fathers of the American Revolution is equally her own answer how republics 
can be founded without resort to some extramundane absolute. At this point, I 
leave Arendt’s account as it is; I intended, as much as possible, to let Arendt to 
present her views herself without too much intervention. It needs to be noted 
                                                                          
150  Ibid., p. 202. See also Hannah Arendt, “What is Authority,” in Between Past and Future: 
Six Exercises in Political Thought (New York: The Viking Press, 1961), pp. 121–2. 
151  Ibid., p. 212. 
152  Ibid., p. 204. 
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that even if Arendt’s account is embedded in the analysis of historical events, 
the focus of this thesis remains Arendt’s theory, rather than history. It is 
assumed that her theory functions to certain extent independently of her 
historical interpretation (that might or might not raise counterarguments). 
 
 
2.2 Derrida and the Paradox of Founding 
Unlike Arendt, who sets two revolutions against each other, Derrida focuses in 
his short text solely on the American Revolution, and specifically on the text of 
the Declaration of Independence, the founding document of the United States 
(of course, analysing through it the founding act in general).153 Similarly to 
Arendt, he admits that the signers of the Declaration are stuck in Sieyès’s 
“vicious circle”: “The ‘we’ of the Declaration speaks ‘in the name of the 
people.’ But these people do not exist. They do not exist as an entity, the entity 
does not exist before this declaration, not as such.”154 
This very clear-cut assertion has induced several criticisms on Derrida’s 
account on the “factual” basis. Namely, it has been argued, that the American 
people, in fact, existed already before the Declaration. Probably the most 
straightforward criticism based on this claim comes from J. Claude Evans who 
refers to the political context prior to the Declaration, saying that American 
colonies, in fact, had their own legitimate political bodies so that the people had 
a say in the matters of respective colonies through their representatives.155 These 
representatives were also sent to “the Continental Congress” since 1774 and 
therefore they were involved in the act of declaring the independence. But also 
Arendt, as it has been shown above, integrates the experience of limited self-
government of American colonies into her version of the founding act. Ingram, 
on the other hand, although he at first approvingly points to this potential 
criticism, later qualifies it by indicating that there is a sense in the idea of 
“American people” that is created by the Declaration, namely “a universal right 
to self-determination.”156 I agree with Ingram in this and do not take the factual 
objection as valid in regard to Derrida’s account or to the “vicious circle” in 
general. In fact, as we see below, such an appeal to prior “freedom” of the 
American people is included in Derrida’s argument as well. Moreover, if to 
                                                                          
153  If it is considered as a founding document then in the sense as Arendt understands it: 
From the two documents, the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the 
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the law of the land, derives its own legitimacy; for the Constitution itself, in its preamble as 
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of ultimate authority.” Arendt, On Revolution, pp. 193–4; see also pp. 203–4. 
154  Derrida, Negotiations, p. 49. 
155  J. Claude Evans, “Deconstructing the Declaration: A Case Study in Pragrammatology,” 
Man and World, Vol. 23, No. 2 (1990), p. 183. 
156  Ingram, Novus Ordo Seclorum, p. 227. 
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follow Arendt in the acknowledgment of the “American people” prior to the 
Declaration, then it could not in itself, as we have seen, cancel out the paradox 
of the “vicious circle” (or at least, both of them). 
If Arendt is, perhaps, more attentive to the self-governing of “the American 
people,” then Derrida is observant of the fact that the Founding Fathers 
appealed to the absolutes. For Derrida, however, this reliance is not accidental 
as it is for Arendt, but it is necessarily so. First, in order to understand his argu-
ment, a small detour is necessary to the theory of constatives and performatives. 
 
2.2.1 The Performative/Constative Distinction 
“Performatives” and “constatives” are concepts coined by John Austin and first 
presented in a lecture series at Oxford University in 1951–54 and at Harvard 
University in 1955.157 As Austin explains, the impetus for the discrimination 
between performatives and constatives is a simple observation that “not all 
‘sentences’ are (used in making) statements.”158 There also are utterances that 
“do not ‘describe’ or ‘report’ or constate anything” but are themselves doing of 
an action.159 Austin dubs such utterances “performatives.” For example, per-
formatives can be utterances starting with phrases like “I bet,” “I promise” (i.e. 
contractual performatives) or “I declare” (i.e. declaratory performatives), such 
as when someone is promising to be at a meeting place or is declaring an event 
open. The other term of the pair – the constative – is suggested by Austin for 
utterances that describe states of affairs.  
The main substantial difference that the discrimination between these two 
kinds of utterances appears to highlight is that the performatives, unlike the 
constatives, cannot be described in terms of truth or falsity. If someone uses an 
uttering to perform an action, it can be judged successful or not, rather than true 
or false. If such uttering achieves its end, Austin calls it a “happy” or 
“felicitous” performative. However, the felicitousness of the performative is not 
the matter of fact and depends on several conditions, which Austin covers in a 
list of six points: there must exist an accepted conventional procedure, 
appropriate circumstances and persons, correct and complete execution of the 
procedure, proper intention of participators, and corresponding subsequent 
conduct by persons involved.160 These six types of what can go wrong with 
performatives form Austin’s doctrine of infelicities, which is developed in his 
second, third and fourth lectures. 
What adds an additional complexity to Austin’s account of performatives 
and constatives is that the argument expounded in twelve lectures contains its 
own revisions and, in fact, the clear cut division between performatives and 
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constatives does not persist up to the end of his investigation. So, halfway 
through the lectures, he announces a fresh start on the subject matter because he 
is not able to maintain the performative/constative distinction, and the second 
half of his lectures is mainly devoted to envisioning possible scenarios to rescue 
the distinction. The purpose of the following short outline of Austin’s scenarios 
of saving his initial argument is less to offer their thorough analysis, for his 
theory is not directly the subject matter of the thesis, but to indicate a basis for 
the later evaluation of Derrida’s critique of Austin. Besides, it also helps better 
to appreciate the complexity of the theory of performatives and constatives. 
His first attempt to rescue the distinctions he made is to find a criterion or 
criteria of grammar or of vocabulary for distinguishing the performative from 
the constative utterance,161 but after studying this possibility in some lengths, he 
concludes “it is not possible to lay down even a list of all possible criteria … 
[because] very commonly the same sentence is used on different occasions of 
utterance in both ways, performative and constative.”162  
Thereafter, he tries to compile a list of performative verbs on the ground of a 
further discrimination between “explicit” and “primitive” performatives. The 
explicit performative is designed to have “a verb in the first person singular 
present indicative active” form, which as Austin explains, “makes clearer the 
force of the utterance, or ‘how it is to be taken’,” as in, for example, “I promise 
that I shall be there.”163 The primitive performative, on the other hand, is 
ambivalent (inexplicit) with regard to the form, as in “I shall be there.” Austin 
proposes that if primitive performatives could be reduced to the explicit form, 
then the list of performative verbs can be created. But again, after studying it 
further, he finds that “it is often not easy to be sure that, even when it is 
apparently in explicit form, an utterance is performative or that it is not.”164  
Lastly, Austin makes, as he says, a fresh start, and begins “to refine upon the 
circumstances of ‘issuing an utterance’.”165 Basically, what he means is that the 
same sentence can appear in different uses (or senses), and one of the uses 
might be at least compatible with what was named as the explicit performative. 
He abstracts three senses (or dimensions) of the speech act in general: 
locutionary sense denotes a referential and semantic aspect of language (i.e. 
“performance of an act of saying something”), illocutionary sense refers to the 
(conventional) force that utterance carries in doing or in attempting to do 
something (i.e. “performance of an act in saying something”), and per-
locutionary sense refers to the effects achieved by the utterance (“performance 
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of an act by saying something”).166 Still, even here things are not entirely clear. 
The tests he provides for recognising illocution and perlocution “are at best very 
slippery,”167 so that he seems to disregard perlocution in the end altogether and 
focus only on locution and illocution. Above all, a success of perlocution, i.e. if 
it achieves certain effects, is entirely contingent (or unintentional). In other 
words, perlocution lacks the conventionality that is one of the defining features 
of the performative. His first general conclusion is: 
 
With the constative utterance, we abstract from the illocutionary (let alone the 
perlocutionary) aspects of the speech act, and we concentrate on the 
locutionary… With the performative utterance, we attend as much as possible to 
the illocutionary force of the utterance, and abstract from the dimension of 
correspondence with facts.168 
 
However, already on the same page, he casts doubt on the conclusion, calling it 
not “so very expedient,” because in reality there are not two poles, but “rather 
an historical development.” All in all, he maintains the distinction between 
performatives and constatives under a more general speech act theory, whereby 
a particular force of an act depends on the context of issuing an utterance and on 
certain assumptions made by participators in the speech situation, which 
approximate an utterance to a pre-existing convention. 
Returning to Derrida’s text on the Declaration, we can see that he clearly 
situates his approach – what he also calls an experiment on, and a test of, 
“conceptual schemes, such as a critical problematic of ‘speech acts,’ a theory of 
‘performative writing’” – in the framework of performatives and constatives. In 
setting up his point of departure for the analysis, he states “[the declarative act 
that founds an institution] does not come back to a constative or descriptive 
discourse. It performs, it accomplishes, it does what it says it does: this at least 
would be its intentional structure.”169 In other words, founding a new political 
entity, a state, by way of revolution in the Arendtian sense, is in its “intentional 
structure” a performative. The big question of Derrida’s analysis is, whether this 
“intentional structure” can live up to its expectation or it inevitably returns to a 
description, to an absolute. Derrida’s answer to this question can be found in his 
critique of Austin’s theory in “Signature Event Context.” The following 
exposition follows the main line of the argument of Derrida by elaborating in 
the first part on what will be in the second part the very principle of reading of 
Austin’s theory. 
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2.2.2 Iterability and Derrida’s Critique of Austin’s  
Theory of Performatives and Constatives 
The text of “Signature Event Context” is not specifically devoted to Austin’s 
speech act theory, but instead, as being intended as a presentation at the 
Conference on the topic of communication, it starts with questioning the idea of 
communication as it is inherited from the history of philosophy, i.e. “as a 
vehicle, a means of transport or transitional medium of a meaning, and more-
over of a unified meaning.”170 Derrida uses Condillac’s Essay on the Origin of 
Human Knowledge to exemplify this kind of perspective on communication 
with a special emphasis on the notion of writing as a means of commu-
nication.171 According to this traditional or classical view, other means, like, 
above all, speech (but also, for example, action for Condillac), are not always 
possible when a recipient is not present, hence, writing as “a species of this 
general communication” comes to complement communication in general.172  
From that point on, Derrida focuses in this text on what is “the essential 
predicate of this specific difference” of writing – absence, non-presence. If the 
traditional or, as Derrida puts it, “ideological” concept of communication173 
admits the absence as an accident that can affect communication, then Derrida 
sees it as embedded in the very structure of communication – without the 
possibility of such absence, communication would not be possible (for in case 
of total presence, there would be nothing to communicate). In the course of the 
text, Derrida gradually detaches his argument from the context of writing and 
communication and generalises it to characterise all language and all 
experience. 
The very core of his argument centres on demonstrating the paradox of 
mutual dependence of two contradictory notions of “absence” and “repetition” 
in the act of communication. As concerns their interdependence then the 
absence of the recipient presumed in the communicative act implies the possi-
bility of repetition, because when something is written (and read), it must be 
capable of being read again, repeated, by the addressee of the writing (whose 
non-presence instigated the communication in the first place). Equally, repeti-
tion implies an absence, because absolute plenitude, where nothing is absent, 
cannot be repeatable, like in case of a self-present absolute knowledge, if it 
were possible (for there would be nothing to communicate). The other aspect of 
contradiction between these terms of “absence” and “repetition” stems from the 
fact that while repetition entails a minimal identity, or sameness, a certain 
ideality, so that a minimal recognition (of repetition) would be possible, then 
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the absence refers to the non-identity with itself, to the difference, and thus, to 
the possibility of alteration. Hence, there is a paradox, where two sides that 
deny each other, nevertheless, make each other also possible. 
In order for the absence as well as repetition to be structural features of the 
written sign, they both have to be “carried to a certain absoluteness;”174 they 
cannot be thought of as empirical accidents happening in some circumstances. 
Hence, the possibility of repetition, of readability as such, cannot be delimited 
to any concrete number of cases. Derrida emphasises that even when something 
is encoded to be readable for two persons only, the possibility of it being 
readable remains for everybody.175 In the same way, and due to the mutual 
implication of absence and repetition, the absence cannot be conceived of as “a 
continuous modification of presence,” which would be “merely a distant 
presence, one which is delayed,” but as “a rupture in presence, the ‘death’ or the 
possibility of ‘death’ of the receiver inscribed in the structure of the mark.”176 
The same logic demonstrated in relation to the receiver pertains also to the 
sender or to the producer, and consequently, to the intention of a writing, 
because the presence of a fully determined conscious intention would arrest its 
repeatability. As Derrida puts it: 
 
for writing to be a writing it must continue to “act” and to be readable even when 
what is called the author of the writing no longer answers for what he has 
written, for what he seems to have signed, be it because of a temporary absence, 
because he is dead or, more generally, because he has not employed his 
absolutely actual and present intention or attention, the plenitude of his desire to 
say what he means, in order to sustain what seems to be written “in his name.”177 
 
Making the absence of the receiver as well as intention absolute allows for 
Derrida to highlight some of the predicates of the classical concept of writing 
that has been held in abeyance and, so to say, liberate their force. First, as the 
sign is repeatable beyond any receiver, sender or intention, then it dissociates 
the written sign from the context; it can always be repeated in other contexts, 
where it attains a different meaning; or in other words, a context (as well as 
intention) cannot conclusively determine the meaning of a written sign any-
more. The meaning is, on the one hand, deferred, as no context can arrest it 
finally, and on the other hand, the meaning is always different, as it is 
ascertainable only in particular contexts. It also follows that if writing cannot 
convey a definite meaning, then it cannot be a species of communication 
anymore. Secondly, the absence inscribed into the very structure of the written 
sign means that there cannot be any original, pure, first sign that will be 
repeated afterwards, but the absence, the non-presence divides the sign at the 
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very moment it emerges, so that the first time is always already a repetition. In 
“Limited Inc a b c…,” which defends and expands the ideas of “Signature Event 
Context,” Derrida sums it up as follows:  
 
At the very moment when someone would like to say or to write, … the very 
factor that will permit the mark (be it psychic, oral, graphic) to function beyond 
this moment – namely the possibility of its being repeated another time – 
breaches, divides, expropriates the “ideal” plenitude or self-presence of intention, 
of meaning (to say) and, a fortiori, of all adequation between meaning and 
saying.178  
 
This division also becomes the internal structure of the written sign in that the 
sign only appears as being separated by a space, or by an absence (by a 
difference) from other signs. 
Now, the sign can never be present in itself; it is present, only in its being 
divided by repetition – but if this is so, then “the unity of the signifying form” 
that carries all possible meaning, experience, or communication, is constituted 
only by this movement of division by repetition and repetition in difference. 
Hereby, Derrida has effected a reversal, in which communication is turned into 
a species of writing and the classical concept of writing has been displaced and 
generalised into a “law” of iterability affecting all language and all experience. 
Iterability is a so-called “infrastructure,” or by words of Derrida, “a grapheme 
in general; which is to say … the non-present remainder of a differential mark 
cut off from its putative ‘production’ or origin,”179 that maintains the 
“movement” of repetition and alteration at the same time. So it is that iter of 
iterability combines twofold root of iter as “again” and also its (probable) 
etymological root in Sanskrit itara as “other.” 
Later in his text Derrida analyses the concept of signature in view of 
iterability, which I use here as an illustrative example of iterability in operation. 
A signature under a document is meant to identify solely the person of the 
undersigned; it must be a unique, singular, a different mark from all others. 
However, the signature can function in its “singularity” only if it is repeatable; it 
can be recognised only as belonging into the series of the “same signature.” 
This makes repeatability part of its constitution, as Derrida says, “in order to 
function, that is, in order to be legible, a signature must have a repeatable, 
iterable, imitable form.”180 Thus, the act of signing is permeated by the paradox 
whereby it must be “as if” a unique, a different event, and still the same event. 
However, a corollary of this is that there always exists a possibility that the 
                                                                          
178  Jacques Derrida, “Limited Inc a b c …,” in his Limited Inc., ed. G. Graff (Evanston, Il: 
Northwestern University Press, 1988), p. 62; originally published in Glyph, vol. 2, 1977, as a 
rejoinder to John R. Searl’s reply “Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida” in the 
same journal to “Signature Event Context.” 
179  Derrida, “Signature Event Context,” p. 20. 
180  Ibid., p. 10. 
52 
signature is repeated by someone else than its actual “owner,” because there is 
nothing that could arrest the repetition into a single, unequivocal, and 
determined context. This, in turn, writes the possibility of failure (or infelicity) 
into the structure of the signature. In other words, iterability reveals that what 
makes the signature possible is simultaneously what makes it impossible. 
Derrida further elaborates on iterability by critically engaging with Austin’s 
theory of performatives and constatives. He notes that, at first sight, it might 
seem that Austin challenges the classical idea of communication. Contrary to 
the classical concept of the constative (as a description), the performative of 
Austin’s theory is not a passage of a thought-content, but rather it itself 
produces an effect; also, it does not describe the outside of language, i.e. it does 
not have a referent; finally, it is dissociated from a true/false opposition. So, 
Derrida, on the one hand, admits a novelty of Austin’s theory. However, on the 
other hand, he points out two other main features of Austin’s theory that 
positions it on the side of the classical concept of communication, namely that 
the possibility (or the success) of the performative is eventually referred back to 
a “total context” of a speech act situation, and that the speech act is determined 
only in relation to a conscious intention of a speaker. Both these moments can 
be inferred from the six infelicity conditions of performatives listed above.181 
Derrida’s deconstructive move in relation to Austin’s theory consists in 
showing that, in order to keep these two characteristics, Austin has to exclude 
certain other “non-serious” kind of infelicities on the assumption that these do 
not pertain to the determination of the performative speech acts. There are three 
different types of such infelicities described by Austin; two of them concern 
intentionality – when something is said by accident or by mistake, or when the 
said is misunderstood; one relates to the “total context” – when “a performative 
utterance will, for example, be in a peculiar way hollow or void if said by an 
actor on the stage, or if introduced in a poem, or spoken in soliloquy.”182 Austin 
admits such exclusion and even the fact that these infelicities “infect all 
utterances,” but nevertheless he postpones developing a theory that could 
incorporate all infelicities, like he says, “I suppose some very general high-level 
doctrine might embrace both what we have called infelicities and these other 
‘unhappy’ features of the doing of actions … in a single doctrine: but we are not 
including this kind of unhappiness.”183 According to Derrida, this move by 
Austin casts his whole doctrine of infelicities as contextual; “it consists in 
recognizing that the possibility, that failure is an essential risk of the operations 
under consideration; then in a move which is almost immediately simultaneous, 
in the name of a kind of ideal regulation, it excludes that risk as accidental, 
exterior.”184 
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For Derrida, this position is untenable. Citability, i.e. the possibility of every 
sign or writing to be cited in different contexts, is another name for repeatability 
that is, as it was shown above, a constitutive feature of every sign. Thus, 
Derrida asks rhetorically:  
 
Could a performative utterance succeed if its formulation did not repeat a 
“coded” or iterable utterance, or in other words, if the formula I pronounce in 
order to open a meeting, launch a ship or a marriage were not identifiable as 
conforming with an iterable model, if it were not then identifiable in some way 
as a “citation”?185  
 
By the “logic” of iterability, infelicities, like a “non-serious” citing on the stage 
or an unintentional utterance under duress, cannot be excluded from the 
determination of the performative, which means that, paradoxically, “a success-
ful performative is necessarily an ‘impure’ performative’.”186  
It must be briefly noted that Derrida’s reading of Austin is not quite as 
unproblematic as it might seem. The debates about the “ground” of Derrida’s 
criticism, i.e. iterability, which were acute in the aftermath of publication of 
“Signature Event Context,”187 have mostly subsided for today. But there is a 
line of criticism still relevant at present that questions whether Derrida’s 
critique does justice to Austin. One such recent criticism comes from James 
Loxley,188 who, in turn, is referring back to works of Shoshana Felman189 from 
1980 and Sandy Petrey190 from 1990, among others. It can be argued that 
Derrida does not pay sufficient critical attention to the development of Austin’s 
text and its style, which has warranted Loxley to argue that “a style of 
philosophy of Austin’s, furthermore, riddled as it is with jokes, irony, puns, 
citations and allusions, could hardly be expected to assume that seriousness and 
playfulness are simply opposed to each other in such a fashion.”191 Derrida 
notices the evolving character of Austin’s text, but does not seem to consider it 
integral to Austin’s argument. But there is a possibility that all the revisions of 
the performative/constative distinction in the text, i.e. being well aware in 
making those distinctions that they do not survive up to the end, convert the 
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initial distinction as non-serious, so that what appears as an undoubtedly serious 
attempt of delineating the performative contains a certain non-seriousness in 
itself.192 This allows a considerably different reading of Austin; according to 
Felman,  
 
the fact that research itself comes to an unhappy ending (which by that very 
token it considers a non-ending, a need to start all over again) may mean that 
research, subjected to the felicity/infelicity criterion, constitutes in itself a 
performance more than a statement, that it too belongs to the order of the 
performative rather than to that of the constative.193 
 
In that case, all these revisions and later switching to general theory of speech 
acts indicate that “the Austinian analysis, if it is an act, is only the act of failing 
to grasp the constative of the performative.”194 Therefore, this inability to 
include the non-serious into the determination of the performative indicates a 
necessary failure in the structure of the performative, because the constative of 
the performative would fail the very idea of the performative, as also Felman 
maintains, “for Austin, the capacity for failure is situated not outside but inside 
the performative, both as speech act and as theoretical instrument. Infelicity, or 
failure, is not for Austin an accident of the performative, it is inherent in it, 
essential to it.”195 Such reading, of course, depends on the possibility of 
separating Austin’s performative from its alleged grounding on intention and 
context. Petrey suggests that it can be done; after all, Austin himself says that 
illocutionary act “is constituted not by intention or by fact, essentially but by 
convention”196 and, as Petrey argues, convention can be understood as “socially 
specific and historically constituted.”197  
The thesis does not enter this debate, as it does not contest Derrida’s main 
argument of iterability and his demonstration how it undermines every new 
beginning and every performative. Perhaps, it might be summed up that Austin 
did not have such concise theoretical framework for his ideas on the 
performative as Derrida, but his theory, nevertheless, expresses similar features 
that show certain affinity to Derrida’s views. Loxley refers to a later article of 
Derrida, where he seems to concede in relation to “the ‘works’ of Austin”: “One 
value of these works is to have not only resisted but marked the line of 
resistance to systematic work, to philosophy as formalising theorisation, abso-
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lute and closed, freed of its adherences to ordinary language and to so-called 
natural languages.”198 
In conclusion, be as it may with doing justice to Austin’s text, what has 
become clear from the previous discussion is that for Derrida, there cannot exist 
any pure performative, and for that matter, no performative that founds on its 
own a new state (for example). A performative inevitably returns to a descrip-
tion. 
 
2.2.3 Derrida on Declarations of Independence 
Having cleared the ground by explicating the performative/constative dis-
tinction, which is used by Derrida as the framework for the analysis of the 
Declaration, I can now proceed to preliminary outlining of Derrida’s inter-
pretation of it. Although, Derrida does not explicitly refer to iterability in the 
text of “Declarations of Independence,” it, nevertheless, informs the whole 
analysis from the very beginning, and therefore, the conclusion arrived in his 
critique of Austin that no performative can exist in its purity but it is always 
already intermingled with a constative, must find its expression also in the 
analysis of the Declaration.  
According to Derrida, the Declaration suffers a sort of “necessary unde-
cidability,” or as he puts it, “one cannot decide … whether independence is 
stated or produced by this utterance.”199 The founding, taken as the moment of 
signing the Declaration, would be a pure performative, if it were not divided 
from the beginning by a constative, according to which the Declaration does not 
create the freedom of the people, but only affirms it being a fact.200 And as 
Derrida says, “it is not a question here of an obscurity or of a difficulty of 
interpretation,” but the act of founding cannot even come into existence without 
such undecidability.  
However, pointing out this undecidability by itself does not solve the 
“vicious circle” that, as Derrida admits, permeates all acts of founding, because 
a theoretical question remains, how the people can be free before they even 
become to exist. There must be an additional step to break the “vicious circle.” 
Here, Derrida argues that a prior freedom and with that, the possibility of the 
founding act is established by a “fabulous event”: “This signer can only 
authorise him- or herself to sign once he or she has come to the end – if one can 
say this of his or her own signature in a sort of fabulous retroactivity.”201 In 
other words, the originary freedom of the people, which is stated by the 
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Declaration, is created retroactively, by a certain “future perfect” tense: as if “I 
will have given myself a name and an ‘ability’ or a ‘power,’ understood in the 
sense of power- or ability-to-sign by delegation of signature.”202  
The “fabulousness” of this event must be spelled out here. It is only by 
recourse to a fable that retroactivity can succeed, because this future perfect 
“should not be declared, mentioned, taken into account” – in order to succeed, 
i.e. to hide its delegitimizing “coup de force,” retroactivity must present itself as 
“the simulacrum of the instant,” which is achieved by a fable that covers up 
temporality of the act of retroaction.203 To use Richard Beardsworth’s expres-
sion, the fable effectuates the “disavowal of time.”204 It might be said that when 
the Founding Fathers of the American Revolution searched for a confirmation 
and bearing from absolutes, like laws of nature, or God’s will, or immemorial 
tradition, then they created fables, the role of which was to hide the operation of 
retroactivity and to invent the game “that tends to present performative 
utterances, as constative utterances.”205 So, it follows that the signature under 
the Declaration still is as if countersigned by an authority beyond the human 
realm, from which the best one, as Derrida says, the most ultimate one, is the 
name of God.206 In this sense, every founding act, every “originary beginning” 
needs (a fable of) god (or nature, the subject, language, a tradition) to sign in the 
last instance. 
Derrida’s solution might seem not much different from Rousseau’s, in that 
also Rousseau, in his letter to marquis Mirabeau cited above and in The Social 
Contract, argues that imposing laws above man requires God for their 
validity,207 but there is an important reservation. It must be noted, that the 
necessary failure in the founding act does not erase the beginning nor does the 
fable entirely replace it. The failure of the performative is a “necessary 
possibility” – it is part of the structure of the beginning which comes to exist 
only because it necessarily and simultaneously is being undone. The unde-
cidability, or, one might say, contamination, between the performative and the 
constative does not mean that these terms annihilate each other or that they are 
combined in a certain compromise; if this could be the case, the whole paradox, 
the aporia, understood as a “non-road”, a non-passage to the thought, would be 
(dis)solved.208 As it was noted in the methodology part on deconstruction, it is 
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the function of iterability (or any other “infrastructure”) to enable to account for 
the aporia without cancelling it out or sublating it into a higher unity.209  
Thus, what is so different from Rousseau, and what appears as a part of the 
solution to Sieyès’s “vicious circle” in Derrida is, paradoxically, the affirmation 
of the aporia: the force of the declaration that binds people and is constantly 
binding them to such declarations is that the question always remains open: “Is 
it that the good people have already freed themselves in fact and are only stating 
the fact of this emancipation in the Declaration? Or is it rather that they free 
themselves at the instant of and by the signature of this Declaration?”210 In this 
sense, if Derrida is forced to conclude, in this very similar manner to Austin, 
that “the question remains: How is a state made or founded, how does a state 
make or found itself?,” there is no contradiction in it – there cannot be a 
constative of the performative.211 Derrida’s take on the Declaration will be 
further explicated in several subsequent parts of this thesis. 
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Chapter 3: Comparison of Arendt and Derrida  
on Declarations: Bonnie Honig’s Case 
This thesis has so far delineated two quite different accounts on the paradox of 
founding or the “vicious circle.” In order to break with the “vicious circle,” 
Arendt sees a possibility to “ground” the founding act on itself; Derrida, on the 
other hand, informed by iterability, ultimately “grounds” it on the logic of 
retroactivity and on fables that close the temporal gap in the latter, leaving 
behind an on-going play of undecidability (which then also is “ungrounding” at 
the same time, for the closure never succeeds entirely). 
One reason for outlining these two accounts was to lay the ground for 
comparison and opposition of Arendt’s and Derrida’s approaches to the “vicious 
circle” and to the Declaration. In this thesis, I develop a position that Arendt 
questions the act of founding in a more radical manner than perhaps appears in 
the first sight, indicating a level of analysis deeper than the interplay of per-
formatives and constatives, which, as could be argued, remains the level of 
analysis for Derrida in “Declarations of Independence.” Only in some later texts 
does Derrida revise and complement his earlier take on issues of the Declaration 
in such fashion that it could allow him to finish the analysis first taken up in 
“Declarations of Independence.”212 The layer beyond (or/and between) the 
opposition between performatives and constatives to which Arendt indicates, 
will be theorised later as a “place” of undecidable legitimacy. 
As mentioned above, this thesis follows Bonnie Honig’s strategy of 
grounding the comparison on performatives and constatives. However, when 
Derrida’s argument on the Declaration utilises (or, at least, explicitly refers to) 
the concepts of the performative and the constative, Arendt’s theory does not do 
that, and therefore, casting her theory in these terms inevitably involves a 
certain degree of interpretation. In the following discussion, I will elicit my own 
understanding of Arendt’s approach, but in doing that, I constantly engage with 
Honig’s interpretation and with the way she renders Arendt’s theory in terms of 
constatives and performatives.  
 
 
3.1 Bonnie Honig: Arendt’s Search for Pure Performativity 
Honig’s position in relation to Arendt is rather univocal. She argues that what 
Arendt celebrates as a break of Sieyès’s “vicious circle” is a theory of pure 
performativity, which avoids references to constative structures. Honig’s argu-
ment takes hold from pointing out Arendt’s rejection of absolutes as possible 
grounds for authority in founding a republic. Indeed, as also referred above, 
Arendt does not see reliance on absolutes beyond the human realm, like self-
evident truths or God, either historically or theoretically viable option for 
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revolutions of the modern age.213 Theoretically, Honig argues, Arendt discards 
absolutes because of their constative character; she interprets Arendt’s 
description of absolutes as “self-evident truths” to denote their constative 
character, which, as they compel without argument, substantiates Arendt’s 
denial to ground a republican revolution on absolutes.214 Honig paraphrases 
what in her view is Arendt’s stance on constatives as follows: “Constatives are 
violent, despotic, and disempowering: they are not the product of shared public 
agreement, they demand an isolated acquiescence to a truth. They are not held 
by us, we are held by them.”215 Hence, Honig sums up, for Arendt, “the appeal 
to an absolute is illicit because of its constative character.”216  
If absolutes are discarded for being constatives, it follows as a matter of 
course that action itself becomes the only possible source of authority and 
stability. Describing Arendt’s position, Honig rewords, “we cannot live without 
standards or some stability; yet our traditional sources of stability are no longer 
viable. Consequently, we are left to the devices of politics and action.”217 In 
other words, Arendt must find a new form of authority that emanates from 
action itself, or as Honig puts it, she looks for “an alternative conception of 
authority, one that inheres not in an untenable absolute.”218 
What happens as a corollary to such an account of Arendt’s theory is that the 
concept of founding merges with the concept of action, i.e. action, in the 
Arendtian sense, accrues a meaning of founding. In other words, according to 
Honig, Arendt is saying that founding has lost its traditional or historical 
reference to a constative and is now bound to emerge from a performative. It 
also is not very difficult to find an additional leverage for her claim about 
Arendt’s understanding of the founding act as a pure performative in Arendt’s 
conception of action, for, indeed, in The Human Condition, she argues: “To act, 
in its most general sense, means to take an initiative, to begin ... to set some-
thing into motion. ... It is in the nature of beginning that something new is 
started which cannot be expected from whatever may have happened before.”219 
This conception of action can be easily related to the idea of the performative, 
allowing for Honig to conclude: “The uniquely political action, on Arendt’s 
account, is not the constative but the performative utterance, a speech act that in 
itself brings ‘something into being which did not exist before’.”220 Thus, it 
seems indeed that Honig’s insistence on Arendt’s depiction of the founding act 
as a performative is well in concordance with Arendt’s conception of action. 
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But at the same time, merging of founding and action poses a problem for 
Honig. Arendt characterises action as “boundless” and “unpredictable,”221 “in-
calculable,”222 as beginning something “unexpected,”223 all of which “is the 
price to pay for plurality and reality”224 in several places in The Human Con-
dition and elsewhere. The question is how such essentially unpredictable and 
spontaneous action can contain stability necessary for founding a political 
entity. After all, for Arendt, founding comprises in “constituting a stable 
worldly structure.”225 The problem leads Honig to Arendt’s concept of 
“promising,” which appears to offer a certain stability in/to action, securing, by 
Arendt’s words, “isolated islands of certainty in an ocean of uncertainty.”226 
However, in that case, Honig argues, “Arendt’s characterisation of action as a 
beginning with nothing to hold on to is somewhat misleading.”227 Honig sees a 
certain contradiction in Arendt’s combining of promising and action, which she 
sums up as a dilemma:  
 
The problem is that if promising is to be a source of reassurance and stability, the 
operation of the practice of promising and the meaning of particular promises 
must be relatively unproblematic. In that case action as promising cannot occur 
ex nihilo and it will not be as risky – as contingent and unpredictable – as Arendt 
says it is. On the other hand, if action is as contingent as that, promising will not 
by itself be able to provide the stability Arendt expects it to: the stability is 
coming from somewhere else, possibly from something external to action’s 
purely performative speech act.228  
 
In other words, if action is to found, it needs stabilisation of promising, which 
would contradict Arendt’s definition of action as unpredictable and spon-
taneous. But if we remain true to Arendt’s concept of action, it cannot found, at 
least without recourse to an absolute – the possibility of which was rejected 
from the outset. 
Honig does not find a proper answer to the difficulty in Arendt. The rest of 
her argument in the article hinges on a conditional, “if we take seriously 
Arendt’s claim that action is a ‘beginning’ that occurs ex nihilo,”229 which is to 
presume, under the dilemma Honig faces, that Arendt’s theory cannot be 
immune to the influence of absolutes or constatives. In this sense, Honig’s 
further argument can be read as a demonstration how Arendt’s attempts at the 
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solution of the problem of authority for a republican revolution remain intert-
wined with absolutes.  
Firstly, Honig argues that Arendt’s effort to erase the need for absolutes 
takes itself the place of an absolute. The argument relates back to Arendt’s 
intention to demonstrate the American Revolution as a genuine founding of the 
republic by a performative act, even if the text of the Declaration cannot do 
without constatives and there are two instances in the “Preamble” where an 
appeal is made to “nature’s god” and to truths that are “self-evident,” which are 
noticed also by Arendt.230 In order to maintain her position, Arendt, in Honig’s 
view, conceals the fact by trying to prove that the Founding Fathers’ appeal to 
absolutes, to constatives, is something immaterial or accidental. So, Honig 
writes: 
 
In my view, Arendt wants to celebrate the American Declaration of 
Independence as a purely performative speech act, but in order to do so she must 
disambiguate it. She dismisses its constative moments and holds up the 
Declaration as an example of a uniquely political act.231 
 
Arendt’s explanations in regard to the constative side of the Declaration by 
referring to antecedent political traditions, to the founders’ mistrust of their own 
power do not seem to convince Honig, and she argues that the reference to an 
absolute (as much as it cannot be avoided) is not lost, but replaced by Arendt’s 
own story, i.e. by “her fable of the American revolution and founding,” which 
sets up “the faith that the American founding fathers did not need gods in order 
to found a legitimate republican politics.”232  
Secondly, Honig emphasises that the concept of augmentation, which is 
Arendt’s solution to the problem of authority in a republican revolution, 
grounds for Arendt the idea of resistibility to “irresistible absolutes.”233 In the 
following, I explore Honig’s construal of Arendt’s concept of augmentation in 
more depth, as it also will be a starting point for unpacking the disagreement 
between the interpretations of the thesis and of Honig. 
 
 
3.2 A Critique: Resistibility to Irresistible Absolute 
Honig arrives at the concept of augmentation in the context of her attempt to 
reveal a possible common ground between the approaches of Derrida and 
Arendt. Their obvious difference is that while Arendt denies absolutes as a 
possible ground for authority then Derrida finds a way to embrace them. 
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Derrida, as it was shown above, combines the performative and the constative 
sides of the founding act together in a sort of undecidability.234 The constative 
side, an absolute, is needed for there to be the performative side. In the light of 
this, Honig first contrasts Arendt’s and Derrida’s approaches:  
 
Arendt resists this undecidability because she seeks in the American Declaration 
and founding a moment of perfect legitimacy. Insofar as the authority of the 
founding derives from a constative, it is rooted not in power but in violence. This 
undecidability, then, delegitimates the republic and so, for the sake of her 
moment of pure legitimacy, Arendt must do away with it. What she does not see 
is that the American Declaration and founding are paradigmatic instances of 
politics (however impure) because of this undecidability, not in spite of it.235  
 
Despite the described discrepancy between Arendt and Derrida, Honig finds a 
way to bridge it by way of pointing to their common concern with the 
possibility of resisting the force of the constative, of the absolute. Derrida, like 
Arendt, “refuses to allow the law of laws to be put, unproblematically, above 
man,” i.e. “to secure the law of laws from all (political) intervention.”236 She 
notes that while Arendt theorises resistance through the concept of augmen-
tation, then Derrida expresses a similar thought by the concept of translation: 
“Just as, on Arendt’s account, the Constitution calls out to be amended, so 
Derrida’s text calls out to be translated: it is not present yet.”237 This “trans-
lation” in Derrida does not merely reproduce the text but also maintains and 
augments it, which, in turn, is linked to the concept of survival. Thus, the 
rationale behind Derrida’s translation is the same as behind Arendt’s augmen-
tation; it “responds to the text of document that seeks to preserve and refer to 
the past moment of founding by augmenting it with another event, another 
speech act or, as in this case, by an act of translation.”238  
Still, it should be added that Honig eventually talks about an uneasy 
negotiation rather than a successful bridging of these two authors.239 The dif-
ference remaining between them is that while Arendt’s exclusion of the 
constative is a precondition of politics, then Derrida sees exactly in the inter-
vention of the constative the very moment of the emergence of politics, or as 
Honig puts it, “for Derrida, politics begins with the entry of the irresistible 
absolute; it is the impossible superimposition of constative on performative 
utterance that occasions the Derridean intervention, an intervention that is 
political.”240 In short, Arendt calls for resisting constatives or absolutes in order 
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to save the political space; for Derrida, politics consists in resisting the always 
intrusive constative. In Honig’s view, if there is any similarity between Arendt 
and Derrida, then it is because Arendt is not able to keep the absolute from 
intervening (even if it is against her will), which is, it might be said, rather 
similar to Derrida’s conclusion. 
Upon a closer analysis, however, problems surface, on the one hand, in 
relation to the association Honig creates between resistibility and augmentation 
in Arendt, and on the other hand, with regard to her usage of the concept of 
resistibility in the context of Derrida’s undecidability. 
 
3.2.1 On the Concept of “Augmentation” in Arendt 
As concerns Arendt, her concept of augmentation functions as a source of 
authority in two senses. In the first sense, the possibility of augmentation and 
amendment of the constitution authorises the founding act by making all present 
and future generations of people part of the beginning and of founding of the 
existing political entity.241 This is also pointed out by Honig: “Our practices of 
augmentation and amendment make that beginning our own – not merely our 
legacy but our own construction and performative.”242 However, in the other 
sense, augmentation means a continual founding and amendment, i.e. “republics 
do not rest on one world-building act of foundation but are manifestly com-
mitted to augmentation, to the continual preservation and amendment of their 
foundation.”243 In other words, the act of founding is unable to fix any per-
manent law of laws above man, for augmentation contains the principle of 
openness and the possibility of resistance to any such attempt. These two senses 
or dimensions can be related together by different logics. 
The first logic emphasises that augmentation is devised to replace an abso-
lute as a source of authority. Arendt searches for an alternative conception of 
authority because absolutes are irresistible and leave no room for persuasion 
and politics, i.e. they “possess a power to compel which is as irresistible as 
despotic power.”244 Hence, if absolutes are leaned upon as sources of authority, 
they become irresistible and overpowering, but the task is exactly to replace the 
source of authority by an alternative, i.e. with a possibility of augmentation 
which contains its own revisions and dynamism that does not let it to become a 
grounding idea in an absolute sense. In that case, the sense of continual 
amending and resisting of augmentation is made an internal aspect of the 
conception of authority and subjected to what could be called “the logic of 
replacement.”  
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Honig seems to be well aware of this aspect and clearly spells it out, but as 
much as such interpretation takes us back to the problematic idea of “founding 
action,” Honig seems to exclude this logic ultimately and emphasise the other 
possibility, which prioritises the sense of continuous founding and amending in 
the act of augmentation. As it was discussed above, according to Honig’s 
account on Arendt, founding becomes reduced to action, which necessitates 
supplementing action with a certain stability via some external “placeholders,” 
like absolutes.245 However, this means that absolutes are irresistible, not in the 
sense of an effect that emerges when absolutes are appealed for support of 
authority, but in the sense of their essential attribute. Absolutes are irresistible 
for their incessant intrusion and insistence, which manifests itself in every 
amendment’s innermost tendency to show itself as a totality, as an absolute. As 
being inescapable, they can be resisted, but not replaced by some “non-absolute 
alternative.” Here a different logic of irresistibility takes over “the logic of 
replacement.”  
As much as the idea of irresistibility is conceivable only vis-à-vis attempts of 
resisting it, so also Arendt’s search for authority in the performative via the 
concept of augmentation can be interpreted as one of such attempts of resisting, 
which then turns out affirming the logic of irresistibility, rather than under-
mining it. In other words, the logic of resisting or continual founding and 
amending absorbs the logic of “replacing,” and Arendt’s attempt to find 
authority in a performative act transforms into an internal aspect of that logic. 
From this also follows Honig’s conclusion that “since, on Arendt’s account, the 
practice of authority consists largely in this commitment to resistibility, the 
practice of authority turns out to be, paradoxically enough, a practice of de-
authorisation.”246 
At first glance, however, it is not entirely clear from Honig’s account how 
the continual amendment, resisting and founding is to be understood; for 
example, does it follow that Arendt propounds the idea of a permanent revo-
lution? Honig situates the discussion about the idea of augmentation in the 
context of Arendt’s critique of the American Revolution. According to Arendt, 
the most serious flaw with the American Revolution, which eventually led to 
“the failure of post-revolutionary thought to remember the revolutionary spirit 
and to understand it conceptually,”247 was the inability of the spirit of revolution 
“to find its appropriate institution”248 – “the Revolution, while it had given 
freedom to the people, had failed to provide a space where this freedom could 
be exercised”249 because it “provided a public space only for the representatives 
of the people, and not for the people themselves.”250 The one from the Founding 
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Fathers, who most clearly sensed the problem, was Thomas Jefferson, who, by 
Arendt’s words, 
  
proposed to provide in the Constitution itself “for its revision at stated periods” 
which would roughly correspond to the periods of the coming and going of 
generations. … In other words, what he wished to provide was an exact 
repetition of the whole process of action which had accompanied the course of 
the Revolution.251  
 
Honig detects here a similarity to Machiavelli’s advice to princes “to reinvigo-
rate their rule with a repetition of the violence of their founding about every 10 
years”252 the idea of which is, by Hanna Pitkin’s words Honig cites here, “to 
keep a political movement or action that the people have initiated … from 
disintegrating into riot, apathy, or privatisation.”253 The same idea about such 
need for the reinvigoration of the republican spirit can also be discerned from 
Arendt’s emphasis on “vitality of the spirit of foundation” in her interpretation 
of the Roman concept of auctoritas, which, as said, “depended upon the vitality 
of the spirit of foundation, by virtue of which it was possible to augment, to 
increase and enlarge, the foundations.”254 It can be deduced from the above that 
the continual founding and amending that Honig refers to in Arendt is a certain 
periodical reinvigoration of the spirit of the (republican) beginning and 
founding, rather than a permanent and never-ending revolution.  
In that case, however, a theoretical question appears, namely how one could 
recognise another attempt of amendment and resistance as an amendment rather 
than as a revolution, or even how one could recognise the end of the revolution 
at hand. This recognition should not mean reducing another attempt of 
amendment to the same one as before, or excluding it completely as alien, but 
maintaining the difference, so that another (beginning) could appear in the same 
(of what exists) as entirely other (beginning, for example). It is as if the term 
“recognition” plays here on a double meaning; it simultaneously refers to an 
active aspect of giving recognition or acknowledging the difference, but also to 
a passive aspect of re-cognising or identifying familiarity or sameness.255  
The matter cannot be solved simply by reducing it to the difference between 
Arendt and Machiavelli, which lies in the fact that Arendt does not search for 
reinvigoration in violence, but instead greatly admired Jefferson’s plan to create 
a system of wards that function like “‘small republics’ through which ‘every 
man in the State’ could become ‘an acting member of the Common 
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government’.”256 The problem is well illustrated by Arendt’s account of the 
French Revolution, which witnessed the emergence of self-governing municipal 
bodies and “a great number of spontaneously formed clubs and societies” in its 
start.257 However, these spaces of potential resistance, reinvigoration and pre-
serving the spirit of the revolution were crushed in the course of the revolution 
by the central government “not because they actually menaced it but because 
they were indeed, by virtue of their existence, competitors for public power.”258 
It shows that every constitutional measure to establish such space for resistance, 
for “the constitution-making and the establishing a new government”259 
presumes a possibility of recognition of the resistance as leading to an amend-
ment rather than to an overthrowing of the regime. At the same time, the 
resistance (if it is to be resistance) must remain different and in this sense as if 
non-recognisable. 
Honig’s account seems unable to offer any concrete answer in this respect. I 
will argue later that it is due to the fact that Honig entirely disregards Arendt’s 
concept of “principle,” that she understands on the same level as promising, but 
which could precisely indicate an answer to the above mentioned difficulty in 
the framework of Arendt’s theory.260  
 
3.2.2 On Derrida’s Resistibility 
In as much as Honig finds Arendt’s and Derrida’s notions of resistibility and 
augmentation comparable to each other, her account of Derrida’s resistance and 
intervention reflects similar problems as her interpretation of Arendt. Honig 
starts by stating an agreement with Derrida that “all acts of founding are (as 
Derrida claims) necessarily secured by a constative.”261 The phrase “necessarily 
secured” also seems to carry the idea of irresistibility of constatives, i.e. that 
they are always (already) intruding and interfering. A look at Derrida’s analysis 
of the Declaration might give a clearer understanding of what is meant here. As 
it was shown above, Derrida argues that the only way for a declaration to found, 
is to be signed retroactively, because the people, in the name of which the 
declaration is signed, does not exist.262 But the retroactive signing cannot be 
legitimate and must be hidden as if it did not exist. This role is fulfilled by a 
constative, which states that the people are already free. However, to simply 
state (in abstraction from everything else) that people are already free is equally 
impossible, because the people do not exist yet, prior to the founding act – how 
they can be free before they exist. Therefore, the appearance of the constative in 
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a founding act is mediated by a fable, for example, God, which allows to sign 
the declaration retroactively by erasing time (creating people’s freedom outside 
time) – people can sign the declaration, because they do it “in the simulacrum of 
the instant.”263 Honig’s emphasis on the need of resisting “the irresistible 
absolute” seems to have a root in the fact that an absolute, for example, God, 
(counter)signs last and therefore, there is a constant inclination to perceive 
“performative utterances, as constative utterances.”264  
Hence, Honig depicts Derrida’s resistance as being directed against consta-
tives/absolutes that secure performatives at the expense of creating an image of 
incontestability of law of laws. Without the possibility of this resistance, 
without the “commitment to resistibility,” i.e. also without the possibility of 
augmentation, of translation, the founding act, as Honig says, “is not present 
yet.”265 The question is how this commitment to resistibility (that should make 
an other to appear in the same) is theorised by Honig in the context of Derrida’s 
analysis of the Declaration. 
One possibility is to follow Honig’s emphasis on the performative aspect of 
the Derridean resistance. Honig insists that there is no need to “succumb to its 
[i.e. the constative’s] claim to irresistibility. We resist it. Our intervention 
testifies to the resistibility of this (allegedly irresistible) constative anchor; and 
posts our opposition to the attempt to ‘put the law above man,’ to secure the law 
of laws from all (political) intervention.”266 Elsewhere, Honig describes 
Derrida’s resistance as an “adoption of a posture of intervention.”267 If formu-
lated in these terms, a first thought might be that the Derridean resistance to a 
constative is itself a sort of a performative act with the emphasis on an active 
subject. The question could be then asked whether the constative is perhaps 
resisted by an entirely other performative. In that case, the performative would 
be promising of another declaration, another revolution with implicating still 
another constative. But as much as the founding act does not exist yet (without 
the possibility of translation, as it were), any other declaration would only 
perpetuate an ongoing revolution. This situation would correspond to the 
problem of a permanent revolution in Arendt’s case. 
But then could it be said that the (same) performative always already resists 
the constative that comes to secure it? If this is to presume a certain symmetrical 
relationship between a performative and a constative, then it would lead to an 
impasse, and nothing could be founded. In terms of the analysis of the Decla-
ration, this possibility seems to entail the following. The performative decla-
ration, having no authority to found as there is no people in the name of whom 
it can speak, draws support from the constative, which states that the people are 
already free and the declaration only confirms that fact. The constative, being 
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unable to explain the existence of the people, relies on the performative, which 
maintains that the people are created by the declaration. Two sides mutually 
support each other to form a founding act. At the same time, conceptually, they 
remain separate, because they also undermine each other – the declaration 
cannot be a confirmation and an act of creation of independence at the same 
time; it must be one or the other. However, the result is not undecidability, but a 
hermetically closed circle, which in itself is perfect (i.e. fullness), but from 
outside, as being impenetrable, a conceptual paralysis (i.e. nothing). The circle 
assumes the existence of time as its ground and its limit. It follows that if such a 
possibility is conceivable, then only on the basis of a certain prior dissymmetry 
between the performative and the constative: the (same) performative can be 
conceived to support the constative (to appear) only after the constative is in 
fact made possible by a fable of an absolute (by erasing time). There is a dis-
symmetry in the sense that the constative is made possible not by a performa-
tive, but by a “fabulous” absolute, which closes time and prevents the concept 
to cancel itself out. 
It can be gathered from Honig’s text that Derrida’s “intervention” is thought 
to partake in the (same) performative; for example, she argues that “Derrida’s 
own project of deauthorisation … becomes part of a practice of authority, not 
simply an unauthorised assault on the institutions of authority from some 
outside.”268 As shown above, this implies a dissymmetrical relationship between 
the performative and the constative, which, however, modifies Honig’s apparent 
intent in her formulations of the Derridean resistance.  
In describing Derrida’s intervention, Honig says that it is occasioned by “the 
impossible superimposition of constative on performative utterance,”269 which 
seems to indicate that the Derridean intervention is not only creating, but also 
constating the impossibility of this superimposition. It means that, on the one 
hand, Derrida’s commitment to or an adoption of a posture of resisting is an 
intervention that partakes in the form of performativity. On the other hand, 
Derrida’s resistance also constates an already pre-existing impossibility – “the 
inadequacy of the present to itself” – which is an ontological impossibility of a 
constative to finally impose itself on a performative.270 As much as the re-
sistance reveals and realises (one might say inscribes) an ontological im-
possibility or a radical rupture, it pertains to the founding act; it lets an other 
beginning to appear so that it does not (re)turn into the same (as before). 
However, the dissymmetrical relationship between the performative and the 
constative uncouples the constative and the absolute: it makes it possible to 
conceive the performative’s resistibility to the constative, but this resistance 
does not need to affect an absolute (and its irresistibility) or retroactivity 
induced by an absolute. If resistance does not intervene into the very retro-
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activity that “produces” the constative, it can only undermine the constative 
without (possibility of) failing it. 
It relates well to Honig’s description of Derrida’s resistance as an “expo-
sure” of the game of performatives and constatives.271 This exposure of the laws 
of the game in general grounds resistibility in the sense that it opens up a 
general possibility for performatives; i.e. the exposure is not about entirely 
dismantling absolutes, but undermining them, so that the performative can 
appear posited against the constative.  
Indeed, the founding act ultimately depends on neither the performative nor 
the constative per se, but on the undecidability between them; as Derrida puts it, 
“this obscurity, this undecidability between, let us say, a performative structure 
and a constative structure, is required to produce the sought-after effect.”272 In 
the analysis of the Declaration, it means that every declaration of freedom, of 
independence leaves undecided whether the freedom is created by the decla-
ration or the declaration only confirms the prior freedom of the people.  
In this context, Honig’s phrase “the impossible superimposition of constative 
on performative utterance” assumes quite a different meaning from what was 
perhaps intended, because the resistance cannot be thought of repeating and 
realising an ontological impossibility but the same founding act. The resistance, 
in its performative dimension partakes in the same performative by undermining 
the constative, but in its constative dimension it re-states (even if differently) 
the same existing founding act. This, however, is the structure of critique. The 
resistance, as Honig describes it, indeed, resists the logic of how performatives 
appear as constatives, but with that it only reveals undecidability, which in fact, 
grounds the founding effect/act in the first place – the possibility of a critique of 
the constative moment is a necessary (internal) part of every founding act. For 
this reason, the critique of irresistibility of the constative does not bring an other 
(founding act, for example) into the same, but allows every other to appear as 
the same (at best, with a difference). In other words, Derrida’s commitment to 
resistibility appears to be cast in terms of a critique of constatives, which is not 
sufficient to intervene into the law of laws instituted by a founding act, because 
it gets constantly absorbed into the logic of founding and undecidability. For 
that matter, it also could not be a reinvigorating resistance to law of laws, if by 
reinvigoration it is meant the possibility of an entirely new beginning in the 
existing. That the resistance (i.e. “adopting of a posture of intervention”) Honig 
draws from Derrida’s analysis of the Declaration amounts to a critique rather 
than deconstruction has two possible exogenous sources. 
First of all, it has to be admitted that Derrida’s text on the Declaration itself 
plays on the “verge” of deconstruction, and it might be argued that it is not a 
properly deconstructive text at all (I return to it later). In evaluating the text of 
“Declarations of Independence,” the context of its publication should not be 
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forgotten: it was first presented as an introduction to a public lecture on 
Friedrich Nietzsche at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville in 1976, on 
the occasion of the 200th anniversary of the American Declaration of Inde-
pendence, i.e. as an event in the chain of celebrations of the Declaration.273 
Derrida’s text does well its job of de/constructing the centrality of the Decla-
ration for politics, revealing how the undecidability gives power to the Decla-
ration or to the Constitution to organise people around itself, to constantly 
occupy people’s minds, and thus, preserves it and keeps it alive. The question of 
the political significance of the Declaration is here the focal point and if there is 
a movement in the text that can be called properly deconstructive, then it is 
marked out and stated, rather than developed out in the course of the text. I will 
return to this deconstructive moment of the text in a short while. A “properly” 
deconstructive intervention into law in general is taken up by Derrida much 
later at the colloquium on “Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice” at 
Cardozo Law School in October 1989 and published in 1990 as “Force of Law: 
The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority.’”274 Most likely, Honig’s text, which 
was published in March 1991, was already in print, when the “Force of Law” 
was published. In any case, it will be argued that it is relatively easy on the 
basis of Derrida’s text on the Declaration to formulate his resistance in terms of 
critique.  
Another source of mistaking deconstruction for a critique is presaged by 
Honig’s usage of the term of deconstruction in her text. Honig, indeed, refers to 
deconstruction and sees her understanding of resistance to be deconstructive, 
but she puts deconstruction “in service of” a certain prior recognition: “his 
[Derrida’s] deconstruction of the American declaration is in the service of this 
recognition [that “power under the condition of human plurality can never 
amount to omnipotence, and laws residing in human power can never be 
absolute.”]275 Here deconstruction appears as a means to something else, which 
betrays a critique as well as a subject behind the critical decision.  
Derrida, in contrast, emphasises that critique is not what deconstruction is all 
about; he puts it bluntly: “deconstruction is neither an analysis nor a critique.”276 
In the article “Ja, ou le faux-bond,” he adds,  
 
deconstruction is not a critical operation, the critical is its object; deconstruction 
is always directed, at one moment or another, against the confidence in the 
critical – critico-theoretical, that is, deciding – authority, against the ultimate 
                                                                          
273  See Geoffrey Bennington, Interrupting Derrida (London and New York: Routledge, 
2000), p. 29. 
274  Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’,” Cardozo Law 
Review, Vol. 11, 1989–1990, pp. 919–1045. 
275  Honig, “Declarations,” p. 108. 
276  Jacques Derrida, “Letter to a Japanese Friend,” in D. Wood, R. Bernasconi (eds.), 
Derrida and Différance (Evanston, Il: Northwestern University Press, 1988), p. 3. 
71
possibility of decidable; deconstruction is the deconstruction of critical 
dogmatism.277  
 
It clearly shows that if there is a deconstructive concept of resistance, it cannot 
be formulated in terms of a performative or of a decision by a subject. In that 
case, the resistance either would not pertain to the founding act or would relapse 
into a conceptual paralysis. Derrida’s much quoted passage in this respect 
states:  
 
Deconstruction is not even an act or an operation. Not only because there would 
be something “patient” or “passive” about it (as Blanchot says, more passive 
than passivity, than the passivity that is opposed to activity). Not only because it 
does not return to an individual or collective subject who would take the 
initiative and apply it to an object, a text, a theme, etc. Deconstruction takes 
place, it is an event that does not await the deliberation, consciousness, or 
organization of a subject, or even of modernity. It deconstructs itself.278  
 
Nevertheless, despite this statement is establishing a rather clear-cut partition, it 
should be considered more as a reaction to the danger that so widespread 
overemphasis of one part or dimension of deconstruction could overshadow the 
meaning of the whole. Indeed, it has not been uncommon to describe de-
construction as a sort of a critique,279 and for example, Clive Barnett, being 
attentive to this development, delineates two phases in the general reception of 
deconstruction, one of which is dubbed a more critical phase: “in the first phase, 
deconstruction was an avowedly critical enterprise, and became closely asso-
ciated with a rigorous mode of literary-theoretical textual analysis.”280 Such 
emphasis would have not been possible if deconstruction had no relation to 
critique at all.  
In one of Derrida’s “definitions” or determinations of deconstruction, this 
critical intervention can be located inside the “general strategy of deconstruc-
tion” as a phase of overturning of violent binary oppositions that metaphysics 
bequeaths to us. Deconstruction shows that any metaphysical opposition is not a 
natural and “peaceful coexistence of vis-à-vis, but rather … a violent 
hierarchy,” in which the dominant side always depends on the subordinate 
side.281 The violence consists exactly in non-recognition of this dependence, 
which now gets revealed in deconstruction. Here, the tasks of critique and 
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deconstruction coincide in uncovering a latent violence. At first sight, the 
exposed violence seems to undo, and therefore, intervene into the founding act, 
because no founding of freedom can come to exist by violence in regard to 
those in the name of whom the freedom is meant to be established. In the 
context of the case of the Declaration, it can be seen that the mutual under-
mining of the performative side of declaring and the constative side of affirming 
indeed inscribes a possibility of violence into any founding act. This is so 
because, if the role of the constative, being supported by a fable (of God, for 
example), is to show naturalness of the “coming” order or law of laws, then the 
performative simultaneously and equally questions that “naturalness.” In other 
words, something that is created by sheer (contingent) will of the people can 
always be different, and digressions from that will are conceivable. Conse-
quently, although any order-creation entails exclusions of what is deemed to be 
“disorder,” every particular exclusion (retrospectively determined) can be 
reversible. In that, the idea of “naturalness” is not altogether abolished, but 
everything that at first appears natural might turn out to be “actually” a violent 
imposition after some lapse of time. This is what I call here “violence as 
forgery;” critical discriminations are needed to restore the “truth” of an order, to 
unveil false pretensions. However, it is not the violence that could intervene into 
the founding act, because it presumes the existence of that very system which it 
appears to undermine. Hence, the fact that violence is impugned, as in re-
sistance advocated by Honig, does not mean by itself an intervention into the 
founding act. The concept that corresponds to this violence as a possibility 
inscribed into the founding act, is “undecidable violence,” which will be expli-
cated in the next section. 
 
 
3.3 Walter Benjamin: the Concept of Undecidable Violence 
An important and much discussed account of undecidable violence is Walter 
Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence,” which I take as a lead in order to explain the 
concept.282 Benjamin locates his critique of violence in the sphere of law and 
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justice, by stating in the beginning of his text that “a cause, however effective, 
becomes violent … only when it bears on moral issues.”283 In his study, he 
searches for a criterion to criticise “violence itself as a principle,” i.e. without 
regard for the ends it may serve.284 He leaves out the natural law doctrine, 
which is able, according to Benjamin, to critique violence only in terms of its 
ends, and begins with examination of the (hypothetical) distinction made in 
positive law “between kinds of violence independently of cases of their 
application,” i.e. between sanctioned (or legitimate) and unsanctioned (or il-
legitimate) violence.285 The reasons why this distinction is made in positive law 
should reveal something about violence as such. Benjamin notes that in case an 
individual can achieve certain ends by using violence, the legal system tries to 
replace these “natural” ends (like in education) by legal ends, which can be 
realised only by legal power. The problem then seems not to be in ends 
themselves that can be attained violently, but in violence as such that lies 
outside the law. In other words, “law sees violence in the hands of individuals 
as a danger undermining the legal system.”286  
The function of violence that law is so afraid of is revealed by Benjamin 
through cases where violence still is permissible in the present legal system. 
One such case is workers’ guaranteed right to strike, which is meant by the state 
to be a (non-violent) possibility “to escape from a violence indirectly exercised 
by the employer.”287 From the perspective of the worker, however, this right can 
be exercised as a form of extortion, “a conscious readiness to resume the sus-
pended action under certain circumstances that either have nothing whatever to 
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do with this action or only superficially modify it.”288 In the revolutionary 
situation of a general strike, these two interpretations collide and the state 
violently suppresses the strike in order to preserve order. Conferring a right to 
strike to workers, the state is fully aware of the possibility of its use as a violent 
extortion, but remains passive in regard to it, because it is an act of forestalling 
“violent actions the state is afraid to oppose.”289 In that case, the right functions 
as an inducement for “men to reconcile their interests peacefully without 
involving the legal system [on the basis of the fear of mutual disadvantage that 
violent confrontation can cause].”290 At the same time, the right to strike is 
actively called violent when it is exercised “to overthrow the legal system” in a 
general strike.291  
The concession of this right to strike for workers, in the light of these 
considerations, reveals the function of violence that the state is afraid of above 
all, and what is the target of Benjamin’s text; namely, the state fears violence’s 
law-making character (die Rechtsetzende Gewalt). Violence needs not to be 
characterised only as a “predatory violence” that fulfils its end and disappears. 
Benjamin refutes this by referring to military law, according to which “even in 
cases where the victor has established himself in invulnerable possession, a 
peace ceremony is entirely necessary…, [which] consists precisely in recog-
nising the new conditions as a new ‘law’.”292 The same danger emanates from 
the figure of the “great” criminal, who very often, “however repellent his ends 
may have been, has aroused the secret admiration of the public,”293 which can 
be explained not by his or her deeds, but only by their very violence, which 
“confronts the law with the threat of declaring a new law.”294 In sum, law 
confronts any violence outside its legal ends, because law recognises in the use 
of violence a possibility of lawmaking.  
This immediately highlights another function or side of violence, which is 
called by Benjamin a law-preserving violence (die Rechtserhaltende Gewalt). 
This violence, but in fact, the whole duality of violence, is exemplified by 
general conscription, which is the “use of violence as a means to the ends of the 
state.”295 The conscription as an example of law-preserving violence seems to 
be chosen by Benjamin for the reason that it is enforced by the military, and not 
by the police. The latter represents for Benjamin an institution, where law-
making and law-preserving are “unnaturally” mixed, because the police uses 
“violence for legal ends…, but with the simultaneous authority to decide these 
ends itself within wide limits (in the right of decree).” This results in their 
                                                                          
288  Ibid., p. 282. 
289  Ibid., p. 290; see also p. 282. 
290  Ibid., p. 290. 
291  Ibid., p. 282. 
292  Ibid., p. 283. 
293  Ibid., p. 281. 
294  Ibid., p. 283. 
295  Ibid., p. 284. 
75 
interventions “‘for security reasons’ in countless cases where no clear legal 
situation exists, when they are not merely, without the slightest relation to legal 
ends, accompanying the citizen as a brutal encumbrance through a life regulated 
by ordinances, or simply supervising him.”296 Nevertheless, it appears that the 
distinction Benjamin first (though, hypothetically) makes between law-making 
and law-preserving starts to crumble as soon as it is made. Besides the police, a 
similar concurrence is manifested in cases where law implements the capital 
punishment, and especially clearly when there is no doubt of its dispro-
portionate use. Benjamin argues that such cases, for example, where “the death 
penalty is imposed even for such crimes as offences against property” un-
questionably indicate that “its purpose is not to punish the infringement of law 
but to establish new law.”297 These cases reveal that there is, as Benjamin puts 
it, “something rotten in law,” because whoever stands outside the order of law 
and is confronted by the violence of the law (in the name of preserving it), is 
confronted by the same violence that he or she embodies against the law. This 
means that law’s outside, which threatens it, appears to be already its inside. 
Benjamin sums it up as follows:  
 
The function of violence in lawmaking is twofold, in the sense that lawmaking 
pursues as its end, with violence as the means, what is to be established as law, 
but at the moment of instatement does not dismiss violence; rather, at this very 
moment of lawmaking, it specifically establishes as law not an end unalloyed by 
violence, but one necessarily and intimately bound to it, under the title of 
power.298 
 
As much as law-making and law-preserving constantly turn into each other, 
violence in law remains undecidable. Similarly, Derrida points out in his 
extensive commentary on Benjamin’s text that “the law is transcendent, violent 
and nonviolent, because it depends only on who is before it – and prior to it.”299  
In terms of our discussion on a founding declaration, if the violence of the 
performative declaration is hidden by a “successful” retroaction (enabled by a 
fable), which posits that the people are free naturally, by right, without any 
recourse to violence, then nevertheless, it is not possible for retroaction, by 
simply alluding to a fable, to erase all violence in the world, and for that matter, 
violence as such. Even if the fable disguises violence in the founding of a law of 
laws, there exists an outside of that law, which cannot be mastered by retroac-
tion; law still has to make use of violence in order to defend itself. Therefore, 
retroactivity can conceal violence only by declaring that all violence used by the 
law is against “them” and not against “us.” In other words, a successful 
retroaction is grounded on the claim that all violence is used not against the 
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entity which has been (or is being) created, but against “others,” who do not 
belong to the people, to the polity or to the order instituted by the law of laws. 
However, this use of violence to defend law is, in principle, as it was shown by 
Benjamin, the same violence that founds laws. This impossibility of deter-
mining with certainty whether violence is law-making or law-preserving means 
that it is not also clear whether violence used by the law is violence only against 
“them” (under the title power) or violence against “us,” or any part of “us.”  
On the assumption of the undecidability of violence, a critique that points 
out the unfairness of a use of force, i.e. a wrongful discrimination between “us” 
and “not-us,” and calls it violence, is always possible, but with a proviso that 
uncovered violence remains undecidable, and therefore, negotiable. Violence is 
critiqued from the position of presumed non-violence within the same founding 
act. This does not mean that such critique might not have effects (that make 
difference), but simply that they remain in the service of the existing founding 
act. 
As much as Benjamin’s aim is to critique not merely one type of violence 
from the position of another type, but violence as such, he has to admit the 
insufficiency of such critique if it stays on the level of undecidable violence. 
Benjamin offers a solution to the problem of the critique of violence in his 
further elaborations in the article, but we reserve an exposition of it to another 
chapter. Here, it sufficed to point out the limits of undecidable violence. 
Going back to the scene of deconstruction, it can be argued that the same 
kind of insufficiency as was discovered by Benjamin is also emphasised by 
Derrida in regard to the critical first “phase” of deconstruction. The first 
“phase” involves a critique of violence embedded in a hierarchy, and resultant 
overturning of that hierarchy, however, “to remain in this phase is still to 
operate on the terrain of and from within the deconstructed system.”300 There-
fore, a second “phase” has to take place, in which deconstruction arrives at 
certain quasi-concepts, “infrastructures,” or “undecidables … that can no longer 
be included within philosophical (binary) opposition, but which, however, 
inhabit philosophical opposition, resisting and disorganizing it, without ever 
constituting a third term.”301 The second “phase” of deconstruction will be 
elaborated also a little bit later in the following chapters, but at this point, I only 
want to accentuate that as much as deconstruction has to accomplish its second 
“phase,” it also has to pass through its first “phase” – “the necessity of this 
phase is structural,” as Derrida puts it; the violent and subordinating structure of 
these oppositions has to be addressed, otherwise “one might proceed too 
quickly to a neutralization that in practice would leave the previous field 
untouched, leaving one no hold on the previous opposition, thereby preventing 
any means of intervening in the field effectively.”302 In this sense, the criticism 
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of Nancy Fraser and Dominick La Carpa that deconstruction is unable to 
intervene into ontical violence and only deals with ontological violence is 
certainly not correct. Deconstruction has to “pass through” its critical phase.303  
However, it also becomes evident here that the differentiation between 
phases cannot be taken at face value; if the first “phase” is a structural necessity, 
due to the fact that “the hierarchy of dual oppositions always re-establishes 
itself,”304 it cannot be a phase in a chronological sense of the term, and it 
certainly cannot be employed in the manner of a “technical procedure,” as 
Derrida underlines in an interview published in Critical Exchange.305 In other 
words, the first “phase,” being a necessity but still not deconstruction “as such,” 
can be understood as revealing a sort of structural possibility of deconstruction, 
which combines two aspects in it. Firstly, it reckons that deconstruction is 
always already taking place (intervening, so to say) inside of any hierarchy or a 
system, rather than being applied from the outside by a decision, in which case 
deconstruction would certainly be critical, but unable to intervene into the 
founding act. But secondly, this internal undoing (in the form of undecidable 
violence), nevertheless, remains a possibility, if it is not inserted or inscribed by 
a certain incision of deconstruction; because otherwise, without the need for 
such an incision, any hierarchy or system would undo itself prior to its 
appearance. It is this inscription that marks a “second phase,” where “an 
overturning deconstruction” turns into “a positively displacing, transgressive, 
deconstruction.”306 Unlike Honig’s formulation of deconstructive resistance in 
terms of a performative, of a decision, the incision of deconstruction is a certain 
“‘passive’ decision … without freedom … without that activity.”307 Derrida 
emphasises:  
 
The incision of deconstruction, which is not a voluntary decision or an absolute 
beginning, does not take place just anywhere, or in an absolute elsewhere. An 
incision, precisely, it can be made only according to lines of force and forces of 
rupture that are localizable in the discourse to be deconstructed.308  
 
These marks of force and rupture cannot be left, as we have shown, by un-
decidable violence that was the concept of violence targeted by critique. De-
constructive resistance requires another concept of violence, and tracking down 
this concept will be the task of the next chapter. 
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On the basis of this chapter, it can be concluded that, although Honig’s 
interpretation posits Arendt’s theory as “a re-theorisation of authority for a non-
foundational politics,” her project of thinking resistance deconstructively 
remains unfinished.309 In her formulations, resistance makes every other begin-
ning to be a return of the same over and again, while deconstruction is, in the 
words of Rodolphe Gasché, “a responding to, first and foremost toward the 
other in its alterity – before all critical separation, division, and decision.”310 
This prompts us to search for another reading of Arendt’s theory that allows a 
different rendering of it in terms of performatives and constatives, and a more 
complex take on Derrida. In the next chapter, I am going to show that radical 
violence – the same violence that Benjamin as well as Derrida “look for” 
beyond what can be called undecidable violence – is addressed in Arendt’s 
theory. Later, I use its explication to pinpoint a deconstructive moment in 
Derrida’s text on the Declaration, i.e. where the incision of deconstruction is 
made along the line of rupture. First, however, it is argued that as much as 
Arendt’s theory is interpreted as dealing with radical violence, her theory of 
action cannot be maintained to be a theory of pure performativity. 
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Chapter 4: Reinterpretation of Arendt and  
Derrida on Declarations 
4.1 Different Perspective on Arendt:  
Radical Violence of the Absolute 
According to Arendt, as it was also showed above, the founding act in the 
modern age cannot draw its authority from absolutes, i.e. from sources standing 
outside the human realm.311 For Honig, Arendt excludes absolutes, because they 
are constative in their character; they compel “without argumentative demon-
stration or political persuasion.”312 Honig relates here absolutes (as fables) to 
constatives, on the ground that “all placeholders, according to Derrida, 
including those that are constative in structure, are fables.”313 In fact, the whole 
idea of pure performativity of Arendt’s conception of founding depends on this 
fusion of absolutes and constatives, because, indeed, it then appears that from 
Arendt’s rejection of absolutes follows also the rejection of the whole constative 
dimension, leaving only performativity to describe action and founding. 
However, I would point out that the role of fables is much more intricate in 
Derrida than that. In his book The Beast and the Sovereign, where he discusses 
Hobbes’ fable of the Leviathan at lengths, he indicates that fable is never merely 
a constative:  
 
What is fabulous in the fable does not only depend on its linguistic nature, on the 
fact that the fable is made up of words. The fabulous also engages act, gesture, 
action, if only the operation that consists in producing narrative, in organizing, 
disposing discourse in such a way as to recount, to put living beings on stage, to 
accredit the interpretation of a narrative, to faire savoir, to make knowledge, to 
make performatively, to operate knowledge.314  
 
My argument is that Arendt excludes absolutes as a possible source of authority, 
because of their radical violence, which pertains into the very founding act (and 
in a sense precedes it). If this is to hold, then Arendt’s idea of action cannot 
stand against such radical violence as a constant fighting back, in which case the 
radical violence is simply reduced into an undecidable violence. For that reason, 
I pursue here a possibility that Arendt’s discarding of absolutes does not mean 
the dismissal of the constative dimension in action at all, and consequently, 
Arendt’s theory of founding action cannot be regarded as a theory of the pure 
performative. 
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4.1.1 Theory of Action 
Even if this thesis started by noting that both Arendt and Derrida similarly 
recognise the problem of the vicious circle, whereby the declaration that founds 
an entity receives its authority to do that only after the fact, their understanding 
of this paradox is still remarkably different. For Derrida, if there were 
hypothetically a pure performative, a declaration in its first movement, so to 
say, then it would have been inevitably violent and in this sense, illegitimate, 
because there always is (and will be) another declaration that must be erased by 
the new one, as he also mentions to be the case in the American Revolution: 
“another state signature had to be erased by ‘dissolving’ the links of colonial 
paternity or maternity.”315 Therefore, the performative and the constative are 
always already imbricated in each other and impure.  
For Arendt, on the other hand, a declaration of independence (for example), 
let us say a performative, is not necessarily violent. The presumed needfulness 
of violence in the founding act is for her “the fallacy which was bound to 
becloud the whole issue of action in the thinking of the men of the revolutions. 
It was in the nature of their experiences to see the phenomenon of action 
exclusively in the image of tearing down and building up.”316 Violence is 
inescapable not for action or an act of creation, for starting a new beginning, but 
“for all purposes of fabrication precisely because something is created, not out 
of nothing, but out of given material which must be violated in order to yield 
itself to the formative processes out of which a thing, a fabricated object, will 
arise.”317 It might seem that Arendt here indeed advocates the purity of action, 
i.e. its independence from a constative structure, but such conclusion is drawn 
merely from the fact that Arendt precludes violence from action. However, 
action can be conceptualised in such a way that it shuns from violence (of 
absolutes), but nevertheless, remains impure and in need of a constative 
structure. 
In order to understand the place action fulfils in Arendt’s theory, it does not 
suffice to start from the paraphrase, also quoted above, that action is taking an 
initiative, beginning something, or rather, somebody, “who is a beginner him-
self.”318 Instead, it requires uncovering its conditions of possibility. In most 
general sense, action is a moment of initiation of something that is (always 
already) inserted into “the ‘web’ of human relationships,”319 into a plurality of 
human beings, which, therefore, becomes a part of the phenomenon of action, as 
“the basic condition of both action and speech.”320 In other words, action 
appears because of this plurality, and only in this web of relations “in which 
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action alone is real.”321 In the course of her account on action in The Human 
Condition, Arendt elaborates on four notions that elucidate the concept of 
human plurality, and which relate to action as its conditions, or rather, as its 
analytically distinguishable moments that make it up. 
The first such moment that accompanies action is speech: “speechless action 
would no longer be action because there would no longer be an actor, and the 
actor, the doer of deeds, is possible only if he is at the same time the speaker of 
words.”322 Speech relates to the plurality as being its actualisation, i.e. it enables 
to define oneself “as a distinct and unique being among equals.”323 
The second aspect of action is “the space of appearance,” which “comes into 
being wherever men are together in the manner of speech and action.”324 The 
space of appearance is a mental, “intangible” space between participants in 
action and speech, “where I appear to others as others appear to me, where men 
exist not merely like other living or inanimate things but make their appearance 
explicitly.”325 Arendt illustrates the thought with an example of polis of ancient 
Greece, which she takes to be “not the city-state in its physical location; [but] it 
is the organisation of people as it arises out of acting and speaking together, and 
its true space lies between people living together for this purpose, no matter 
where they happen to be. ‘Wherever you go, you will be a polis.’”326 As much 
as the space of appearance is a space where humans can recognise each other, it 
also is a guarantor of reality for human beings: “To men the reality of the world 
is guaranteed by the presence of others, by its appearing to all.”327 
The third dimension of action is power: “power is what keeps the public 
realm, the potential space of appearance between acting and speaking men, in 
existence.”328 The most important defining feature of power is its being a 
potentiality, i.e. power is not something that can be possessed and stored up, 
like strength or force can be, but it exists only in its actualisation; “power 
springs up between men when they act together and vanishes the moment they 
disperse.”329 By the same token, “without power, the space of appearance 
brought forth through action and speech in public fade away as rapidly as the 
living deed and the living word.”330 
The last internal moment of action is promising, as it can be inferred from 
the following passage, which also combines all the mentioned aspects of action 
together: 
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The power generated when people gather together and “act in concert,” which 
disappears the moment they depart. The force that keeps them together, as 
distinguished from the space of appearances in which they gather and the power 
which keeps this public space in existence, is the force of mutual promise or 
contract.331 
 
The same thought is also expressed in On Revolution, in the context of the 
American Revolution, where Arendt relates promising back to the situation 
prior to the Revolution, saying: “what had happened in colonial America prior 
to the Revolution … was, theoretically speaking, that action had led to the 
formation of power and that power was kept in existence by the then newly 
discovered means of promise and covenant.”332 Power has a potentiality to keep 
the presence of people to each other alive, and promising provides a certain 
scope to it by having “the capacity to dispose future as though it were the 
present, that is, the enormous and truly miraculous enlargement of the very 
dimension in which power can be effective.”333 
Arendt relates the faculty of promising back to other aspects of action by 
noting that promising is essential for disclosing our identities by speech in the 
space of appearance: “Without being bound to the fulfilment of promises, we 
would never be able to keep our identities … [which can only occur] through 
the presence of others, who confirm the identity between the one who promises 
and the one who fulfils.”334 As much as all these notions designate internal 
dimensions of action, no one of them is prior to the other, but they determine 
mutually each other and actualise (in) action. 
In this theorising of action it is revealed that the most characteristic attribute 
of action and power is their fleetingness. Arendt repeatedly reminds us that 
action by itself, if there is such a thing, would be a fleeting moment that fades as 
soon as togetherness of people involved in it is lost; there is only a “fleeting 
moment of the deed.”335 This means that Arendt’s conception of action cannot 
be thought as striving to be a pure performative, even if it forecloses violence, 
because it needs a (sort of) constative structure to achieve some perpetuity.  
 
4.1.2 Promise 
As the consideration of promising for an internal moment of action indicated, 
this perpetuity cannot be attained by Arendt’s notion of promising. In this, I 
disagree with Honig’s interpretation of the relation between promising and 
action, which grounds her charge of contradiction in Arendt. I would say that 
Honig’s reading seems to contain its own inconsistency, when, on the one hand, 
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she describes the meaning of “promising” for Arendt as something that happens 
to action, as complementing it from the outside, like when she says: “Arendt’s 
performative politics presupposes a community of promisors, a pre-existing 
community.”336 On the other hand, she cites Arendt that promising and for-
giving “are not applied to action from the outside [but] arise directly out of the 
will to live together with others in the mode of acting and speaking.”337 
Arendt’s figurative phrasing in describing promising as “islands of predict-
ability” leaves much room for interpretation and it can appear in conflict with 
action’s character as being unpredictable and starting the unexpected. If inter-
preted in this way, it is not easy to see how promising describes action from 
inside, which might also be Honig’s difficulty, as noted above.338 But Honig’s 
rather straightforward conclusion that “promising is to be a source of reas-
surance and stability” for Arendt does not add up in the context of the passage 
where Arendt cautions about the limits of the power of promises: 
 
The moment promises lose their character as isolated islands of certainty in an 
ocean of uncertainty, that is, when this faculty is misused to cover the whole 
ground of the future and to map out a path secured in all directions, they lose 
their binding power and the whole enterprise becomes self-defeating.339 
 
What Arendt seems to be saying here is that promising, i.e. making and keeping 
promises, is a plural concept – no promise can “cover the whole ground,” take 
upon itself to promise everything, and no contract can embrace all life, or it 
would not be a promise or a contract at all but simply a law. In Arendt’s words, 
without the faculty of promising “we would be the victims of an automatic 
necessity bearing all the marks of the inexorable laws.”340 Consequently, and 
importantly, the plural concept of promising inevitably includes its failure; it 
must be able to fail, which means, paradoxically, that promising “leave[s] 
unpredictability of human affairs and the unreliability of men as they are.”341 
Promising does not solve the problem it was called for to solve, but rather, 
“deals” with it, “using them [the unpredictability and unreliability of human 
affairs] merely as the medium, as it were, into which certain islands of 
predictability are thrown and in which certain guideposts of reliability are 
erected.”342 In other words, there are only instances of promise-making, which 
here or there, sometimes, are also kept, and these are “the guideposts of 
reliability,” “islands of certainty,” which should uphold a possibility, a horizon 
of stability for the public realm. After all, promising is not a description of a 
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state of affairs for Arendt, but a faculty of human beings, the actualisation of 
which remains undecided. All in all, in order to outlive “the fleeting moment” 
and appear explicitly in the human realm, action also requires the possibility of 
stability, which shows “the future as though it were the present.”343 It is not 
clear from Honig’s text, that the stability Honig makes Arendt to expect, i.e. 
stability over “promising,” is the same as Arendt pictures to herself. Rather, 
Honig’s reduction of promises to a source of stability seems to be exactly 
against which Arendt warns here; it would mean “to cover the whole ground” 
instead of being “isolated islands of certainty.”344 
So, all in all, Honig’s argument was that Arendt, although willing to pro-
pound a pure performativity as a source of legitimacy and authority for a 
founding act, still is not able to succeed in it and she inconsistently relies on 
promising, which inadvertently undermines action’s spontaneity. However, 
now, after restating the relationship between action and promising, it can be 
seen that promising is not devised to cancel groundlessness and unpredictability 
of action, but is its inherent dimension, allowing for action to become what it is. 
 
4.1.3 Action and Founding 
Now, if we refrain from the view that “promising” was meant to offer some 
stability for action in Arendt, the question of the relationship between action 
and founding emerges once again. It was pointed out above that Honig’s 
reading of Arendt leads to a merger of action and founding.345 But if action 
cannot be fully stabilised, neither internally by promising nor externally by an 
absolute, then action and founding cannot be thought as coinciding; action 
remains fleeting and unpredictable and therefore, it could not be in itself also an 
act of founding. This is very clearly stated also by Arendt herself:  
 
Neither compact nor promise upon which compacts rest are sufficient to assure 
perpetuity, that is, to bestow upon the affairs of men that measure of stability 
without which they would be unable to build a world for their posterity, destined 
and designed to outlast their own mortal lives.346 
 
It does not mean, however, that if separated, action stands against the founding 
act, which would presume equating the founding act with what Arendt calls 
“fabrication,” or “making” (i.e. as opposed to creating something). Though, the 
proposition that action is made durable by “fabrication” is in itself not incorrect, 
because it is the realm of “work” that only can ensure some memorability for 
the realm of action, or as Arendt puts it, “acting and speaking men need the help 
of homo faber in his highest capacity, that is, the help of the artist, of poets and 
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historiographers, of monument-builders or writers, because without them the 
only product of their activity, the story they enact and tell, would not survive at 
all.”347 Still, the founding act emerges only in case there is some measure of 
stability or perpetuity to action: 
 
where and when men succeed in keeping intact the power which sprang up 
between them during the course of any particular act or deed, they are already in 
the process of foundation, of constituting a stable worldly structure to house, as it 
were, their combined power of action.348 
 
What is important here to notice is that this being “in the process of founding” 
does not occur prior to the moment “when men succeed keeping intact the 
power,” i.e. prior to a stabilisation of action. This stabilisation can take place 
only by recourse to a constative structure. It follows that every founding act has 
a dual grounding in action and in its stabilising structure. In fact, this duality 
permeates Arendt’s discussion of French and American revolutions from the 
very beginning as she emphasises that the success of founding of the republic 
depends on finding its power and authority from separate sources.349  
Here, it can be affirmed that in some sense Arendt’s depiction of the 
founding act is not much different from Derrida’s as in both cases the founding 
act appears in a certain interplay between the performative and the constative 
sides. In Arendt’s theory, action always appears into a certain permanence, 
otherwise it would be a fleeting moment, immediately disappearing, leaving no 
trace of memory of it. 
 
4.1.4 Radical Violence in Arendt 
In light of what was said previously, what makes up a genuine paradox for 
Arendt, and according to her, for the Founding Fathers of the American 
Revolution as well, is that while the founding act seems unavoidably in need of 
a constative structure, it could not rely on absolutes as a possible source of 
authority. The paradox lies here in the fact that, historically, absolutes were 
performing exactly this role which is now separated and left for constative 
structures; as she puts it, “the legitimacy of rule in general, and the authority of 
secular law and power in particular, had always been justified by relating them 
to an absolute source which itself was not of this world.”350 So, the perplexity of 
Arendt could be described as follows: assuming that absolutes are violent, 
something has to take the role of the absolute without being it. Even in her 
formulations of a solution to the problem of finding an alternative source of 
authority to absolutes, she never gave up the term “absolute” (only occasionally 
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used it within quotation marks). For example, she says: “this ‘absolute’ lies in 
the very act of beginning itself,” or “the absolute from which the beginning is to 
derive its own validity … is the principle.”351 Rather than deducing from these 
cases an argument for a pure performative, it can be understood as expressing 
the inescapability of the constative dimension. However, if so, then the question 
appears how this distinction inside the constative structure becomes possible: 
why does not discarding of absolutes affect the constative dimension in general 
in the same way? 
For Derrida, the rejection of absolutes is not an option. For him, a perfor-
mative declaration always contains a certain originary violence or illegitimacy, 
because there is no people yet, before the founding act, to authorise the signing 
of the declaration of independence, which means that an absolute (a fable of 
God, for example) is absolutely necessary to hide this violence, without which 
no performative (as well as constative) is conceivable. This coup de force of 
retroactive signing, which at the same time must remain inconspicuous, is in 
every beginning, in every performative declaration of independence. 
In Arendt’s perspective things are different. Arendt’s theorisation of action, 
as it was expounded above, made apparent that action is theoretically con-
structed via power. Power, on the other hand, stands for Arendt in opposition to 
violence, as she very plainly states it in On Violence: “Power and violence are 
opposites; where the [first] one rules absolutely, the other is absent.”352 Hence, 
to bring something new into the world, one needs power, not violence, and 
power relates to the idea of people acting together, while violence is instru-
mental, as a means to an end. If action builds on power it “needs no justi-
fication,” for it springs up from the people themselves.353 It follows that even if 
the fleetingness of power eventually makes the constative structure necessary, it 
does not preclude the possibility of the initiation of action. In this respect, 
Arendt even states at one place in On Revolution that power and action “was 
enough ‘to go through a revolution’ …, [but] it was by no means enough to 
establish a ‘perpetual union’, that is, to found a new authority.”354 So, for 
Arendt, there is always a possibility of the very first initiation of action, which 
does not depend on an absolute or a constative. This is equally the condition to 
think of absolutes separately from (or in the dimension of) constatives. 
Having established this, it is possible to show, how the “irresistible” absolute 
can be considered as a radical violence that threatens the possibility of the very 
founding act. For that purpose, it is necessary to take another look on the 
relationship between power and violence in Arendt, which is, in fact, a bit more 
complicated than their just described oppositional nature to each other. 
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According to Arendt, power and violence appear also inevitably together, as it 
can be gathered from the following passage:  
 
Violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course it ends in 
power’s disappearance. This implies that it is not correct to think of the opposite 
of violence as non-violence; to speak of non-violent power is actually redundant. 
Violence can destroy power; it is utterly incapable of creating it.355  
 
In other words, and this is important for our purposes, the violence Arendt talks 
about can exist only together with power (even if being opposed to it). This 
means, however, that the violence located on the side of power depends in the 
same way as the latter for its stability (and perpetuity) on the constative side. 
But if it is assumed that there is any violence on the constative side (like the 
violence of absolutes) then it is the violence that could suspend all the interplay 
between the performative and the constative dimensions as well as destroy the 
violence on the side of power. The fact that the violence on the constative side, 
if there is such thing, must be thought as preceding the violence on the side of 
power, allows us to describe the latter as what was named above “undecidable 
violence.”356 On the other hand, radical violence on the side of the constative is 
the violence that, as it was argued, must have been the final target for 
Benjamin’s critique of violence and Derrida’s deconstructive resistance.  
It must be kept in mind that, as explained in the previous section, the radical 
violence (in the constative dimension) does not contradict the necessity for 
constatives in general, because the possibility of the initiation of action inde-
pendent from the constative side makes their distinction possible (i.e. between 
absolute violence and the violence that relates to constatives). 
As it can be discerned from the discussion above (e.g. from “if there is any 
violence on the constative side”), the radical violence (i.e. violence on the 
constative side) is not structurally explained in Arendt’s theory.357 An expli-
cation how absolutes can be thought embodying radical violence has to be 
deduced from the particular historical situation that, according to Arendt, 
accompanies the French and the American revolutions. Above all, this period 
was affected by the process of secularisation and its effects. Secularisation, by 
which Arendt means the separation of the secular and the religious spheres, left 
politics without the religious, “a transcendent and transmundane” source of 
authority. However, the real problems that the loss of the religious sanction 
brought along for the secular realm first remained concealed by the rise of 
absolutism, which “seemed to have found, within the political realm itself, a 
fully satisfactory substitute for the lost religious sanction of secular authority in 
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the person of the king or rather in the institution of kingship.”358 In the 
American and French revolutions, it is exactly this “pseudo-solution” that is 
unmasked, revealing a “profound instability, [being] the result of some elemen-
tary lack of authority.”359 The following passage, I quote in full, seems to 
contain all the elements necessary to explain the radical violence of absolutes 
that emerged as a result of the decline of absolutism: 
 
The revolutions, even when they were not burdened with the inheritance of 
absolutism as in the case of the American Revolution, still occurred within a 
tradition which was partly founded on an event in which the “word had become 
flesh,” that is, on an absolute that had appeared in historical time as a mundane 
reality. It was because of the mundane nature of this absolute that authority as 
such had become unthinkable without some sort of religious sanction, and since 
it was the task of the revolutions to establish a new authority, unaided by custom 
and precedent and the halo of immemorial time, they could not but throw into 
relief with unparalleled sharpness the old problem, not of law and power per se, 
but of the source of law which would bestow legality upon positive, posited 
laws, and of the origin of power which would bestow legitimacy upon the 
powers that be.360 
 
What has to be highlighted in this passage is Arendt’s depiction of an un-
solvable paradox that emerged for the initiators of these revolutions. When 
these revolutions of modern times were launched, they still faced the absolute 
source of authority as a seemingly successful guarantor of the entire secular 
realm. Indeed, they faced it and their project depended on it, but these revo-
lutions themselves also marked the failure of this absolute source of authority in 
their attempt “to establish a new authority, unaided by custom and prece-
dent.”361 The process of secularisation evolving in the background, the initiators 
were left with the failure of the very ground they could not disclaim. The failure 
of absolutes consists exactly in their appearing as compelling without argument 
and, therefore, despotic and violent, like Arendt describes them.362 This made 
absolutes unsuitable to be a source of authority for the republican founding act, 
because one cannot found such entity by recourse to violence in relation to 
those who make up this entity. On the other hand, this now violent ground 
regardless of its violence still functioned for the founders as their only possible 
ground of the revolution. This moment where a constative structure grounds, 
but nevertheless, also fails at the same time, is the moment of radical violence. 
At that moment, the very possibility of the founding act is put under question, 
and the interplay of the constative and the performative side is suspended. Here, 
we can also appreciate why the question of absolutes signifies such a paradox 
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for Arendt and why it induces such a sense of urgency in founders, putting the 
problem of finding a non-absolute source of authority “into relief with un-
paralleled sharpness,” as it is phrased in the above-cited passage. 
So, said differently, the passage from Arendt shows that the so-called 
“intermediate stage” of absolutism in the process of secularisation produced a 
situation where, on the one hand, the absolute, as already “a mundane reality,” 
was radically violent, but on the other hand, there was a meaning or sense 
related to absolutes of transmundane source, like God, that made the latter still 
an allure. By Arendt’s account, the French revolution could not break free from 
that spell and raised “the will of the nation” to the place of the transmundane 
source of authority and power, with its dismal consequences.363 The American 
Revolution was concerned mainly with finding authority (for “a new law of the 
land”) rather than power which they had derived from a different source of 
togetherness of the people.364  
Nevertheless, the Founding Fathers, as we have pointed out above, could not 
have refrained entirely from relying on absolutes. This being the case, Arendt 
still points to a possible excuse for the Founding Fathers, as their appeal to 
absolutes was intended perhaps differently. The despotic nature of expressions 
like “self-evident truths” and “nature’s God” that can be found in the text of the 
Declaration of American Independence refer above all to laws of reason such as 
we can confront in mathematics. But in that period of time, as Arendt observes, 
“mathematical laws were thought to be sufficiently irresistible to check the 
power of despots.”365 Their intention then was not simply to put absolutes in the 
place of a despot, but to include in it “a mechanism of check and balance.” 
Nevertheless, ultimately, “the fallacy of this position was … to believe that 
these mathematical ‘laws’ were of the same nature as the laws of a community, 
or that the former could somehow inspire the latter.”366 
If to leave aside this flirt with absolutes, there still is a “solution” for the 
problem of authority, that Arendt sees generating its effect in the American 
Revolution, and which eventually saves it from descending into chaos, but 
before it will be explicated any further, we examine how Arendt’s case can help 
to determine the radical violence in Derrida’s commentary on the Declaration. 
 
 
4.2 Derrida’s Violence 
As it was noted above, the “lines of force” and of rupture, along which the 
incision of deconstruction can be made, mark not the undecidable violence, but 
the radical one.367 The task then is to locate the line of rupture produced by the 
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radical violence, which allows deconstruction (deconstructive resistance) to be 
“inserted” (rather, inscribed) into the text. Setting up this task in the context of 
his text “Declarations of Independence” does not mean that Derrida has not 
dealt with violence in general, or with the radical violence in particular, in his 
works prior to the text on the Declaration. In his discussion of violence in the 
essay “Violence and Metaphysics” on Emmanuel Levinas, he notes that there is 
also a certain violence in the situation of urgency – which is the same kind of 
urgency that, according to Arendt, was felt by the Founding Fathers.368 In this 
sense, beyond radical violence of the absolutes, there still is a despotism of 
necessity or urgency to find a solution to this paradoxical situation, which 
would then make the solution, whatever it is, also a sort of violence (a sort of 
impossibility to act otherwise and with more consideration). This violence is 
called by Derrida a secondary violence, a “war upon the war,” and in taking up 
this theme, he clearly addresses the problem of radical violence:  
 
This secondary war, as the avowal of violence, is the least possible violence, the 
only way to repress the worst violence, the violence of primitive and prelogical 
silence, of an unimaginable night which would not even be the opposite of day, 
an absolute violence which would not even be the opposite of nonviolence: 
nothingness or pure non-sense.369  
 
Nevertheless, it is not immediately clear where the deconstructive moment of 
radical violence could be located in Derrida’s commentary on the Declaration. 
In order to reveal it, we take a lead from Arendt’s case, which can be described 
by pointing out two conflicting aspects in an absolute (source of authority): in 
its first aspect, an absolute (the constative dimension) grounds the secular 
realm, and therefore also the revolution, by guaranteeing (the possibility of) 
authority of the founding act; in its second aspect, the absolute, nevertheless, 
fails, as it gets “revealed as a facile expedient and subterfuge” by the revolution 
itself.370 
The corresponding situation in Derrida’s analysis to the first aspect by which 
the founding of a new authority leans on an absolute (or on a constative 
dimension) is immediately obvious in that the declaration of independence must 
be, as Derrida puts it, countersigned by an absolute, for example, by God. 
However, as for the second aspect, an essential difference between Derrida’s 
and Arendt’s cases should be taken into account. While Arendt’s depiction or 
construction of the situation of the radical violence is, as we saw, historical, 
then Derrida’s must be structural, because the role of the absolute is to make 
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possible the interplay of constatives and performatives that “grounds” the whole 
founding act by hiding the violence of the performative. Now, having estab-
lished above that the success of the absolute to hide violence rests upon its 
ability to erase time so that the signature-giving and its authorisation take place 
“in the simulacrum of the instant,” it can be assumed that the key to the radical 
violence has to be found in the dimension of time. 
Hence, the next step is to carefully consider the relation of the absolute to 
time. An absolute, for example, God, allows to think that the people have 
produced their freedom, but at the same time they also have confirmed it, 
because they are already free by the sanction of God. So, focusing on this 
moment of “the simulacrum of the instant,” it can be noticed that what the 
instant, in fact, creates is the “eternal time” of the people (their beginning from 
the time immemorial). But the eternal time cannot exist prior to the instant or 
somehow after it; it emerges in the very instant of the founding act, and 
therefore, the instant must be divided by the eternal time of the people from the 
very outset.  
So it follows that at the moment of the instant, where the people are already 
free by God, the instant is put into question by the eternal time that it grounds. 
In other words, this division of the instant implies that the eternal time of the 
people cannot arrive at an instant, but must be thought as delayed, constitutively 
delayed; as if it is late to itself, so to say. The same line of thought has been 
proposed by Richard Beardsworth: “The unsurpassable violence of law (its 
aporia) is predicated on the delay of time. An act of legislation always arrives 
too early and/or too late.”371 
 
4.2.1 The Event of the Signature 
My argument in the following is that the delay of time translates in the context 
of the Declaration to the delay of the signature. God countersigns, but the 
founding signature under the Declaration, nevertheless, does not “arrive” at the 
“right” time. The lag in the signature reveals the moment of radical violence, 
because God, an absolute, precisely had already signed, but he signed inconclu-
sively and the signature is failing. In order to see what the “delaying signature” 
entails theoretically, some further clarifications are needed.  
The act of signing has been analysed above by recourse to the infrastructure 
“iterability”.372 However, in order to emphasise different aspects of it, I recast 
the problem of the signature less in terms of a beginning but of an event, and 
analyse the signature via infrastructure “undecidability.” After all, Derrida’s 
term for describing infrastructures has been the “non-synonymous substitu-
tions,” meaning that even if infrastructures are substitutable, they still are not 
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synonymous, and the transcription via a different infrastructure could reveal 
other angles to the signature.373 
“Undecidability” is perhaps best explained by Derrida in his article “Force of 
Law” under the second aporia of law, which is, as he calls it, “the ghost of the 
undecidable.”374 The “logic” of the undecidability could be put as follows. A 
decision seeks to appear as definitive, infallible, authoritative, like the decision 
of a court, which cannot, for example, sentence anybody to death by expressing 
a probable, likely, unsure opinion on the matter of guilt.375 But it only can 
pretend to be definitive and final if it pursues a rule, a prescription, a logic. 
However, if the decision follows a rule, a prescription, etc., it cannot be a deci-
sion anymore, but a calculation; it is a calculation that establishes itself as a 
complete and infallible by following certain rules. So it follows that as long as 
the decision is not a calculation, it must be preceded not by a rule, but by a risk, 
uncertainty, openness, in short, undecidability. Derrida says: “A decision that 
didn’t go through the ordeal of the undecidable would not be a free decision, it 
would only be the programmable application or unfolding of a calculable 
process.”376 But even more importantly, the decision can never entirely over-
come this uncertainty, because then it must have been still a calculation. 
According to Derrida: 
 
the undecidable remains caught, lodged, at least as a ghost – but an essential 
ghost – in every decision, in every event of decision. Its ghostliness deconstructs 
from within any assurance of presence, any certitude or any supposed 
criteriology that would assure us of the justice of a decision, in truth of the very 
event of a decision.377 
 
This is an aporia that affects law and justice. It must be noted that un-
decidability as an infrastructure in Derridean sense has to be kept apart from a 
mere “oscillation [or tension] between two significations, [or decisions] or two 
contradictory and very determinate rules, each equally imperative.”378 Even if it 
can be called as an undecidability, it is not the same as the undecidability in the 
“infrastructural” sense.379 
It follows from the “logic” of undecidability, as explicated above, that any 
signature, also a founding signature, understood as an event, must have a possi-
bility to fail, because otherwise it would be a mere calculability. In the context 
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of the founding act, since the people as an entity does not exist prior to signing 
the declaration, the failure of the “signature” to found is the failure to create this 
very entity in the name of which the signature could have been given. Hence, 
the founding signature, being the signature that creates its own authorisation, 
and that exists only due to this authorisation, can appear only as a successful 
signature, because the failure of the signature, strictly speaking, cannot be 
conceived; it does not appear. Therefore, also, the failure of the founding 
signature cannot be understood as a simple non-recognition or illegitimacy (of 
the once successful signature) but only as a non-presence; there is no one to 
have recognised the signature. At the same time, even if the signature is 
successful in achieving its recognition and it comes into existence, this non-
presence cannot be erased from the structure of the signature, because without 
the possibility of the failure of the founding signature, there is no signature at 
all; if the recognition of the signature were always already guaranteed ahead, 
there would be no need for it. Therefore, non-presence always remains in the 
signature and it is a necessary part of the structure of the signature. 
A signature permeated by non-presence might seem a paradox. On the one 
hand, non-presence cannot directly stand against the presence of the signature as 
its simple cancellation. If this were the case, no signing could take place at all. 
On the other hand, non-presence obviously cannot inhabit in the signature as a 
complete nothing, without any effect, because then it would remain entirely 
unintelligible. 
These two moments of non-presence as “cancellation” and “unintelligibility” 
are united or “reconciled” in the delay of the signature. The structure of delay is 
constituted of two sides. Firstly, there is a possibility of failure of the signature 
that places the non-presence in the very heart of the signature. But, secondly, 
there must also be a possibility of the signature (as a non-erasable potentiality), 
which allows for the non-presence to achieve its intelligibility. Such a possi-
bility must exist, because delay itself (as delaying) cannot be directly perceived 
– it necessarily “occurs” prior to the presence of the signature. Without the non-
erasable possibility of the signature, there would not be even non-presence, 
because non-presence is not dividable between itself and its possibility. There-
fore, there would be no delay, but simply nothing in this situation.  
Hence, the delay of the signature cannot be conceived without the non-
erasable possibility. It can be noticed that it is the same kind of theoretical 
necessity as it was for Arendt who had to establish the possibility of differen-
tiation between the constative and the absolute, by constructing the possibility 
of initiation of action independent from the constative dimension. This warrants 
a generalisation of the “non-erasable possibility” of the signature, as it was 
termed here, to a sort of transcendental condition of possibility of deconstruc-
tive intervention. As much as locating of radical violence in Derrida’s account 
of the Declaration presumes a clarification of the transcendental possibility or 
the non-erasable possibility of the signature, then in the following section, it 
will be shown how this is theorised by Derrida. 
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4.2.2 Transcendental Possibility 
It has been established above that a deconstructive intervention is not simply 
inserted from the outside, but it is always already taking place in its structural 
possibility by undoing internally the deconstructed system. However, a 
deconstructive intervention does not emanate simply from the inside either, 
which means that the incision of deconstruction is still necessary, and this is 
performed on the line of rupture created by the radical violence. This raises a 
question how to think of the incision that is made neither from the outside nor 
the inside. As much as the task of deconstruction is to account for contra-
dictions and aporias, the problem encountered here is essentially the same as 
posed by Gasché: “If the infrastructures do not constitute, engender, or produce 
these differences or contradictions, how, then, do they relate to them … how, 
then, are we to think their intercourse with that of which they are infra-
structures?”380  
So it is that the incision of deconstruction cannot produce or start decon-
struction, but neither is it simply a supplement and an addition to what takes 
place independently; as Derrida puts it: “The incision is neither the incised 
integrity of a beginning, or of a simple cutting into, nor simple secondarity.”381 
However, if the incision does not produce deconstruction, and at the same time, 
still is a necessary part of deconstruction, then the incision must have its own 
space of occurring already imbedded in what is incised; i.e. the incision itself, 
prior to its deconstructive effects, should have its own conditions of possibility. 
In other words, undecidable violence as a structural possibility is not the 
condition of possibility for the incision of deconstruction, but rather a condition 
of its effects, but the incision requires a sort of transcendental condition of 
possibility, a space of appearance, so to say, “prior to” the structural possibility. 
This space of appearance marks the non-erasable possibility. 
The intricacy of the problem can perhaps be best explained by recourse to an 
example. Derrida employs the figure of a letter-opener in a few places in 
“Dissemination;” he says: “‘Scission’ … also marks the arbitrary insertion of 
the letter-opener by which the reading process is opened up.”382 I follow his 
usage and exemplify the incision of deconstruction by an incision or scission 
performed by a letter opener to open up reticent pages of the book. The first 
moment of interest is that the incision of a letter opener occurs along the bend 
of a sheet, just like “according to lines of force and forces of rupture that are 
localisable in the discourse to be deconstructed.”383 But the second moment is, 
and this is important, that the incision does not produce the space it opens up 
between the sheets of the book. Rather, it requires that space, a determined 
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space or blank behind the surface of the bend to be able to make the cut. Derrida 
says at one point in Dissemination: “It [the fold] differs from itself, even before 
the letter opener can separate the lips of the book. It is divided from and by 
itself.”384 This space, that is already waiting there, but still as if a secret, can 
also be referred to as a determined blank or a fold or a playing space. Derrida 
works it out with the help of “to come” theoretical articulation: “the determined 
blank or playing space [is] imposed by the still to come theoretical articu-
lation.”385 He has developed two concepts on the basis of this idea, “justice to 
come” and “democracy to come,” from which the first one is explicated next to 
show how “to come” theoretical articulation theorises the space of incision as a 
non-erasable possibility. 
 
4.2.2.1 “Justice to Come” 
The idea of justice (to come) relates directly to the aporia of undecidability and 
is analysed in the first part of “Force of Law.” Derrida argues there that justice 
has to be able to respond to the singularity of a case, and therefore, it has to 
untangle itself from a rule, a law and be open to undecidability. At the same 
time, justice also cannot be attained without a decision, “for only a decision is 
just.”386 This amounts to a sort of a paradox by which justice can never be fully 
present:  
 
And once the ordeal of the undecidable is past (if that is possible), the decision 
has again followed a rule or given itself a rule, invented it or reinvented, 
reaffirmed it, it is no longer presently just, fully just. There is apparently no 
moment in which a decision can be called presently and fully just: either it has 
not yet been made according to a rule, and nothing allows us to call it just, or it 
has already followed a rule – whether received, confirmed, conserved or 
reinvented – which in its turn is not absolutely guaranteed by anything; and 
moreover, if it were guaranteed, the decision would be reduced to calculation and 
we couldn’t call it just.387  
 
Nevertheless, it does not mean that there is no point in talking about justice; on 
the contrary, justice is required: “The deconstruction … itself operates on the 
basis of an infinite ‘idea of justice,’ infinite because it is irreducible, irreducible 
because owed to the other, owed to the other, before any contract, because it has 
come, the other’s coming as the singularity that is always other.”388 Justice, as 
responding to the other in its singularity, is owed to the other who is neither 
excluded as alien nor included as the same, and the other’s remaining the other 
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precludes justice to be thought as completed, or done, because the other cannot 
be known, i.e. appropriated. Justice is never already done, decided (by a lawful 
decision, for example), but it is always still to come. Therefore, the concept of 
“justice to come” marks an inevitable gap between law and justice:  
 
Law is the element of calculation, and it is just that there be law, but justice is 
incalculable, it requires us to calculate with the incalculable; and aporetic 
experiences are the experiences, as improbable as they are necessary, of justice, 
that is to say of moments in which the decision between just and unjust is never 
insured by a rule.389 
 
Hence, also, justice to come is the possibility of a “space” for a new declaration 
and signature, or for an incision into the law, because there never is enough 
justice, which is to say that justice is never fully present, to redress an expec-
tation and urgency for a new signature, for a new promise of justice. Derrida 
concludes: 
 
For this very reason, it may have an avenir, a “to-come,” which I rigorously 
distinguish from the future that can always reproduce the present. Justice 
remains, is yet, to come, à venir, it has an, it is à-venir, the very dimension of 
events irreducibly to come. It will always have it, this à-venir, and always has.390 
 
This means that the signature is always possible and waited for, because justice 
is never executed in full − there always is a space for another signature, for 
another promise of justice. It can be said that every present signature, every 
founded law and identity is always already producing (a possibility of or 
potentiality for) another signature, law, identity from inside, because justice 
remains to come. The importance of the theoretical articulation of “justice to 
come” reverberates back in his statement that “deconstruction is justice:” “The 
undeconstructibility of justice also makes deconstruction possible, indeed is 
inseparable from it.”391 It is understandable, for it is its transcendental condition 
of possibility. 
Now, having established that “justice to come” theorises what has been 
called the determined space of incision, or a certain transcendental condition of 
possibility for deconstructive intervention, it is possible to fully outline the 
moment of radical violence and to understand how the signature can be 
suspended in its possibility, so that it infinitely delays. 
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4.2.3 Radical Violence in Derrida 
As concluded in the previous section, on the basis of “justice to come” as a non-
erasable possibility, the delay of the signature can be fully delineated. Since 
delay cannot be directly perceived, it must “occur” as an internal moment of the 
signature, which is to say that at the moment of its appearance, the signature has 
been delayed – it appeared “later,” not in the “right” time. In other words, delay 
happens only at (or in) the moment of appearing of the signature, because prior 
to its appearance, there can be no deadline set for the signature. In the context of 
the Declaration, this means that God has signed and the signature has appeared 
to authorise the Declaration, but it happened too late. So it is that in an instant, 
God creates the eternal time of the people so that the Declaration is also a 
confirmation of their freedom, but as soon as people already are free by the 
grace of God, there is no univocal relation to a possible signer (who was to sign 
in fact). Inevitably, the question emerges, who represents the people in their 
eternal time; who amongst them signs the declaration, because there is no one 
by right to sign the confirming declaration – no signature is better than any 
other. 
The whole history that was invented with the eternal time puts under ques-
tion every signature that is proposed to sign in representation of the eternally 
free people, and this question emerges from the very beginning, at the moment 
of no time, forming an internal structure of the founding act. Therefore, it holds 
the signature back; it does not let it emerge, and with that the whole founding 
act is put on hold, as if the instant of God’s countersignature itself did not arrive 
at all. In the delay of the signature, what is faced is precisely what Derrida has 
termed “nothingness or pure non-sense.”392 Here it can be seen how retro-
activity, which is disavowal of time, and delay, which is temporalisation, clash 
with each other. 
Another way to put it is to say that, in its presence, (a space of) the signature 
appears temporalised. Such a delay reveals then a temporal as well as a spatial 
gap between the signature and the text. The signature, as soon as it is added to 
the text, does not hold together with the text (anymore) and is separated from it, 
because signing takes place later (or in advance) than writing of the text to be 
signed, and also below (or above) that text, i.e. outside the text. This funda-
mentally undermines the signature, because the text, the declaration, was first 
written violently outside the law. In “Signsponge,” Derrida similarly describes 
the signature’s belonging to the text and its “falling” outside the text at the same 
time:  
 
By not letting the signature fall outside the text any more, as an undersigned 
subscription, and by inserting it into the body of the text, you monumentalize, 
institute, and erect it into a thing or a stony object. But in doing so, you also lose 
                                                                          
392  Supra, n. 369. 
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the identity, the title of ownership over the text: you let it become a moment or a 
part of the text, as a thing or a common noun.393 
 
So, if the signature is in the text, it loses its authorisation; if it is outside the text, 
it disappears.  
The moment of radical violence is manifested in the question “who signs?,” 
because in the delay of the signature, all possible signatures would be violent, 
but the signature cannot found freedom by recourse to violence in regard to 
those who are freed. Due to the aporia of time, God arrives to sign, but he fails 
to sign conclusively; i.e. at the moment when it appears that (as if) people have 
been always already free, the question emerges, “who signs?,” for besides 
God’s signature there must be somebody else who signs for the people in repre-
senting them. The founding act is left in a limbo. 
Therefore, the question “who signs?” is the line of rupture, which makes it 
possible to make a deconstructive incision, an intervention. Indeed, Derrida’s 
text on the Declaration starts with this question: “And out of all these questions, 
the only one I will retain for the occasion … is this one: who signs, and with 
what so-called proper name, the declarative act that founds an institution?” and 
the texts ends with the same question: “The question remains: … Who signs all 
of these authorisations to sign?”394 
This is the deconstructive moment in the text of “Declarations of Inde-
pendence;” the question “who signs?” marks out the line of rupture in any 
founding act. However, it might be argued that this question frames the text, or 
sets its margins, and its division, in such a manner that the question itself is not 
questioned; what is dealt with is what remains unquestionable in the question 
(which is undecidable violence). Derrida himself gives a sign of this withdrawal 
by finishing his text saying: “I will not, in spite of my promise, engage myself 
on this path today,” i.e. of answering (or rather questioning) the question “who 
signs?”. This is what has allowed me to argue that it is not a “properly" 
deconstructive text; though, not because the question is not answered, as it 
cannot be, but because it is not questioned, at least not in this text.395 Above all, 
this means that if deconstructive incision is marked out, the incision itself is not 
performed yet (one might say, not re-marked yet). Infrastructure, that precludes 
falling back into the “third term” that would bind everything back together, is 
not yet forged and enacted. This task it is taken up in the last part of the thesis 
                                                                          
393  Jacques Derrida, “From Singsponge,” in D. Attridge (ed.) Acts of Literature (New York 
& London: Routledge, 1992), p. 363. Also, Jacques Derrida, Signéponge = Signsponge 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), p. 56. 
394  Derrida, Negotiations, p. 50. 
395  See on the question of question (and for the shortest synopsis of Derrida’s project in 
general) an interview with Derrida “What comes before the question?,” which is published 
as a footage linked to the documentary Derrida by Kirby Dick, and Amy Ziering Kofman 
(USA: Zeitgeist Films, 2002). Accessible also in YouTube:  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z2bPTs8fspk (6.24 min.) 
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with some help (perhaps) of Arendt and Benjamin, whose theories are dealt 
with next. 
In this chapter, a different interpretation of Arendt’s theory was developed, 
which allowed us to argue that while Arendt rejected absolutes as a source of 
authority for the republican founding act, she did not abandon the constative 
dimension in general. Furthermore, exactly for the reason that she did not do 
that, she was forced to address the radical violence. Under this reinterpretation, 
it became possible to read Arendt’s account of radical violence into Derrida’s 
interpretation of the Declaration, and to reveal the latter’s limits. In the next 
chapter, we consider what it entails to think radical violence and how different 
authors try to cope with that task. In the second part of thesis as a whole, we 
start to examine how deconstructive approach reveals limits of Arendt’s account 
of legitimacy and of Benjamin’s account of violence. 
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PART II 
Chapter 5: Benjamin and Arendt:  
Reconciling Radical Violence 
5.1 Benjamin’s Critique of Violence, Continued 
In the second part of the thesis the main question is how it is possible to 
“contain” the radical violence. So far we have located the radical violence in 
accounts of Arendt and Derrida, but we have not shown how they deal with it. It 
has been also stated that it is indispensable for the deconstructive resistance to 
theorise the radical violence, for it disrupts the return of the same, or put 
differently, if such resistance is not thought in the founding act, then it replaces 
the absolute with itself. At the same time, as it has been pointed out in their 
accounts, there is an intolerable urgency in this suspension of the founding act 
to find a way out and solve the paradox.  
In the following, I am going to examine possible “solutions” to the radical 
violence. Firstly, I return to Benjamin’s critique of violence, which is an inter-
esting and controversial case of a possible “solution.” The radical violence was 
not located in Benjamin’s analysis earlier because there is a possibility of seeing 
precisely in Benjamin’s idea of radical violence an attempt at solving the 
problem of violence of law. Some readings have seen in this concurrency a sign 
of Benjamin’s failure; others, in contrast, have called it “deconstruction before 
the name.”396 After the analysis of Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence,” I 
elaborate on a possible solution of Arendt to the situation of radical violence, 
and, by the same token, to the problem of founding a republic. Finally, I 
propose a “solution” in line with Derrida’s deconstruction, which is deduced 
from the act of signing the Declaration that founds a state. 
Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence” was used above to outline the concept of 
undecidable violence, but as it was noted, his critique of violence, as much as it 
targets violence as such, could not stop at this point. First of all, facing the 
impossibility of maintaining a clear demarcating line between violence and non-
violence, between law-making and law-preserving violence, Benjamin rules out 
two forms of criticism of violence as inadequate. 
In the first case, he argues that “a really effective critique of it [violence] is 
far less easy than the declamations of pacifists and activists suggest,” because, 
in so far as all non-violence supports in some sense the same violence against 
which it stands, as it was shown above, all attempts of critique from the position 
of (presumably) complete non-violence become discredited.397 This explains 
Benjamin’s rejection of all that kind of “childish anarchism,” as he says, for it 
remains impotent: “Attacks that are made merely in the name of a formless 
                                                                          
396  Samuel Weber, “Deconstruction Before the Name: Some Preliminary Remarks on 
Deconstruction and Violence,” Cardozo Law Review, Vol. 13 (1991), p. 1181. 
397  Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” p. 284. See above, p. 76–7. 
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‘freedom’ without being able to specify this higher order of freedom, remain 
impotent against it.”398  
The second form of criticism that Benjamin dubs as insufficient, attacks 
particular laws and policies in the name of non-violence. The weakness of this 
approach is explained by reference to fate. Namely, in law’s eyes, there is no 
contradiction in punishing of what might seem an accidental infringement of an 
unwritten law, because according to law’s self-understanding, so to say, law is 
fate: “however unluckily it may befall its unsuspecting victim, its occurrence is, 
in the understanding of the law, not chance, but fate.”399 Law (or an in-
fringement of the law) is waiting for a trespasser as the latter’s fate, so that at 
the moment of an accident, in law’s eyes, the trespasser will have been always 
already guilty. The figure of “fate” assembles here the undecidability of law, the 
uncertainty of the demarcating line between us and them, between law-
preserving and law-making. This means, above all, that law does not apply as a 
deterrent, because this would “require a certainty that contradicts the nature of a 
threat and is not attained by any law, since there is always hope of eluding its 
arm.”400 Law’s nature as fate, Benjamin suggests, can be also identified in the 
principle of modern law by which “ignorance of a law is not protection against 
punishment.”401 On these grounds, for Benjamin, all attempts to attack the 
violence of law by proposing to diminish its uncertainty through impugning 
particular laws and legal practices fail because “law-preserving violence is a 
threatening violence” and it is indifferent towards such calculations; in law’s 
perspective, everything “what threatens, belongs inviolably to its order.”402 
Relating law to fate also allows for Benjamin to name law-preserving and law-
making violence together as “mythical violence.” 
As a result of these considerations, Benjamin concludes that the task of 
critiquing violence as such is much more difficult, because now “such a critique 
coincides with the critique of all legal violence – that is, with the critique of 
legal or executive force – and cannot be performed by any lesser program.”403 
Excluding these forms of criticism, Benjamin shows that, on the one hand, there 
is a futility of the straightforward critique against violence from the position of 
non-violence itself. On the other hand, this leads Benjamin to a certain paradox, 
because he shows next that the non-violent sphere itself is possible. For 
                                                                          
398  Ibid., p. 285. 
399  Ibid., p. 296. 
400  Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” p. 285. 
401  Ibid. Cf. Jacques Derrida, “Before the Law,” in D. Attridge (ed.) Acts of Literature (New 
York and London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 181–220. 
402  Ibid. 
403  Ibid., p. 284. /s. 187: “Sie [durchschlagende Kritik] fällt vielmehr mit der Kritik aller 
Rechtsgewalt, das heißt mit der Kritik der legalen oder exekutiven Gewalt zusammen und ist 
bei einem minderen Programm gar nicht zu leisten.” As the translation of Benjamin’s rather 
elusory text might not convey all the nuances that could be of importance in such a close 
reading, I append German originals to the quoted passages from Walter Benjamin, 
Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 2 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991). 
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example, this is the case in relationships of private persons in regard to “matters 
concerning objects,” i.e. in commerce.404 The possibility of exclusion of 
violence in principle for such affairs is demonstrable by the fact that “there is no 
sanction for lying,” which shows, in other words, that there is a human sphere, 
“the proper sphere of ‘understanding,’ language,” that is inaccessible to 
violence.405 A special case of non-violent means is a proletarian general strike. 
Benjamin borrows the concept from Georges Sorel, who introduced a distinc-
tion between political and proletarian general strikes in his Réflexions sur la 
violence (1908).406 The first, a political general strike, “is violent since it causes 
only an external modification of labour conditions,” however, the second, “sets 
itself the sole task of destroying state power,” and therefore, as much as “it 
takes place not in readiness to resume work following external concessions,” is 
nonviolent and “a pure means.”407 In addition, Benjamin counts among non-
violent means the informal dealings of diplomats in resolving conflicts between 
states they respectively represent, and also referees who in a somewhat different 
way and context do the same. 
It appears that the critique of violence resting on the ideal of non-violence is 
futile, but on the other hand, non-violent means of handling human affairs are 
possible. Benjamin faces here a paradox, because the sphere of non-violence 
cannot be created by non-violence (for the critique of violence from the 
perspective of a simple demand for such means cannot achieve its end), and the 
non-violent sphere cannot obviously be generated by the undecidable violence 
itself. The conclusion that non-violence is ineffective and the undecidable 
violence “gravely problematic” makes Benjamin to search for another kind of 
violence: “Since … every conceivable solution to human problems … remains 
impossible if violence is totally excluded in principle, the question arises as to 
other kinds of violence than all those envisaged by legal theory.”408 
                                                                          
404  Ibid., p. 289. /s. 191: “auf dem Wege über die Sachen.” 
405  Ibid. If there are sanctions for lying nowadays, then according to Benjamin, this is only 
the result of “a peculiar process of decay,” and a sign of the lack of confidence on the part of 
the law, for it places penalty on fraud “not out of moral considerations, but for fear of the 
violence that it might unleash in the defrauded party.” Ibid., pp. 289–90. 
406  See, Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence (Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
407  Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” p. 291. / Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, s. 194: 
“setzt der proletarische [Generalstreik] sich die eine einzige Aufgabe der Vernichtung der 
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äußerliche Modifikation der Arbeitsbedingungen wieder die Arbeit aufzunehmen, so ist die 
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die Arbeit aufzunehmen.” See also Sorel, Reflections on Violence, pp. 109–173. 
408  Ibid., p. 293. /s. 196: “Da … jede Vorstellung einer irgendwie denkbaren Lösung 
menschlicher Aufgaben …, unter völliger und prinzipieller Ausschaltung jedweder Gewalt 
unvollziehbar bleibt, so nötigt sich die Frage nach andern Arten der Gewalt auf, als alle 
Rechtstheorie ins Auge faßt.” 
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First, he reminds us the basic dogma of all legal theories that “just ends can be 
attained by justified means, justified means used for just ends,” against which 
he then puts up a hypothesis that there must be a non-mediate kind of violence, 
a sort of pure violence:  
 
How would it be, therefore, if all the violence imposed by fate, using justified 
means, were of itself in irreconcilable conflict with just ends, and if at the same 
time a different kind of violence came into view that certainly could be either the 
justified or the unjustified means to those ends, but was not related to them as 
means at all but in some different way?409 
 
In this hypothesis, Benjamin does nothing else than unfolds the situation of 
radical violence. Benjamin depicts a situation where justified means, i.e. legiti-
mate violence of law, could not appear, because they are in irreconcilable 
conflict with just ends, which are decided by God.410 This means that legitimate 
violence, under the title of power, remains suspended, revealing an entirely 
different sort of violence that is called in this thesis as the radical violence. As 
Benjamin relates law-making and preserving violence to fate, which belongs to 
the mythical domain, he dubs this radical violence, being the violence that halts 
mythical violence, as “divine violence.” The radicality of this violence becomes 
also apparent in Benjamin’s portrayal of divine violence through contradistin-
guishing it from mythical violence:  
 
If mythical violence is lawmaking, divine violence is law-destroying; if the 
former sets boundaries, the later boundlessly destroys them; if mythical violence 
brings at once guilt and retribution [die Sühne], divine power only expiates; if 
former threatens, the latter strikes; if the former is bloody, the latter is lethal 
without spilling blood.411  
 
It might be said that it is this characterisation of divine violence by Benjamin 
that has led to the emergence of two divergent “schools” of interpretation on the 
overall outcome of Benjamin’s critique of violence. There is an approach of 
Derrida and after him, Gasché, who argue that Benjamin’s divine violence falls 
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back into the schema it is supposed to criticise. Gasché calls it “Benjamin’s 
hypercriticism,” and clearly dissociates it from deconstruction (even if 
Benjamin is affected by deconstruction already in progress in the text). As much 
as later sections in this chapter well illuminate their perspective, next I will 
dwell on the argument of the other approach, which, probably, finds its most 
systematic exposition in Werner Hamacher’s article “Afformative, Strike,” 
though, there are also many other sympathetic authors to this cause.412 In gen-
eral, this line of interpretation advances the argument that the divine violence 
not only marks a radical rupture, but prefigures a genuine, deconstructive 
“solution” to the situation. According to Hamacher, the divine violence is not a 
substitution of the (positing) violence of law (i.e. a substitution of “one violence 
with another”413), but it is altogether something else, that, as he puts it, does not 
posit, nor oppose, but deposes (entsetzen).414 
Benjamin’s text certainly seems to lend support to this interpretation of 
divine violence as deposing violence. Firstly, even if divine violence is de-
scribed as striking and lethal violence, and “it is justifiable to call this violence, 
too, annihilating,” it does not mean conferring on humans “lethal power against 
one another … For the question ‘May I kill?’ meets its irreducible answer in the 
commandment ‘Thou shalt not kill’.”415 Hence, no potential pretexts or 
justifications can be drawn from the character of divine violence for human 
behaviour.  
Another favourable point for their argument is related to the fact that, by 
Benjamin’s description, the highest manifestation of divine violence by humans, 
revolutionary violence, is non-violent, a pure means – it consists of refusing to 
work without any specific end in mind, and therefore, as Hamacher puts it, “the 
proletarian strike can no longer be understood within a logic of positings and 
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Routledge, 1994), pp. 110–138. Other authors who are writing in this tradition include 
Matthias Fritch, Samuel Weber, Robert Sinnerbrink, and others. 
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27
105
their decay, or within a dialectic of performatives or of production.”416 Perhaps, 
the most important passage in Benjamin’s text for this line of reasoning is 
where he cautions: 
  
Less possible and also less urgent for humankind, however, is to decide when 
unalloyed violence has been realized in particular cases. For only mythical 
violence, not divine, will be recognisable as such with certainty, unless it be in 
incomparable effects, because the expiatory power of violence is not visible to 
men.417 
 
This means that divine violence is not decidable by human beings at all, even if 
it remains still as a possibility; it is determinable only in its effects, but never 
before. Hamacher concludes on this: “pure violence ‘shows’ itself precisely in 
the fact that it never appears as such.”418 If it does not appear as such, it cannot 
be a substitute for mythical violence.  
An interesting reading of the last sentence of Benjamin’s text by Samuel 
Weber might be added to these points, which clearly departs from Derrida’s 
reading. The latter indicates the closeness between Benjamin’s first name, 
Walter, and the last words of the text, “die waltende,” as if Benjamin indis-
cernibly signs the text inside it, taking by that, perhaps, the position of a divine 
violence. The last sentence is: “Die göttliche Gewalt, welche lnsignium und 
Siegel, niemals Mittel heiliger Vollstreckung ist, mag die waltende heißen.” / 
“Divine violence, which is the sign and the seal but never the means of sacred 
execution, may be called sovereign violence.”419 
Weber, on the other hand, emphasises the ending of the word “waltende,” 
which refers to the grammatical form of the present participle; in English, it 
would give “-ing” ending, so that “waltende” could be then translated as not 
“sovereign” but “governing” violence. But governing violence “spans the oppo-
sition” of lawmaking and law-preserving violence, “parasiting and contami-
nating each of the two poles of the alternative.”420 In that case, the opposition is 
kept, rather than substituted, and even if divine violence is to found “a new 
historical epoch,” it is done not before, nor after, but “on the breaking of this 
cycle maintained by mythical forms of law, on the suspension [Entsetzung] of 
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law …, and finally on the abolition of state power.”421 Divine violence is bound 
to intervene, i.e. to govern, without interruption, all the time. 
Hamacher assembles all these motives together into a “concept” that 
suspends and enables (“solves”) at the same time: “It would rather be the pre-
possibility which is ‘realised’ in no performative, let alone in a constative, and 
does not strive for ‘realisation’.”422 Thus, according to Hamacher, the divine 
violence could be understood as afformative; it is not a performative, as it is not 
positing anything, but “an absolute imperformative,” “as depositive, as political 
a-thesis.”423 Afformative contrasts to the performative, or “performation,” by 
writing off the (Latin) prefix “per-” with the prefix “af-”, which “marks the 
opening of an act, and of an act of opening.”424 But afformative does not 
substitute the performative entirely; it remains as an opening to any positing, 
any performative, or formation. But afformative is an opening not only to the 
performative, but to itself as well, so that “afformation means also exposing to 
the unposited, giving what cannot become a gift, an event of formation which is 
not exhaustible by any form.”425 Afformative “is” “the event of forming, itself 
formless, to which all forms and all performative acts remain exposed.”426 As 
such, afformatives function in a twofold manner; first:  
 
[They let something] enter into the realm of positings, from which they 
themselves are excluded; and, second, … they are not what shows up in the 
realm of positings, so that the field of phenomenality, as the field of positive 
manifestation, can only indicate the effects of the afformative as ellipses, pauses, 
interruptions, displacements, etc., but can never contain or include them.427 
 
Therefore, all in all, “afformative, or pure, violence, is a ‘condition’ for any 
instrumental, performative violence, and, at the same time, a condition which 
suspends their fulfilment in principle.”428  
As it might be recognised, although it is not in any way acknowledged in the 
text, Hamacher has built up the “movement” of afformative in a perfectly 
deconstructive fashion – afformative, divine violence, makes something pos-
sible, while at the same time withdrawing from what was accomplished. This is 
similar to what Derrida says of infrastructures, like for example of the trace: 
“the trace is never as it is in the presentation of itself. It erases itself in 
                                                                          
421  Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” p. 300 (with my emphases). / Benjamin, Gesammelte 
Schriften, s. 202: “Auf der Durchbrechung dieses Umlaufs im Banne der mythischen 
Rechtsformen, auf der Entsetzung des Rechts samt den Gewalten …, zuletzt also der 
Staatsgewalt, begründet sich ein neues geschichtliches Zeitalter.” 
422  Hamacher, “Afformative, Strike,” p. 1140. 
423  Ibid., p. 1138. 
424  Ibid., p. 1139. 
425  Ibid., p. 1143. 
426  Ibid., p. 1139. 
427  Ibid. 
428  Ibid. 
107 
presenting itself.”429 To this closeness of afformative to deconstruction, I will 
return in a short while, but at this point, I would like to propose another kind of 
reading that maintains the intrinsic (but unintentional) ambiguity of Benjamin’s 
text; in my opinion, Benjamin’s position remains ambivalent despite its aims.  
It has been argued above that radical violence becomes discernible in the 
constative dimension as a whole only against the assumption of a certain 
inerasable possibility; for Arendt, it was the possibility of the initiation of action 
and for Derrida it was the transcendental condition of “justice to come.” In 
Benjamin’s case, a similar possibility was marked out in the possibility of a 
non-violent sphere of conflict resolution. As it was shown above, the paradox 
that ensued from the assumption of such non-violent sphere forced Benjamin to 
form a hypothesis of altogether different kind of violence. Nevertheless, on 
closer inspection, the possibility of the non-violent sphere cannot be thought to 
take the function of the transcendental condition or possibility. 
Benjamin points to the possibility of the non-violent sphere by listing several 
instances of the use of pure means, the most important of which is the possi-
bility of revolutionary violence of the proletarian general strike. At first sight, it 
might seem that on the basis of these manifestations, he isolates radical violence 
under the name of “divine violence.” However, in the very end of the text, he 
turns the logic around, when he argues that “if the existence of violence outside 
the law, as pure immediate violence, is assured, this furnishes the proof that 
revolutionary violence, the highest manifestation of unalloyed violence by man, 
is possible, and by what means.”430 In this sentence, the radical or divine vio-
lence proves the possibility of the non-violent sphere; i.e. from the existence of 
violence outside the law it is derived the possibility of revolutionary violence, 
which is described as a non-violent means of conflict resolution. So it seems 
that Benjamin, even if he argues for the possibility of the non-violent sphere, 
does not recognise it as the condition to think the radical violence.  
Still, there are also other places in Benjamin’s text that can be argued to 
theorise the transcendental condition of possibility to think radical violence. 
Right after setting up his hypothesis on radical violence, Benjamin makes a 
brief reference to justice in the text, which might be of interest in this respect. 
He explains that even if it is beyond human reason to unravel the insolubility of 
all legal problems, i.e. to decide on the justification of means and the justness of 
ends, there still exists a general belief in the possibility of it. It is because of: 
 
the stubborn prevailing habit of conceiving those just ends as ends of a possible 
law, that is, not only as generally valid (which follows analytically from the 
nature of justice), but also as capable of generalisation, which, as could be 
                                                                          
429  Derrida, “Différance,” p. 23. 
430  Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” p. 300. / Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, s. 202: “Ist 
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shown, contradicts the nature of justice. For ends that for one situation are just, 
universally acceptable, and valid, are so for no other situation no matter how 
similar it may be in other respects.431 
 
According to Derrida’s reading of this passage, justice is understood here as 
being something beyond law, something which law can never fully achieve: 
“This sudden reference to God above reason and universality … is nothing other 
than a reference to the irreducible singularity of each situation. … what I shall 
here call a sort of justice without droit [law].”432 So, it might seem that what 
Benjamin here refers to is not much different than Derrida’s “justice to come,” 
which would then enable a proper theorising on the radical violence. However, 
a careful consideration reveals that there are, in fact, two movements taking 
place in Benjamin’s text at the same time.  
The sequence of Benjamin’s argument is as follows: if there is an irrecon-
cilable conflict between justified means and just ends, it throws light “on the 
ultimate insolubility [Unentscheidbarkeit] of all legal problems,” because it is 
not reason but God that decides over the justness of ends, which is a thought 
that remains hidden because of a misconception that laws could in principle 
reach singular justice.433 In the first movement, indeed, it can be pointed out that 
the singularity of justice (named as God) is referred to as the condition on which 
radical violence can be recognised. However, in the second movement, all 
radicality of this irreconcilability between justified means and just ends, that 
also spotlights the insolubility of legal violence, is gained from the fact that God 
decides over the justness of ends; if it were not God who decides, the conflict of 
means and ends could have been a reconcilable matter. This means that God as 
justice not only stands over against radical violence making it discernible, but it 
also creates it. 
Thus, God plays a double role here. That it seems to cause no trouble for 
Benjamin is explainable by an assumption he silently has to make that in this 
conflict between ends and means, God has no guilt; God does not fail, but 
remains to hover over the whole scene (of mythical as well as divine violence). 
All guilt and failure lies with laws and with humans themselves. If God were 
guilty, it would not stand over the scene under the name of justice; if it is not 
guilty, it can stand for the inerasable possibility of justice, but it could not be the 
source of radicality in the conflict between means and ends that reveals radical 
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violence. Hence, with this thought that God is right, Benjamin immediately 
closes, what he had opened – a thought on radical violence; it is opened in the 
first movement, only to immediately collapse into the constative dimension of 
undecidable violence in the second movement, because, and there is no other 
way to put it, God becomes a fate. 
This explains the ambiguity related to Benjamin’s account. Radical violence, 
if there is such thing in Benjamin, becomes now both – it is undecidable by 
humans, but nevertheless, it must be (is thought as) actual, because, in the last 
analysis, i.e. without a transcendental condition of possibility (with concomitant 
inability to maintain the difference between the logics of the absolute and the 
constative), its existence is guaranteed, “assured,” as Benjamin puts it, only by 
its manifestations, by the threat (which is summoned by Benjamin, to recall 
Derrida’s reading of the word “waltende”) of its manifestations. Last sentences 
of his text only reverberate to this ambiguity: “Once again all the eternal forms 
are open to pure divine violence, which myth bastardized with law. It may 
manifest itself in a true war exactly as in the divine judgement of the multitude 
on a criminal.”434 
Depending on which movement of the text is stressed, the ambiguity of 
Benjamin’s text also explains the existence of very divergent interpretations on 
it. In contrast to Hamacher’s interpretation, for example, Slavoj Žižek presents 
his understanding of Benjamin by paraphrasing Friedrich Engels’ 1891 refer-
ence to the Paris Commune:  
 
Interpreters of Benjamin struggle with what “divine violence” might actually 
mean. Is it yet another leftist dream of a “pure” event which never really takes 
place? … “Well and good, gentlemen critical theorists, do you want to know 
what this divine violence looks like? Look at the revolutionary Terror of 1792–
94. That was the Divine Violence.”435 
 
Aside Žižek’s affirmative conclusions from this for his own project, which are 
debatable, his reading of Benjamin certainly is equally viable, though, in its 
accentuation of the actual manifestations of violence, it stresses the second 
movement of the text. 
Even if the pointed out ambiguity clarifies the paths to these different 
interpretations, it lessens their power of argument at the same time. Above all 
what interests us here is the possibility to depict Benjamin’s text as a decon-
structive intervention (and a “solution”). If at first sight, it seemed that 
Benjamin’s account can be thought to belong to a deconstructive paradigm, as it 
was suggested by Hamacher and Weber, among others, nevertheless, after 
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Formen frei, die der Mythos mit dem Recht bastardierte. Sie vermag im wahren Kriege 
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illuminating these developments in Benjamin’s text, it is doubtful that this 
position can be maintained. 
If, perhaps, there is a ground to consider divine violence as a deconstructive 
opening to the other in what was called the first movement of the text, then the 
second movement inevitably turns it around. The second movement of the text 
where God appears as a fate, rewrites or returns the “beginning point” of affor-
mative in “dethronement, or deposition,” which was said to be no longer valid 
(it was said that afformative’s opening not only to positing but to itself, to un-
posited, i.e. its “being-ahead-of-itself,” invalidates this origin.) God’s impli-
cation in radical violence means that the unposited turns into its literariness, i.e. 
into what remained unposited – its being “depositive,” “imperformative,” “a-
thesis,” “dethronement.”436 The text’s ambiguity allows us to keep the sense of 
opening of divine violence, but it is opening to deposing, and this is, even if 
deposing is understood in a non-posited way, opening to a “no,” to a negative. 
This means that afformative takes the shape of “no-no.” 
No-no stands, in some sense, in relative opposition to an “infrastructure” yes-
yes developed by Derrida in the analysis of James Joyce texts in “Ulysses 
Gramaphone: Hear Say Yes in Joyce.”437 Derrida observes the usage of the 
phrase yes-yes in Joyce’s texts, but also in everyday speech, when one is 
answering a phone, or giving a promise – as if “yes must reaffirm itself immedi-
ately.”438 But rather than seeing in it a chance expression, Derrida establishes it 
as a general law:  
 
In order for yes of affirmation … to have the value it has, it must carry the 
repetition within itself. It must a priori and immediately confirm its promise and 
promise its confirmation. … The yes can only state itself by promising itself its 
own memory.439  
 
Derrida generalises yes-yes into an affirmation that must “precede” (not 
temporally or logically) every utterance or identity. The infrastructure yes-yes 
will be delineated in more detail in the final part of this thesis, but here the 
contrast with no-no should mark out the affirmative nature of deconstruction. 
The latter is also directly confirmed by Derrida in several of his texts and 
interviews; for example, in a roundtable discussion published in The Ear of the 
Other, Derrida states: “the deconstructive gesture … is accompanied, or can be 
accompanied … by an affirmation. It is not negative, it is not destructive.”440  
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In the no-no, the affirmation of the “first” no is closed by the “second” no, 
which is inevitably definite, and therefore resembling not an opening “before all 
critical separation, division, and decision,” recalling Gasché’s words,441 but an 
opening after separation, division, and decision, as to a final solution. This 
opening to no is conceivable, if “no” is said by someone altogether different and 
good (e.g. God) to what is altogether guilty and rotten (e.g. human law). As 
such the no remains into the system it negates, for any final solution is doomed 
to bring back the same. No-no of “afformative” is more like mimicry of 
deconstruction (or of an infrastructure) than being itself the deconstructive 
“solution” we were looking for. If it sometimes might feel that no-no presumes 
an explanation, that an explanation is promised and must follow, then it is only 
because there is yes-yes already at work in “no-no.” 
It can be argued that Benjamin’s inclination, or at any rate, his hope, to 
arrive at a final solution is manifest also in the following passage on the last 
page of his text. Benjamin states there:  
 
The law governing their [the law-making and of law-preserving formations of 
violence] oscillation rests on the circumstance that all law-preserving violence, 
in its duration, indirectly weakens the law-making violence represented by it, 
through the suppression of hostile counter-violence. This lasts until either new 
forces or those earlier suppressed triumph over the hitherto law-making violence 
and thus found a new law, destined in its turn to decay.442 
 
For Derrida this passage indicates that Benjamin might however dimly (i.e. “to 
some extent”) finally recognise the law of iterability, as much as he notices that 
“the founding violence is always represented in a conservative violence.”443 If I 
do not misinterpret Derrida’s phrase “to some extent,” then my reading runs 
here somewhat counter to Derrida’s. “The spectral mixture” of law-making and 
law-preserving violence is recognised by Benjamin much earlier in his text, but 
in this passage, Benjamin, rather, does exactly the opposite; he wavers and takes 
a step back from (what might be called) the law of iterability.444 Here, Benjamin 
lays out the whole logic or law of violence, which was initially delineated 
structurally as a sort of “spectral mixture,” in a historical continuum, inserting 
the dimension of time (as duration) into it. This depicts the law of oscillation as 
a symmetrical and hermetically closed circle, which, as it was shown above in 
this thesis, would be conceivable only on the basis of a prior dissymmetry.445 In 
this move, Benjamin seems to want to emphasise a need for divine violence to 
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break the circle, and with that finally to found “a new historical epoch.”446 It is 
altogether other solution from which the other remains excluded in the same 
way as before. 
Derrida passes his final assessment on Benjamin’s text not at the colloquium 
on “Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice” at Cardozo Law School in 
October 1989, but a half a year later at the colloquium on “Nazism and the 
‘Final Solution’: Probing the Limits of Representation” at the University of 
California in April 1990, which is included in Cardozo Law Review text as 
“Post-scriptum”; he says: 
 
What I find, in conclusion, the most redoubtable, indeed (perhaps, almost) 
intolerable in this text …, is a temptation that it would leave open, and leave 
open notably to the survivors or the victims of the final solution, to its past, 
present or potential victims. Which temptation? The temptation to think the 
holocaust as an uninterpretable manifestation of divine violence insofar as this 
divine violence would be at the same time nihilating, expiatory and bloodless, 
says Benjamin, a divine violence that would destroy current law through a 
bloodless process that strikes and causes to expiate.447 
 
Here, Derrida seems to draw his judgement not from the first or the second 
movement of Benjamin’s text, but from the very ambiguity itself. He adds: “It is 
the thought of difference between these deconstructions [Benjamin’s] on the 
one hand and a deconstructive affirmation on the other that has guided me 
tonight in this reading.”448 Nevertheless, Benjamin’s ambiguity is such that this 
emphasis of Derrida seems to be often overridden and drawn into the very 
ambiguity of Benjamin’s text, opening it to criticisms from one or the other side 
of the ambiguity.449 
In conclusion of Benjamin’s critique of violence, we must say that Benjamin 
sort of pacifies the radical violence via God before he would have a chance to 
“deal” with it, and the ambiguity is not here a solution (if to use this word in 
this context). Therefore, we discard Benjamin’s “solution” to radical violence; 
next, it is time to return to Arendt’s take on the same problem. 
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5.2 Arendt on the “Principle” 
The problem that Arendt faces, after having (re)constructed the situation of 
radical violence that accompanies the French and the American Revolutions, is 
where to find authority that would allow founding a republican state. In new 
circumstances of secularisation and revolution, authority could have not been 
derived from an absolute, but nevertheless, the “absolute,” as Arendt continued 
to name it, or the constative, as we would put it, was still absolutely necessary. 
So, Arendt, and the Founding Fathers after her, found themselves in the 
situation of “the failure of the very ground they could not disclaim.”450 This 
situation begged for solutions, and as it has been suggested above, Arendt 
advances a “solution” of her own, claiming that “what saved the American 
Revolution from this fate [of crumbling as the French Revolution did] was 
neither ‘nature’s God’ nor self-evident truth, but the act of foundation itself;” in 
other words, “this ‘absolute’ lies in the very act of beginning itself,” whereby 
“the absolute from which the beginning is to derive its own validity and which 
must save it, as it were, from its inherent arbitrariness is the principle which, 
together with it, makes its appearance in the world.”451 The question is whether 
it is a properly deconstructive “solution,” that allows to accept the other 
(beginning) in the same.  
Honig downplays in her account on Arendt the importance Arendt assigns to 
the role of the “principle” in the founding act, referring to it only in the endnote 
of her article: “Sometimes Arendt toys with the notion that a ‘principle’ might 
save ‘the act of beginning from its own arbitrariness’. At other times she con-
cedes that the arbitrariness of beginnings is ‘complete’.”452 Honig’s charge of 
inconsistency in Arendt’s usage makes sense only if the “principle” is under-
stood on the same level as promising, i.e. as an alternative means to promising 
in stabilisation of action. However, this thesis has redefined the role of 
promising in relation to action, and even if to concede that the “principle” is 
stabilising, it cannot be in the manner promising is. In addition, it has been 
shown that Arendt does not deny the need for the constative dimension, which 
means that the latter at no point does simply collapse into any internal dimen-
sions of action. To a certain extent, a direct indication to different roles of the 
“principle” and promising can be found in Arendt’s description of principles as 
“inspir[ing], as it were, from without,” while promising is internal to action; it is 
not “applied to action from the outside.”453 Nevertheless, to call Arendt’s 
references to the “principle” as “toying” might be justified in the sense that 
Arendt’s elaborations of the concept of the “principle” in On Revolution and 
elsewhere are rather scant. 
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In On Revolution the “principle” is above all explicated in the context of the 
analysis of the American Revolution. In this analysis, Arendt has no illusions 
about how the American Revolution came to be “grounded” on the “principle”; 
the Founding Fathers did not propose or somehow consciously follow a theory 
on principles, but they hit the idea of the “principle” half accidentally in their 
emulation of traditions of the ancient Roman Republic. The Roman idea was, 
according to Arendt, to derive the authority of their republic from the possibility 
of reincarnating and augmenting its very foundation; “authority in this context 
is nothing more or less than a kind of necessary ‘augmentation,’ by virtue of 
which all innovations and changes remain tied back to the foundation which, at 
the same time, they augment and increase.”454 It can be said that the “principle” 
is what constitutes the idea of augmentation, drawing the line between amend-
ing and violence. 
Though, it must be also noted that even if the “principle” saved the Ameri-
can Revolution, as Arendt says, i.e. it founded a republic, eventually, in 
Arendt’s opinion, the revolution did not live up to its expectations, and exactly 
for the reasons that it did not preserve, as supposedly Romans did, such space of 
freedom that could have induced in people a sense of being part of the founding 
act or a sense of incarnating it. In case of the American Revolution, it was 
caused, as Arendt suggests, by insufficient attentiveness to and by the lack of 
understanding of the very grounds of their revolution in power: “The trouble 
was that they took this [revolutionary] spirit for granted, because it was a spirit 
which had been formed and nourished throughout the colonial period.”455 As for 
the French Revolution, such spaces, spontaneously formed in the start of it, 
were suppressed as the revolution unfolded, for the reason that the French 
Revolution tried to derive power and authority from the selfsame source, which 
turned any rivalry with the sovereignty of the state power unthinkable.456 
In order to understand Arendt’s conceptualisation of the “principle,” it is 
necessary, however, to distance from the historical manifestations of the “prin-
ciple” and see how the idea of the “principle” is theorised “as such.” In the 
following analysis, there is, perhaps, an element that can be called a vouloir-
dire of Arendt, in the same manner as Derrida describes his analysis of 
Benjamin in some occasions. This means that to certain extent the analysis also 
indicates to what could lie behind Arendt’s scarce remarks on the “principle” 
which does not find a properly elaborated theoretical formulation by Arendt 
herself. Next, I return to the passages already quoted in passim in the short 
synopsis of Arendt’s theory in the beginning of the thesis to analyse them in 
more detail.457 
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In a crucial passage on the “principle,” Arendt says: “What saves the act of 
beginning from its own arbitrariness is that it carries its own principle within 
itself.”458 The beginning’s arbitrariness refers here to the sphere of action; it is 
free, independent of the constative dimension to start anything, but at the same 
time, without a constative, without an affirmation or a statement that something 
has been already started, it would be a fleeting moment disappearing im-
mediately. Furthermore, it is said in this passage that the “principle” that 
“embodies” the constative dimension inhabits the beginning itself. But at the 
same time, “beginning and principle, principium and principle, are not only 
related to each other, but are coeval.”459 Arendt notes that the “principle” and 
the beginning in Latin as well as in Greek are etymologically coterminous, and 
she finds support from Plato whom she makes (by slightly paraphrasing him) to 
say: “‘For the beginning, because it contains its own principle, is also a god 
who, as long as he dwells among men, as long as he inspires their deeds, saves 
everything.’”460 To think this “principle” as strictly simultaneous to the begin-
ning would entail two things: the “principle” cannot have any content prior to 
the beginning; if it were, it would turn into a ground for the beginning. But 
equally, the “principle” cannot be formed after the beginning, because the 
beginning has no authority, no constative to come to exist (with some perma-
nence). Hence, the “principle” cannot have any determined content; if it were, it 
should come to exist prior to or after the beginning. 
If it is said that the “principle” has no content, it does not mean, never-
theless, that it can be thought as positing an empty form, because if there was no 
content to begin with, there is no empty form; what appears, is the beginning, 
and the “principle,” strictly speaking, does not exist, not as such. Therefore, the 
“principle” can “exist” only as a possibility of any form, formation, formulation, 
etc. Using the term borrowed from Hamacher, it could be said that the 
“principle” is not positing anything, but is mere opening. In that case, the 
“principle” could be described as a sort of absolute “transparency,” which, how-
ever, maintains its being something like a “medium.” The latter is necessary, for 
otherwise the “principle” would (be) nothingness. It follows that whatever the 
“principle” is coeval with must shine through it, for the “principle” is pure 
opening.  
The “principle,” as said, is coeval with the beginning, and it “remains 
apparent as long as the action lasts.”461 The question is what is entailed in action 
that shines through the “principle.” Beyond internal dimensions of action, 
outlined above as speech, space of appearance, power and promising, there is 
one more element that makes difference – legitimacy. According to Arendt, 
power is in need of legitimacy: “Power needs no justification, being inherent in 
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the very existence of political communities; what it does need is legitimacy. … 
but it derives its legitimacy from the initial getting together rather than from any 
action that then may follow.”462 On the one hand, this means that legitimacy is 
not what stabilises power, but it is in the same way as power dependent on the 
constative side. On the other hand, legitimacy of power, it might be said, is 
derived from (or has a form of) the difference between accidental coming into 
contact of people and their getting together “to act in concert.” 
So, whatever the initial getting together of people is based upon shines 
through the “principle” as the principle’s own(most), but (as much as we speak 
about a differential system without positively determined contents) in the form 
of difference (or of legitimacy), in differentiating.463 Therefore, whatever shines 
through the “principle” cannot be thought to replace it, or to simply “be” it 
(which would reduce the constative dimension into nothingness). The prin-
ciple’s keeping itself as different, differentiating, so to say, makes every 
beginning to appear as a repetition, as a repetition of itself. In other words, if 
whatever shines through the “principle” as the principle’s own(most) arrives as 
a beginning, it arrives only because it repeats. This turns the beginning into the 
repetition of repetition or into a repeating repetition, which is to say that in 
differentiating, the “principle” is not what is repeated, or repeatable, but what 
causes repetition (or what is repetition). The “principle” differentiates “be-
tween” what appears as the principle’s ownmost and what comes to shine 
through the “principle,” and makes the beginning to be repetition of itself (of its 
own repetition).  
It is not impossible to see the “principle,” on this interpretation, as an 
infrastructure, which would easily chain up, for example, with “infrastructure” 
yes-yes – the “principle” relates to the beginning affirmatively; every beginning 
appears in affirmation of and in promise to every other (beginning). Yes-yes, 
that was also mentioned above in the context of Benjamin, will be explicated in 
the following chapter. 
To certain extent, this reading is supported by Arendt’s account of (an odd) 
temporality of the beginning. There is an important quote from Augustine in 
this respect that Arendt repeats in several of her most essential texts over and 
again: “Initium … ergo ut esset, creatus est homo, ante quem nullus fuit,” which 
she translates with slight differences always as “that there be a beginning, man 
was created before whom there was nobody.”464 In Arendt’s reading of this 
quote, Augustine differentiates between the beginning of the world and of the 
human being; the latter is named initium and the former with the word 
principium. Aside from indicating that the creation of the world denotes a less 
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radical beginning than the creation of the human being, because there was 
nobody before the latter, whereas before the world was made, there were angels, 
Arendt points out that “with the creation of man, the principle of beginning 
came into the world itself, which, of course, is only another way of saying that 
the principle of freedom was created when man was created but not before.”465  
In secular terms, Arendt expresses the same thought as follows: “The very 
capacity for beginning is rooted in natality … in the fact that human beings, 
new men, again and again appear in the world by virtue of birth.”466 Put bluntly, 
the sentence seems to be saying that there is a beginning, because there was 
beginning, but it makes sense if to read it in the context of previous delibera-
tions, as saying that the second beginning (which is in some sense “first”) 
cannot appear otherwise as repeating, affirming and confirming the first. By 
words of Arendt: “With word and deed we insert ourselves into the human 
world, and this insertion is like a second birth, in which we confirm and take 
upon ourselves the naked fact of our original physical appearance.”467 Hence, 
the first birth arrives only if the second birth has arrived to affirm the first, in a 
sort of repetition.  
Indeed, this strange temporality of beginning suggests a possibility that, for 
Arendt, starting something new by humans is always already a response to the 
beginning or beginnings, as it is argued by Patchen Markell: 
 
Arendt’s account of beginning … shows us that action, as a response to events, 
is, you might say, always a second step rather than a first: if we can never quite 
lose our capacity to act altogether, this is because there never ceases to be a fund 
of doings and happenings – beginnings – in the world to which we might 
respond.468 
 
Arendt herself quite explicitly calls action as also a response; “its impulse 
springs from the beginning which came into the world when we were born and 
to which we respond by beginning something new on our own initiative.”469 
However, for the reasons delineated above, I think that Markell overstates his 
position when he further argues that “Arendt thus replaces the unanswerable 
question of how to generate something … from nothing … with the more 
tractable question of how to sustain, intensify, and democratise the beginnings 
with which we are already confronted.”470 Arendt, I would say, does not replace 
the question of the spontaneous beginning, but indicates that action as a 
commencement is possible only if it also is, at the same time, a response.  
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Nevertheless, there remains an element of vouloir-dire in this interpretation, 
and Arendt’s formulations fall short of proper potential of the idea of the 
“principle.” According to the conceptualisation of the “principle” proposed 
above, it could be said that the “principle” is manifested by or in repetition, but 
in Arendt, it is manifested by concrete principles:  
 
The manifestation of principles comes about only through action…. Such 
principles are honour or glory, love of equality, which Montesquieu called 
virtue, or distinction or excellence … but also fear or distrust or hatred. Freedom 
or its opposite appears in the world whenever such principles are actualised.471 
 
In the case of the American Revolution, the principle was, as Arendt concludes 
in On Revolution, “the interconnected principle of mutual promise and common 
deliberation.”472 For Arendt, it seems, that whatever is shining through the 
“principle” creates the beginning which repeats its beginning in a principle, but 
not in the “principle” as difference, as a cause of repetition, but as what is 
repeatable; in that case, the content that comes to shine through the “principle” 
replaces it as if the “principle” were an empty form, so that the beginning 
appears as repeating a principle’s ownmost content. But the “empty form,” as it 
was said above, is a positing, which already presumes a beginning; it should not 
be mixed up with “opening.” If the “principle” figures like a positing, then it is 
always already mending the situation of radical violence. It might be said that 
the situation of radical violence is exposed by Arendt, but her “solution” as if 
gets situated prior to radical violence, so that radical violence is “pacified” 
before any need to find a “solution” to it. Insofar as radical violence, as it has 
been traced in the course of the thesis, is irreducible, then any such exclusion of 
radical violence does not solve or defeat it, but rather, allows it to become mani-
fest time and again in the worst kind of violence (and in the name of its 
eradication).  
Nonetheless, the rest of Arendt’s theory supports understanding of the 
“principle” as an empty form, which is the same as reducing radical violence 
into emptiness (which, in fact, merely hides it). In order to maintain an 
appearance of a solution, it now becomes important to preclude for the content 
to fully replace an empty form, because otherwise it would just take the role of 
an absolute. The emptiness starts to be the dividing line between appearing 
either as another absolute or as a principle that allows repetition. Arendt’s 
explications on the principle do not exactly thematise, how the principle is kept 
emptying so that the content never quite is able to fill in the empty form, but it 
does not mean that this logic is not present in her theory. It should be kept in 
mind that Arendt’s approach has its roots in phenomenology, which means, as 
Majid Yar explains, that “the world of common experience and interpretation 
(Lebenswelt) is taken to be primary, and theoretical knowledge is dependent on 
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that common experience in the form of a thematisation or extrapolation from 
what is primordially and pre-reflectively present in everyday experience.”473 So, 
while Arendt’s aim is not to offer an abstract conceptual theory on the 
possibility of the founding act, it is necessary to examine her account on the 
American Revolution in order to recognise the logic of emptying in her theory. 
There is an element in Arendt’s analysis of the American Revolution (and 
applying to all modern revolutions), the importance of which is noted by her, 
but its theoretical standing remains unclear. It is the process of secularisation, 
defined by Arendt as “the separation of religion from politics and the rise of a 
secular realm with a dignity of its own.”474 While the significance of revolutions 
for Arendt comes from the fact that they are “the only political event(s) which 
confront us directly and inevitably with the problem of beginning,” then 
secularisation is depicted by Arendt as a defining circumstance of the emer-
gence of modern revolutions.475 Arendt argues:  
 
Indeed, it may ultimately turn out that what we call revolution is precisely that 
transitory phase which brings about the birth of a new, secular realm. But if this 
is true, then it is secularisation itself …, which constitutes the origin of 
revolution.476 
 
There are two main features of secularisation as a phenomenon, which can be 
gathered from Arendt’s account. Firstly, it is a contingent historical occurrence 
beyond direct human intervention, a result of multiple developments and 
sources. Perhaps, it can be said that if Arendt depicts revolutions as not being 
prepared by revolutionists, who “hardly did, or were in position to do, much to 
advance and direct [them],”477 then the same describes also the process of 
secularisation. Secularisation in this sense defines modern times, but modern 
times do not consist in fighting for secularisation. Secondly, secularisation can 
never be completed; it never arrives at its end, meaning that borders between the 
secular and the political world remain shifting. Consequently, the absolutes are 
never entirely excluded and secularisation can be even reversed. As long as 
secularisation remains on the way, an absolute, e.g. God, remains always in a 
double position as an allure and failure. If secularisation were to be achieved 
absolutely, so that the allure of the absolute vanishes altogether from the politi-
cal realm, then the “empty place” of the constative dimension would appear full, 
for any stabilising content would take the place of the absolute. To what extent 
Arendt refutes this possibility is seen from a remark that could be said to apply 
to Benjamin in the same way as to Marx: “Utopian and unfounded promises of 
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a final ‘realm of freedom’ (that), in its Marxian version at any rate, would in-
deed spell ‘the end of all things,’ a sempiternal peace in which all specifically 
human activities would wither away.”478 
It then can be concluded that in this particular historical case, the process of 
secularisation, i.e. the possibility of initiation of something without any help or 
tutelage of some “higher” authorities, empties, so to say, the principle from the 
“absoluteness” of its content and makes for it necessary over and again to repeat 
itself. In other words it follows, even if it is not thematised theoretically by 
Arendt, that “gathering together of human beings,” which is the source of 
power, is not predetermined by anything and is absolutely contingent (which 
has been also indicated above by phrasing “whatever shines through the prin-
ciple”). This explains how Arendt can describe manifestations of the “principle” 
as too general for determining specific guidelines for action – it could be said 
that they become emptied of their specific content.  
Thus, Arendt argues that principles “are much too general to prescribe 
particular goals, although every particular aim can be judged in the light of its 
principle once the act has been started.”479 In this formulation, the “principle,” 
in some sense, functions as opening, because no action can be judged before-
hand; all beginnings are welcomed. Nevertheless, after action is started, some 
actions can be judged as detrimental to or divergent from the principles that 
inform the beginning. Hence, Arendt’s principle, on the one hand, allows en-
trance of every beginning and resistance, but on the other hand, it determines 
and rejects every resistance that does not conform to the pre-settled idea of 
amendment. In this way, principles are binding to all subsequent deeds, 
amendments and resistances, so that the arbitrariness of every beginning, Arendt 
talks about, gets indeed tamed by a principle. However, principles then are not 
what they seem to be by their “idea,” but a kind of compromise. A principle 
allows us to recognise the other – but only as much as possible. Quite in 
accordance with this, Arendt says: “The way the beginner starts whatever he 
intends to do lays down the law of action.”480 This seems to confirm that the 
“principle” as opening describes only a sort of “original” action, which lays 
down terms for every future action, but after the “original” action has 
performed, there is no action but “deeds that are to follow” by “those who have 
joined him [the beginner] in order to partake in the enterprise and to bring about 
its accomplishment.”481 
Such understanding and conceptualisation of the “principle” problematises 
Arendt’s diagnosis on the final outcome of the American Revolution. As also 
pointed out above, she thinks that the American Revolution did not live up to its 
expectations, because “the Revolution, while it had given freedom to the people, 
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had failed to provide a space where this freedom could be exercised.”482 It is the 
space where people under the auspices of a principle relate back to the 
beginning, and by their actions, keep augmenting it. As much as the Revolution 
found its authority in the principle, there is, in fact, no good reason why the 
Founding Fathers disregarded Jefferson’s proposal of incorporation of town-
ships into the Constitution. These “elementary republics” were thought “to per-
mit citizens to continue to do what they had been able to do during the years of 
revolution, namely, to act on their own and thus to participate in public 
business.”483 Potentiality of every beginning to be an amendment, rather than 
revolution, should have allowed such a space of citizen initiative. Arendt 
explains the failure of the revolution to provide such space by some contingent 
eventualities, like that the founders’ had an excessive belief into the power of 
the Constitution (to deliver perhaps the same thing), that they took revolu-
tionary spirit for granted484 and that they “failed to understand to what extent the 
council system confronted them with an entirely new form of government, with 
a new public space for freedom.”485 However, now it can be suggested that this 
failure was not caused by some accidental miscalculation, but by their very 
understanding of the “principle” and authority itself: The idea of the “principle” 
that (as if) informed their founding act, made the beginning repeat a principle. 
In other words, a law of action was determined in the beginning, but whoever is 
understood as being under that “law of action,” is already the same, not as an 
other. Therefore, the beginning (always already) repeats the principle for all (for 
they are the same), and for deeds that accomplish things set in motion in the 
beginning, there is no need to specify such space of freedom.  
So, it was not some understatement or misunderstanding of the Revolution’s 
roots in power, but the very nature of the interpretation of the “principle” and 
authority, that led to such outcome. As much as Arendt does not find any 
structural cause for the “failure” of the American Revolution, she has no other 
option as to hope that storytelling will suffice to preserve the lesson for the 
posterity, as she says on the final pages of On Revolution: “There is nothing that 
could compensate for this failure or prevent it from becoming final, except 
memory and recollection. … the storehouse of memory is kept and watched 
over by the poets.”486 (It also reveals that, in some sense, Arendt’s own under-
standing, at least to some extent, must have extended the exemplary case she 
uses to bring into light how to found a republic.) 
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Chapter 6: Derrida’s “Solution” to Radical Violence 
The question from which the thesis started to evolve was how a republic could 
be founded that does not lean upon an extramundane source of authority. Such 
founding has to preserve its unfoundedness in whatever is founded, because 
otherwise it would turn itself into an absolute beginning. Therefore, any 
theorising of such founding has to find a way to think in it a resistance that 
would not be reduced to repetition of what is already founded, nor excluded as a 
revolutionary coup; in other words, a totally other beginning must be con-
ceivable in the same or in the already existing. In the previous parts of the 
thesis, I have pursued approaches of Arendt and of Benjamin (as well as of 
Honig) on this matter to a conclusion that this task remains uncompleted by 
them. At the same time, their approaches were analysed from the point of view 
of deconstruction that (as if) was assumed (in its “proper” form) to be able to 
get hold of a totally other (beginning). In this sense, different moments of 
deconstruction have been extracted in the course of the thesis, like the structural 
condition of undecidable violence, the transcendental condition of justice to 
come and radical violence as a line of rupture along which deconstructive 
incision is made, though the incision itself has not yet been theorised. As it was 
argued above, Derrida’s text of “Declarations of Independence” that was the 
starting point of the analysis does not amount to such incision. In this chapter, 
these two routes – thinking totally other (beginning) and the incision of de-
construction – are brought together with the aim to explicate the incision of 
deconstruction, its so-called “arrival” at what it is, i.e. at its second “phase,” 
which also is deconstruction’s answer to the problem of thinking totally other 
(beginning) in the same. These explications, in turn, help to make understand-
able the argument proposed and developed thereafter that legitimacy can be 
understood in exactly this role – as being an opening to the other in its alterity, 
which equally is the incision or inscription of deconstruction in the founding 
act. 
 
 
6.1 The Relationless Relation to the Other and  
the Lesser Violence 
As much as thinking is an activity of classifying, simplifying, deciding, etc., 
then accepting the other as other, “before all critical separation, division, and 
decision,” as Gasché puts it, involves an unavoidable paradox.487 The other as 
other cannot be thought directly, but must remain in thinking as a sort of 
rupture; otherwise, it would be appropriated as the same. Derrida calls this 
paradoxical condition of rupture that opens up a relation, following Maurice 
Blanchot and Emmanuel Levinas in this, a relation without relation:  
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This dissociation, the separation is the condition of my relation to the other. […] 
That’s what some French-speaking philosophers such as Blanchot and Levinas 
call the rapport sans rapport, relationless relation... that’s the structure of my 
relation to the other; it’s a relation without relation – it’s a relation in which the 
other remains absolutely transcendent. I can’t reach the other, I cannot know the 
other from the inside.”488  
 
This paradoxical relation is well summarised by Kas Saghafi: 
 
In order to enter into relation with the other, it is necessary that an interruption 
be possible and that the relation be “a relation of interruption.” However, this 
interruption does not simply interrupt the relation with the other; rather it opens 
the relation to it. In fact, all social bonds and ties presuppose and are made 
possible by such an interruption. As well as a relation of interruption, there is 
simultaneously a certain mediation in the relation to the other. In this other 
experience of mediation not to be confused with a relation of reconciliation and 
totalisation the other is understood as other in a certain relation of incompre-
hension. It is necessary that, at a given moment, the other remain as other. … 
The relation to the other then is constituted by the two logics of economy 
(mediation without opposition) and aneconomy (radical alterity), relation and 
interruption of relation, interruption and negotiation.489 
 
Pointing out Derrida’s indebtedness to Levinas in thinking of the impossible 
relationship or “relationless relation” with the other does not mean to argue that 
Levinas’ and Derrida’s understandings entirely coincide on this matter. Levinas 
argues in one of his key works Totality and Infinity that “the relation with the 
Other, or Conversation, is a non-allergic relation, an ethical relation,” which 
commands unconditionally, prior to anything else, “to already be for the 
Other.”490 Levinas associates this ethical relation with being Good: “Goodness 
consists in taking up a position in being such that the Other counts more than 
myself.”491 For Derrida, however, such ethical relation, which is intrinsically 
conditioned by the other, inevitably posits the other as a sort of presence in 
itself, against which Derrida argues: “There is no ethics without the presence of 
the other but also, and consequently, without absence, dis-simulation, detour, 
differance, writing.”492 Ethics cannot be derived from the assumption of the 
goodness of the other, for this would mean that the other is determined or 
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known already beforehand and it would not be “absolutely other” that emerges 
in the relation of interruption. If the other might be a violent other, then the 
unconditional opening cannot a priori preclude a (more or less) violent res-
ponse. Therefore, the relationless relation, which is also opening to the other, is 
“the origin of morality as of immorality. The non-ethical opening of ethics. A 
violent opening.”493 This refers to a crucial difference between Derrida’s and 
Levinas’ interpretations of the relationless relation to the other. This provisional 
opposition that I drew here between Levinas of Totality and Infinity and Derrida 
of Metaphysics of Violence cannot of course do justice to their whole complex 
relationship, which evolved during their whole lives, but at least it indicates that 
their uncritical joining is not possible and not intended in this thesis. 
The question about the need and possibility to assimilate Levinas and 
Derrida has induced a wider debate on these authors and on ethics of decon-
struction in academic circles. I am not going to enter into this topic here, but as 
much as violence has been one of the key themes in this thesis, I take up Martin 
Hägglund’s engagement with the concept of “lesser violence” that forms one 
aspect of the wider discussion on ethics of deconstruction. 
One of the first to address the question of ethics in deconstruction was 
Simon Critchley, who argues that “Derridean deconstruction can, and indeed 
should, be understood as an ethical demand, provided that ethics is understood 
in the particular sense given to it in the work of Emmanuel Levinas.”494 Even if 
he, to a certain extent, later distances himself from this first formulation of his 
position in The Ethics of Deconstruction, he repeats, nevertheless, one of his 
central claims in a rearticulation of his position five years later: “My claim is 
that the ethical moment that motivates deconstruction is this Yes-saying to the 
unnameable, a moment of unconditional affirmation or a categorical imperative 
that is addressed to an alterity.”495 In this formulation, deconstruction is 
motivated by an ethical concern, i.e. the ethical is prior to deconstruction. In 
somewhat similar manner, Drucilla Cornell argues that “instead of simply 
preferring one [Derrida] to the other [Levinas], we need to read Derrida and 
Levinas together to heed the call to responsibility and to enact a nonviolent 
relation to otherness.”496 Leaving here aside the relation to Levinas, then, what 
is posited in the formulations of Critchley and Cornell (but also in this line of 
thinking in general) is an ethical demand on deconstruction to create a non-
violent opening to the other. 
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Hägglund has questioned such ethical interpretations in his “The Necessary 
Discrimination: Disjoining Derrida and Levinas” on the ground that for Derrida, 
violence is irreducible, and therefore, the non-violent relation to the other 
cannot be presumed or set for an ideal: “If there is always an economy of 
violence, decisions of justice cannot be a matter of choosing what is nonviolent. 
To justify something is rather to contend that it is less violent than something 
else.”497 This highlights the term “lesser violence,” because, as Hägglund says, 
“the struggle for justice can thus not be a struggle for peace, but only for what I 
will call ‘lesser violence.’”498 
The term “lesser violence” is not really thematised by Derrida and 
mentioned only in few occasions, primarily in “Violence and Metaphysics.” The 
most quoted passage in this regard is as follows and it can be found in a 
footnote rather than in the main text: “…within history – but is it meaningful 
elsewhere? – every philosophy of nonviolence can only choose the lesser 
violence within an economy of violence.”499 As a way of explanation, we can 
relate differences of opinion about the importance of the term “lesser violence” 
for the project of deconstruction to the ambiguity of meaning in this sentence, 
resulting from different emphases. One possibility is to emphasise the part of 
this sentence which says that one “can choose the lesser violence.” Above all, 
this reading can be attributed to Richard Beardsworth, who was the first to bring 
the term into wider currency in his book Derrida and the Political (though it 
characterises all “ethical” readings of deconstruction as well). The other 
possibility is to emphasise the final part of the sentence by which any “choice” 
remains “within an economy of violence.” This view comes from more recent 
discussions of the term by Hägglund and Haddad, who argue that the lesser 
violence remains always contaminated by the worst violence, and that the risk 
of the worst is never superseded by the lesser violence. In the following, I 
briefly explain what these two readings hold, and then develop my own 
interpretation, which, perhaps, points to a third possibility of emphasis. 
First of all, both readings agree that there is a possibility for lesser violence 
embedded in deconstruction and that this possibility appears through the 
experience of aporia (of time and law). So, Hägglund notes that “Beardsworth 
rightly observes that ‘it is in fact only through the experience of the economy of 
violence that judgments of lesser violence can be made’.”500 In this sense, 
Hägglund and Beardsworth both could find support for their argument from the 
following passage of Derrida:  
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The irreducible violence of the relation to the other(,) is at the same time 
nonviolence, since it opens the relation to the other. It is an economy. And it is 
this economy which, by this opening, will permit access to the other to be 
determined, in ethical freedom, as moral violence or nonviolence.501 
 
However, as said above, it seems that Beardsworth and Hägglund draw different 
conclusions from this opening of the possibility of discrimination between 
violence and nonviolence. Beardsworth seems to say that the recognition of the 
aporia, or “endurance” of it, leads to less violent decisions: “in recognition of … 
[aporia, a relation of interruption] one judges according to the ‘lesser vio-
lence’.”502 How exactly this happens remains a little obscure in Beardsworth’s 
account, but the best explanation is perhaps as follows:  
 
The acknowledgement of the prescriptive force of one’s statements may make 
one more ready to transform the field that is posited by the nature of one’s 
decision – given that the field, together with its frontiers, is the result of a 
decision and not the representation of a preceding “real”. This is the argument of 
a “lesser violence” in a general economy of violence.503  
 
In short, for Beardsworth, the experience of the impossible makes one to realise 
the prescriptive force of his or her decisions and the possibility of discrimi-
nation between “moral violence or nonviolence” itself will drive our choices. 
Hägglund’s argument against Beardsworth is that even if the aporia time is 
recognised, this leads to the lesser as well as to more violence: “The supposed 
lesser violence may always be more violent than the violence it opposes,” for 
there are no objective empirical criteria to decide, what is lesser or what is more 
violence, as Hägglund explains.504 For Hägglund, the “lesser violence” refers 
always to factually less violent outcomes, which would make sense only on the 
basis of knowledge about what is less violent in every particular situation. To 
know that, however, is impossible. Therefore, the opening to the other cannot be 
a priori ethical demand, but “which opens the possibility of every relation.”505 
Samir Haddad follows Hägglund in many respects and his criticism of 
Beardsworth is very similar, but he adds an additional turn – while Hägglund 
keeps the term “lesser violence” to explain the idea of justice, Haddad claims 
that the “lesser violence” as a concept is in fact altogether redundant:  
 
My claim is thus that the language of “choosing a lesser violence” is out of place 
in the Derridean analysis of violence. It either names a choice that is either 
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already made (that of staying within the economy) or a choice that cannot be 
made (that of a knowledge that would reduce violence within the economy).506  
 
According to Haddad, the widespread usage of the term “lesser violence” is not 
caused by the merit of this term, but by “political” necessity to find an easy way 
to defend Derrida and deconstructionists from accusations “of relativism, nihil-
ism, sophistry, and so on.”507 
In order to outline my own view on this matter, I start with quoting a passage 
from Derrida’s Specters of Marx, which seems to counter Hägglund’s and 
Haddad’s as well as Beardsworth’s interpretations:  
 
No progress of knowledge could saturate an opening that must have nothing to 
do with knowing. Nor therefore with ignorance. The opening must preserve this 
heterogeneity as the only chance of an affirmed or rather reaffirmed future. It is 
the future itself, it comes from there. The future is its memory.508  
 
My argument against Beardsworth on the one side and Hägglund and Haddad 
on the other is that they do not preserve heterogeneity between knowledge and 
ignorance that Derrida refers to in the quote above; they fall over to one side 
(knowledge) or to the other side (ignorance). Beardsworth seems to say (and 
this is how Hägglund and Haddad read him) that out of the experience of aporia 
there emerges a certain knowledge to judge according to lesser violence. At the 
same time, when Hägglund and Haddad both agree that “the logic of decon-
struction spells out that one cannot finally learn how to negotiate the economy 
of violence and make less violent judgments,” they highlight ignorance about 
how to make less violent judgments in particular cases.509 But in either case 
heterogeneity itself is missed, for there is no knowledge, but also no ignorance; 
there is heterogeneity of the two.510 
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“endurance” means in this context, for in fact, as also Hägglund remarks, all judgements 
pass through the experience of the impossible, it is emphasised here that there is a chance for 
lesser violence, but this is not exact knowing about how one should proceed. On the other 
side, Hägglund talks about “critical vigilance” in the end of his article, which for sure does 
not change the fact that anyone is liable “to make mistakes or erroneous judgments in a 
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The question is how this preservation of heterogeneity is to be understood, 
and what are the consequences of this for the debate on ethics of deconstruction. 
In the beginning of this section, it was quoted from Saghafi that the “relation-
less relation” is interruption and negotiation. However, in the same manner as 
developed above on the undecidability between the performative and the 
constative, the interruption and the relation cannot form a “circle,” so that one 
cancels the other.511 Hence, firstly, in order there to be a relation to the other as 
other, the other must be other absolutely, and therefore, there must be an 
interruption with the other. But this results in a sort of “double bind” as con-
cerns the relation, for the relation has to remain truthful to itself as a relation, 
but being that, it must not interrupt interruption. The relationless relation cannot 
be a compromise between its two sides. Therefore, secondly, in order there to be 
a relation, in relationless relation to the absolutely other, the other cannot be as 
in itself, but only as “othering,” as remaining other to itself. In other words, 
what “relates” in this relation has to effect the “othering” of the other, making 
other to appear as other to itself. One might say that in that case the relation is to 
the infinitely other.512 This is essentially the same what is also noted by 
Hägglund: “Every finite other is absolutely other, not because it is absolutely in 
itself but on the contrary because it can never be in itself. Thus, it is always 
becoming other than itself and cannot have any integrity as such (for example, 
as ‘ethical’).”513 
However, in my interpretation, the view that sees the other not as in itself, 
but as other to itself, is the lesser violence. The lesser violence means to judge 
in view of the other as “determined” by other others (oneself among them), i.e. 
as being always already alien to him- or herself. And in this sense, judging on 
others is also judging on oneself, and all violence is equally violence against 
oneself. In other words, it could be said that the relationless relation “com-
prises” in interruption with the other, in which the other appears as in itself, and 
in a relation to the other, which must take the other as other to itself (in order for 
there could be a relationless relation at all). Perhaps, this “must” in this 
formulation of the relation can be said to be a “demand,” as also Derrida says in 
few cases that will be cited below, but it is important to notice that in this 
formulation where the “demand” is kept analytically separated from the inter-
ruption, the word “demand” can be used only as a figure of speech, for in fact it 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
given situation,” but which also is not entirely compatible with a complete non-knowledge 
how to arrive at the lesser violence. (Hägglund, “The Necessity of Discrimination,” p. 69) 
Be it as it may, as much as both of them do not thematise the possibility as hauntology, 
which I will do next, it is justified to position them as it is done in the text. 
511  See above, p. 69. Perhaps, a more exact figure to characterise this logic would be an 
ellipsis, rather than a circle; see Jacques Derrida, “Ellipsis,” in Writing and Difference 
(London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 371–8. 
512  This “relating difference” or “differing relation” as an “infrastructural movement” will 
be explicated in the course of the rest of this chapter. 
513  Hägglund, “The Necessity of Discrimination,” p. 56. 
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is an immediate necessity (and not an ethical demand). It is immediate because 
the infinitely other is, by words of Derrida,  
 
an absolute Singularity, Singular because differing…, and always other, binding 
itself necessarily to the form of the instant, in imminence and in Urgency: even if 
it moves toward what remains to come, there is the pledge [gage] (promise, 
engagement, injunction and response to the injunction, and so forth) … given 
here and now, even before, perhaps, a decision confirms it. It thus responds 
without delay to the demand of justice.514 
 
Now, however, if this “must” is thought in the formula of “relationless rela-
tion,” i.e. as always already affected by interruption, this “must” becomes a 
possibility. It is indeed possibility for the good and for the bad, as Hägglund and 
Haddad maintain – out of the experience of the impossible, there emerges a 
possibility to relate to the other as in itself, which is the possibility of evil, but 
also there is a possibility to relate to the other understood as being other to 
itself, which is the possibility of the lesser violence.  
In order to unravel this possibility for the good as well as for the bad a little 
bit further, I distinguish between two aspects in this possibility. Firstly, indeed, 
this possibility (for the good as well as for the bad) itself is better than no 
possibility at all in this case, as also follows from the subsequent passage of 
Derrida:  
 
To be “out of joint,” whether it be present Being or present time, can do harm 
and do evil, it is no doubt the very possibility of evil. But without the opening of 
this possibility, there remains, perhaps, beyond good and evil, only the necessity 
of the worst. A necessity that would not (even) be a fated one.515  
 
That this possibility, this opening is worth to be maintained, does not yet 
contradict the argument of Hägglund and Haddad; for even if the possibility to 
arrive at less violent outcomes is a lottery, there is a 50% chance to hit a lesser 
violence, which certainly is better than nothing. 
But secondly, the possibility as possibility, i.e. even if it is not opposed to 
necessity, accrues an additional meaning, for the reason that this possibility 
itself is a necessity. Therefore, it becomes a demand, or demanding, but in a 
very special sense. Let us concentrate on the following passage from Specters of 
Marx, where Derrida uses Blanchot’s “Three Voices of Marx” to make the 
point:516 
 
But the here-now does not fold back into immediacy, or into the reappropriable 
identity of the present, even less that of self-presence. … the demand that … is 
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“always present” must implicitly, it seems to us, find itself affected by the same 
rupture or the same dislocation, the same “short circuit.” It can never be always 
present, it can be, only, if there is any, it can be only possible, it must even 
remain a can-be or maybe in order to remain a demand. Otherwise it would 
become presence again, that is, substance, existence, essence, permanence, and 
not at all the excessive demand or urgency that Blanchot speaks of so correctly 
[justement].517 
 
The possibility that emerges from the experience of the impossible is not just 
between this or that, between more or less violence, but there (is) can-be, which 
haunts every judgement, every this or that, for it is now always possible to 
choose or judge differently. This can-be is not simply knowledge, nor igno-
rance, it is the very heterogeneity that must be kept, if there were any violence 
or nonviolence in the moral sense. In this can-be, the immediate “must” of the 
relationless relation returns in a ghostlike form, neither present nor absent, 
becoming also a demand, demanding a question. In the end of Specters of Marx, 
Derrida asks in a rhetorical manner, “could one address oneself in general if 
already some ghost did not come back?” – this question derives from this 
immediate “must” to take other as other to itself; it is this necessity that gathers 
the ghost while remaining without presence.518 So it is that before any decision 
or judgment comes to pass, it is summoned under questioning in itself, making 
the decision to reflect (and to reflect upon) the possibility of lesser violence, 
even if there is no prior knowledge what it is or how to reach it in every 
concrete case; one might or might not succeed in judging with “lesser violence”, 
it even might be not possible to measure it, but the possibility of lesser violence 
remains to haunt. (I will return to the question of reflection later in the analysis 
of Derrida’s text “The Laws of Reflection: Nelson Mandela, In Admiration.”) 
This demand cannot be expressed in the form of ontology, or any ethics. 
Levinas’s ethical ontology is replaced here by Derrida’s hauntology as it is 
developed in Spectres of Marx. Derrida says on specters in general:  
 
It does not belong to ontology, to the discourse on the Being of beings, or to the 
essence of life or death. It requires, then, what we call, to save time and space 
rather than just to make up a word, hauntology. We will take this category to be 
irreducible, and first of all to everything it makes possible: ontology, theology, 
positive or negative onto-theology.519 
 
Hence, the possibility to arrive at less violent actions, which emerges out of the 
experience of the impossible, is not a matter of knowledge, but nor is it non-
knowledge; the demand to take the other as other to itself, which defines lesser 
violence, remains to haunt, and for the same reason, it is demanding. 
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In the discussion of the lesser violence, the “othering” of the other, the other 
as remaining other to itself, which is the key to the relationless relation, was 
marked out, but nevertheless, left unexplained. In the next section, I will return 
to this “movement”, which is, as said above, also the incision of deconstruction, 
its “arrival” at the second “phase” of deconstruction.  
 
 
6.2 Infrastructural Accounting 
As it was established in the previous section, deconstruction aims at “capturing” 
(without making it thinkable) the other in its otherness, which makes it the task 
of the incision or inscription of deconstruction to institute – 
 
a relation in the form of a nonrelation, to inscribe rupture in the text, to place the 
chain of discursive knowledge in relation to an unknowledge which is not a 
moment of knowledge: an absolute unknowledge from whose nonbasis is 
launched chance, or the wagers of meaning, history, and the horizons of absolute 
knowledge.520 
 
This task, if it can be so called, is performed by Derridean “infrastructures,” to 
which deconstruction arrives in its second “phase.” 
In the following, in order to explicate the incision of deconstruction, and as 
much as the metaphor of a letter opener that cuts open the fold between two 
sheets (of a book, for example) was already used above in the explication of the 
conditions of incision of deconstruction, I will briefly turn to the figure of the 
fold in Derrida’s analysis of Stéphane (Étienne) Mallarmé’s work in “The 
Double Session.”521 With the help of the figure of the fold, and the blank that 
relates to it, it can be shown how the second movement of deconstruction 
arrives to “infrastructures” and offers a “solution” to the situation of radical 
violence. It also serves for demonstrating how the above performed analysis on 
Arendt’s “principle” over the concept of repetition parallels with Derrida’s 
analysis of the “blank.” 
In the second part of “The Double Session,” Derrida focuses on the “blank” 
and the “fold,” which are, as he says, “systematically recognised as themes of 
modern criticism” of Mallarmé’s work.522 The blank is “the place where nothing 
takes place but the place. But that ‘place’ is everywhere; it is not a site fixed or 
predetermined.”523 The blank understood in this way corresponds closely to 
Arendt’s “principle” in the sense of absolute transparency, as it was interpreted 
above. Derrida’s explications can be divided into two movements (although 
they take place simultaneously), which, in turn, can be related to two “phases” 
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of deconstruction – the critical and, let us say, “infrastructural” phase, as they 
were outlined above.524 
The first movement is initiated “through an interruption that suspends the 
equation between the mark and the meaning,” which is the situation of radical 
violence in terms of the thesis. This allows us to think of the “blank” as “the 
place where nothing takes place but the place,” or as absolute transparency. The 
“blank” appears when whatever shines through it as the “blank’s” own(most), or 
as Derrida puts it, in Mallarmé’s texts “the ‘blank’ appears first of all, to a 
phenomenological or thematic reading, as the inexhaustible totality of the 
semantic valences that have any tropic affinity with it.”525 In terms of Arendtian 
“principle” (its vouloir-dire), we could say that the “principle” “appears” when 
whatever content (i.e. anything that brings people to act together) shines 
through the “principle” (and becomes) as its own(most). Derrida further dif-
ferentiates between two forms how the “blank” appears – it appears in the form 
of the white, or whiteness, and in the form of the fold; as he says: “the white is 
marked (snow, swan, virginity, paper, etc.) or unmarked, merely demarcated 
(the entre, the void, the blank, the space, etc.).”526 
However, there is a second movement in which the “blank” reduplicates 
itself:  
 
It inserts (says, designates, marks, states – however one wishes to put it, and 
there is a need here for a different “word”) the blank as a blank between the 
valences, a hymen that unites and differentiates them in the series, the spacing of 
“the blanks” which “assume importance.”527  
 
This means that the blank marks everything white “plus the blankness that 
allows for the mark in the first place, guaranteeing its space of reception and 
production.”528 That the “blank” appears in the form of whiteness, indeed, com-
plicates things, because due to this reduplication there will be “white on white;” 
so, in case of Mallarmé’s texts Derrida concludes: 
 
These veils, sails, canvases, sheets, and pages are at once the content and the 
form, the ground and the figure, passing alternately from one to the other. 
Sometimes the example is a figure for the white space on which they are 
inscribed, that which stands out, and sometimes it is the infinite background 
behind. White on white. The blank is coloured by a supplementary white, an 
extra blank that becomes … a blank open on all four sides, a blank that is 
written, blackens itself of its own accord, a false true blank sense [sens blanc], 
without a blank [sans blanc], no longer countable or totalisable, counting on and 
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discounting itself at once, a blank that indefinitely displaces the margin and 
undoes … “the unitary aspiration of meaning.”529 
 
Again, the meaning of this passage perhaps gets clearer when juxtaposed with 
the “principle” (creating a sort of parallax). It was argued that whatever shines 
through the “principle” as its own(most) does not somehow replace the “prin-
ciple,” but the “principle,” at the moment when whatever content shines through 
it as its own(most) in the form of difference, differentiates from whatever shines 
through it, forming a repetition before the beginning. The beginning is the 
repetition of the principle, which is already not one, but in repetition of itself 
and in itself.  
There are (at least) three outcomes that follow from the fact that this repe-
tition is not a matter of choice, but a structural necessity: firstly, as much as 
there is not one (side) without the other, it can be called an affirmation, an 
unconditional affirmation for no principle can restrict it (because the affirmation 
is prior to it) – in other words, prior to the beginning there is an affirmation 
where the principle is confirmed by itself as an other; secondly, it is a promise 
(and memory), because this repetition is not a fulfilment through the next turn 
of repetition, but it has to remain repeating, like giving a promise to remember 
to return again; and thirdly, as much as there is a difference that does not let the 
“sides” of repetition to be one, it is a response, a response (or a call) to the 
other. In line of this, Derrida says:  
 
This affirmation is unconditional, first of all, in its form: it is intractable and 
excludes itself… But it is again unconditional in its content, as should be every 
affirmation of this type. It is in effect nothing other than affirmation of 
affirmation, the “yes” to the originary “yes,” the inaugural engagement of a 
promise or of an anticipation which wagers, a priori, the very future.530 
 
Therefore, the beginning (and the future) is possible only by repeating an 
affirmation given to an other (beginning), which is altogether other (in so far as 
it is not graspable by any principle); the beginning “can only affirm itself and 
engage itself in this repetition. … there would be no future without repetition,” 
as says Derrida.531 This “self-repetition, self-confirmation in a yes, yes” prior to 
the beginning, which is also a “self-otherness or self-difference (the difference 
from within oneself),” is “the place of” an infrastructure, for example, for yes-
yes, in which the other as other is accounted without its appropriation.532  
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I will return to yes-yes in a little later, but right now let us follow further the 
thought on the “blank,” for Derrida also analyses the “blank” as appearing in 
(the form of) the fold. At the moment the blank appears as the demarcated blank 
in the fold, like the void, the entre, the space, etc., the blank folds over, i.e. “it 
re-marks itself, marks itself twice.”533 Now, in order to underline specifically 
the incision of deconstruction, I recall the example of a fold between two sheets 
(of a book, for example) that is being cut open by a letter opener. If we observe 
the incision made in that case, it can be noticed, that this blank-fold opened as 
the result of the incision, always opens into “another fold,” which re-marks it, 
so that not only the blank appears inside the fold, but also the fold appears 
inside the blank; in other words, the fold opens at the same time into the outside 
and the inside, or as Derrida puts it: “The fold does not come up upon it from 
outside; it is the blank’s outside as well as its inside. … The fold folds (itself): 
its meaning spaces out with a double mark, in the hollow of which a blank is 
folded.”534 
Another illustration of the same movement could be a situation where 
someone wants to insert a mark, perhaps a word, or punctuation into a text, so 
as to change its “initial” meaning. In order to do that it has to follow the 
structure of the text and find a gap, for example, an end of a sentence, a turn of 
a paragraph (a structural possibility), which allows incision in such a way that it 
does not disrupt the flow of the text, but nevertheless, displaces it, so that the 
whole starts to mean something else. Simultaneously, it must be assumed that 
the text is open, or that the meaning of the text is never complete, so that adding 
an additional mark cannot ruin the text as such (a transcendental possibility). 
Indeed, one has to find also a blank, a space of whiteness (a space of incision) to 
add the mark. But this is not yet the whole story. At the moment of incision, the 
mark necessarily appears in the text only as marked out by other marks. In other 
words, in order to appear as something intervening (re-marking) in the text, it 
has to be re-marked; re-marking has to precede the mark. At the same time, the 
re-mark is also a repetition, which must take place after the mark has appeared. 
This refers to an aporia, which is accounted for by the infrastructure “re-mark.”  
Perhaps, a more systematic exposition of the re-mark, following in this 
Gasché’s approach, offers some additional clarity about how aporias are ac-
counted by infrastructures. The mark in general is the mark of itself. It means 
that the mark contains a differential structure in itself; it is double from the very 
beginning, because it does both: it marks and is marked. But it marks itself as 
something other, as another mark; only this allows the differential structure. 
Gasché says:  
 
Because a mark acquires the ideal identity necessary to its iteration as the mark 
of something other than itself only to the extent that it is constituted by what it is 
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not, the totalizing semic mark must also inscribe or insert within itself the 
differential structure of the mark, that which makes the mark possible. The mark 
must thus be marked, or re-marked, by its own mark (march, margin).535 
 
It can be said that it is possible to divide the structure of the mark in general 
between a “marking mark” and a “marked mark.” On the one hand, as much as 
they are in the mark, they are the margins of the mark, which now re-mark the 
mark. On the other hand, they open up a space or a fold, a differentiation 
between them. As the mark is inevitably something else than another mark, this 
space, “the re-marked site of the mark,”536 becomes consequently the true place 
of the mark, where the mark only can emerge. In this sense, the space between 
marks, that demarcates them, becomes the space of inscription of the mark. The 
mark becomes possible by falling into the space of inscription, which is already 
in the mark. But as soon as the differential structure (re-mark) appears, and the 
mark starts to stand for itself as another, re-mark has to withdraw; as Gasché 
says: “By re-marking itself, the mark effaces itself, producing in this manner the 
illusion of the referent. It effaces itself, disappears in the appearing of what it is 
not – a proxy of itself.”537 In other words, in signifying something else, the mark 
appears as a sign. The re-mark makes the totalising mark possible, but at the 
same time it undermines this totalisation and makes it impossible.  
It can be seen that, indeed, besides all conditions of deconstruction de-
lineated above, there still is one additional movement of double opening or 
marking, for example, re-mark (or yes-yes) that takes place at the moment of 
incision, in which, paraphrasing here Gasché, the transcendental conditions of 
possibilities are put into relation with their structural possibilities.538  
The deconstructive “solution” (which is also its incision) that we were 
looking for remains affected by this “logic” as well. In its first movement and 
“phase,” the “solution,” that cannot appear in the presence, as it was said above, 
nevertheless, maintains its future and its past, i.e. its “has yet to be,” but also, its 
“has already been,” which amounts to the “original” undecidability between, for 
example, the performative and the constative, from which this thesis proceeded 
in its analysis. The “solution” is (remains) undecidable. This is also the first 
“phase” of deconstruction – deconstruction shows undecidability (or contin-
gency) of any content that passes through the “principle;” it is expressed in a 
certain indifference towards whatever series of whites stands for the blank, or in 
the phrase “whatever content shines through the ‘principle’.” 
But in its second movement, the undecidability or opposition of perfor-
matives and constatives, opens itself into “an other undecidability,” which 
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precedes it in an a-temporal way. This is undecidability as an “infrastructure,” 
which is the second movement of deconstruction. Derrida argues in Memoirs: 
for Paul de Man (what he does not do in “Declarations of Independence”) that: 
 
There remains to be thought an other undecidability, one no longer bound to the 
order of calculation between two poles of opposition, but to the incalculable 
order of a wholly other: the coming or the call of the other. … There is no inside-
the-undecidable, certainly, but an other memory calls us, recalls us to think an 
“act” or “parole” (speech), or a “speech act” which resists the opposition 
performative/constative, provoking at the same time the aporia and movement 
forward (la marche), the relation of one to the other, that is to say, history or the 
text. But we know … that this singular memory does not lead us back to any 
anteriority. There never existed (there will never have existed) any older or more 
original “third term” that we would have to recall, toward which we would be 
called to recall under the aporetic disjunction. This is why what resists the non-
dialectisable opposition, what “precedes” it in some way, will still bear the name 
of one of the terms and will maintain a rhetorical relation with the opposition. It 
will be figured, figurable. It will have the figure of opposition and will always let 
itself be parasited by it. We will call “act,” for example, that act (of speech or 
not) which precedes the opposition between the language of act and the language 
of truth, between the performative and the constative.539 
 
In terms of the logic of “principle,” we could say that if a content shines through 
the “principle” as its own(most) in the form of undecidability, then it remains 
(not(-))decidable,540 which is not one more turn of undecidability, but it is a 
difference from itself and in itself. This means that one cannot face unde-
cidability without deciding at the same time, i.e. without being in(-)decision-
making.541 Derrida argues in the similar vein in “Force of Law”:  
 
the undecidable is not merely the oscillation or the tension between two 
decisions, it is the experience of that which, though heterogeneous, foreign to the 
order of the calculable and the rule, is still obliged – … to give itself up to the 
impossible decision, while taking account of laws and rules.542  
 
This second movement is, on the one hand, inseparable from performing the 
incision, while on the other hand, it is (as if) the result of the incision, and it is 
called by Gasché as “inscription.” Deconstruction ends, one might say, with 
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inscription, which evades metaphysical concept of production and generation – 
there is no contradiction or opposition between what is inscribed and the space 
or surface of inscription, “it only affirms, but does not produce or constitute,” 
and this prevents the incision of deconstruction to turn into a creation or 
generation of deconstruction.543 In next sections, I further illuminate what the 
deconstructive accounting entails by examining a trap of thinking that lures any 
engagement with radical violence. 
 
 
6.3 The Trap 
It was shown above that a deconstructive engagement with radical violence 
takes place over the “relationless relation,” which is opening to the other in its 
otherness. This also means that what has been formulated above as the problem 
of radical violence cannot have a solution that is thought (in one way or 
another) on the basis of the full and self-contained presence, because it would 
not maintain an aporetic relation to radical violence, and any such solution gets 
situated “prior to” radical violence, hiding and preserving, rather than dealing 
with it.544 Equally, any resistance thought in this way remains a repetition (or 
destruction) of the same founding act. Now, as can be seen from cases of Arendt 
and Benjamin, and some others that will be mentioned below, even if radical 
violence is recognised, the presence as the ground of a “solution” might return 
even against author’s explicit intentions to the contrary. This is the sign of a trap 
for/in thinking, which will be explored more closely below.  
Derrida mentions such trap for thinking about radical violence in “The 
Double Session”:  
 
And yet the structural site of this theological trap is nevertheless prescribed: the 
mark-supplement [le supplément de marquee] produced by the text’s workings, 
in falling outside of the text like an independent object with no origin other than 
itself, a trace that turns back into a presence (or a sign), is inseparable from 
desire (the desire for reappropriation or representation).545 
 
There is no short way to explain this passage, therefore, the whole following 
section will be dedicated to the task. I argue that whoever falls into this trap 
remains entrapped into the so-called first “phase” of deconstruction and neces-
sarily misunderstands the deconstructive “solution” to the problem of radical 
violence in “infrastructures” (that maintain the irreducible reference to the Other 
without turning into the third re-totalising term). 
So, Derrida argues in this passage that the mark-supplement, i.e. the blank 
between valences or whites, i.e. the re-marking fold, can fall “outside of the text 
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like an independent object with no origin other than itself,” turning into a 
presence that feeds “the desire for reappropriation or representation,” the desire 
to erect, for example, “the whiteness of the page of writing into the fundamental 
signified or signifier.”546 Following this thought on the basis of the fold, it might 
be said that the fold folds, but not into a different fold, or into a fold as such.547 
Derrida says in this respect that because of the reduplication of the fold “that 
nothing has preceded, there will never be any Blank with a capital B or any 
theology of the Text;” i.e. for the reason that nothing has preceded, there cannot 
be any different fold.548 Nevertheless, as much as the fold is the blank’s outside 
as well as its inside, it is possible that the supplementary mark is thought/ 
perceived falling (only) into the outside, or, I would add, only into the inside of 
the text, turning into an independent object generating desire for reappro-
priation. Derrida calls it a theological trap.  
These two cases of the theological trap (i.e. the mark falling inside or 
outside) cannot be opposed to each other in the manner like a trap of tran-
scendence would oppose a trap of immanence. If the supplementary mark is 
thought to fall outside, as it would be in the case of God, as we shall see very 
soon, then saying that God is transcendent and immanent, means not that the 
theological trap is avoided, but just that God is “and,” which binds the both. In 
“Declarations of Independence” Derrida uses this phrase: “And is God: at once 
creator of nature and judge.”549 The other case of the theological trap, when the 
fold folds inside, could be described by the formula “there is neither 
transcendence nor immanence;” it is “nor” that mediates both, and takes the 
place of God. In contrast, the Derridean infrastructure “is the structure and/or, 
between and and or.”550 Next, these both cases of the trap will be explicated by 
the help of some contemporary readings of Derrida. 
 
6.3.1 The Case of Laclau 
The case of the trap when the mark-supplement falls inside the text, rather than 
outside, it could be said, in terms of the fold, that the fold folds into inside, as if 
a fold in the garment is pushed back and the blank seems to appear only in the 
inside. In that case, (as the re-marking seems to be impossible) it appears that 
nothing of the blank (is) nothing as such, though it is merely a trap, because 
where nothing is to be seen is itself already a content; as Derrida puts it, “from 
the moment the blank (is) white or bleaches (itself) out, as soon as there is 
something (there) to see (or not to see)…”.551 This case can be illustrated by the 
                                                                          
546  Ibid. 
547  For that reason the phrase “another fold” was put into quotation marks at the explication 
of the blank-fold above. 
548  Derrida, “The Double Session,” p. 265. 
549  Derrida, “Declarations of Independence,” p. 52. 
550  Derrida, “The Double Session,” p. 268. 
551  Ibid., p. 265. (The emphasis is mine.) 
139
theory of hegemony of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. The theory of 
hegemony has its own terminology and complexity, which can be explicated in 
much more detailed manner than could be done in the framework of this thesis, 
but, nevertheless, in the following it is attempted to demonstrate its main logic 
and problems by concentrating on its relation to deconstruction. 
Laclau has elaborated on the relation between the theory of hegemony and 
deconstruction, above all in books Deconstruction and Pragmatism, and 
Emancipation(s).552 In the former, Laclau summarizes his view on this relation-
ship as follows: 
 
Deconstruction and hegemony are the two essential dimensions of a single 
theoretico-practical operation. Hegemony requires deconstruction: without the 
radical structural undecidability that the deconstructive intervention brings about, 
many strata of social relations would appear as essentially linked by necessary 
logics and there would be nothing to hegemonise. But deconstruction also 
requires hegemony, that is, a theory of the decision taken in an undecidable 
terrain: without a theory of the decision, that distance between structural 
undecidability and actuality would remain untheorised.553 
 
In the context of the idea of deconstruction delineated in this thesis so far, this 
passage poses a puzzle. On the one hand, there seems to be a place in the 
“logic” of deconstructive movement that could accommodate the theory of a 
hegemonic decision. Namely, if put in terms of the “logic” of the “principle” 
outlined above, the theory of hegemony theorises deconstruction’s “indif-
ference” to what content starts to shine through the “principle.” For example, if 
in case of Arendt it was said that “whatever the initial getting together of people 
is based upon shines through the ‘principle’ as the principle’s own(most),” then 
in concrete political circumstances, there always is one (set of) value(s) or 
demand(s) around which people are getting together and which passes through 
the “principle.”554 The theory of hegemony explicates how one particular 
demand, value, or, most generally, content (a signifier) takes a hegemonic 
position in relation to other equivalent demands, values or contents and 
determines the beginning (or meaning). One of the main tasks of this project 
then is to think structurally, how a content in representing the totality of a 
system is never able to take the position of an absolute (and restore an absolute 
fullness, order, meaning, etc.). This is theorised on the basis of the concept of 
contingency, which means that all possible candidates for the role of represen-
tation are equivalent to each other and there cannot be any predetermined con-
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tent for this position; by words of Laclau, contingency refers to a situation 
“where no specific content is predetermined to fill the structural gap.”555 If all 
contents are equivalent then one particular content that stands in for the totality 
remains constitutively inadequate to its task, which is manifested in its ap-
pearing as split between the general form of fullness and its own particular 
content: “on the one hand, it will be its own literal content; on the other … it 
will represent a general function of filling that is independent of any particular 
content … [i.e.] the general form of fullness.”556 In this way, the particular 
content brings about a horizon of fullness, which it is trying to fill in (but as 
much as other possibilities are equivalent to the one actually incarnating the 
fullness, the filling is always ultimately inadequate). On the discursive level, it 
amounts to production of empty signifiers, for in order to name the absent 
fullness, a particular content, in taking the role upon itself, has to empty or 
mitigate (to certain extent) its own particularity, so that it could represent other 
contents (or demands, etc.). In other words, this process of emptying is what 
separates any particularity in its role of representation from taking the place of 
an absolute. The above said finds its shortest expression in the definition of 
hegemony proposed by Laclau and Mouffe: hegemony is when “one difference, 
without ceasing to be a particular difference, assumes the representation of an 
incommensurable totality.”557 
On the other hand, Laclau posits hegemony on the same level as decon-
struction in its second movement, but in the second movement, as it has been 
shown above, deconstruction does not need to be supplemented by a decision – 
there is no infrastructural undecidability without a decision. Nevertheless, 
Laclau’s depiction of the relationship between hegemony and deconstruction 
can be expressed with the following sequence: if there always is one particular 
content (values, demands, etc.) that determines the act of founding, then it tends 
to be presented as the only one suitable for the representation (for example, 
other possibilities might simply be forgotten, sedimented over time). According 
to Laclau, deconstruction exposes that such claims are unfounded, and every 
value, demand or content is structurally undecidable and contingent, i.e. there 
always are other possibilities to begin something. For example, in Emanci-
pation(s), Laclau explains that the undecidability deconstruction generates 
“should be literally taken as that condition from which no course of action 
necessarily follows.”558 Such undecidability, in turn, highlights the need for a 
decision, and for a theory to explain how the decision is possible in these 
circumstances of undecidability. It follows that “the role of deconstruction is ... 
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to reactivate the moment of decision,”559 by revealing “original” undecidability, 
but the theory of hegemony provides for the logic of the decision, which then as 
if completes deconstruction. As a result, a clear dividing line between two 
theoretical moves can be drawn: the first move, deconstruction, is comple-
mented by the second one, hegemony. Laclau has subscribed to this position 
also in his most recent interviews: “But deconstruction stops … at the moment 
of undecidability. A theory of hegemony needs a further step – a theory of the 
decision – and that is not provided by deconstruction.”560 
The view that hegemony and deconstruction are complementary theoretical 
steps has provoked several criticisms. Above all, Aletta Norval insists that 
deconstruction means something more and different than just a “foregrounding 
of contingency,” and that the Derridean undecidability should be kept apart 
from a mere structural openness: “Structural openness points to the essential 
contestability of all identity and the ultimate impossibility of closure. Undecida-
bility, by contrast, designates a terrain, not of general openness and contesta-
bility, but of a regulated tension and of a suspension in the ‘between’.”561 In this 
way, Norval’s main charge against Laclau is that he ignores a specific conno-
tation of the Derridean undecidability as an infrastructure.562 Norval’s critique 
is also echoed by Lasse Thomassen, who states that “deconstruction and 
hegemony, undecidability and decision, can neither be temporally separated, nor 
conceived as different and complementary analytical moves.”563  
The reason for this reduction of deconstruction to its first “phase,” can be 
explained by a lure of the theological trap. The gist of the problem is centred on 
how to account for the absolutely inaccessible, the other in its otherness. If 
deconstruction thinks, as it was shown above, the openness to the other as other 
via relation without relation, for “what other means is phenomenality as dis-
appearance,” as Derrida puts it,564 then, like also E. E. Berns notes, Laclau 
rejects the possibility of the relation without relation: “If identities are exclu-
sively relational, then all relation must, by definition, be internal. The concept 
of an ‘external relation’ has always seemed inconsistent to me.”565 Therefore, 
the “principle,” or the “blank, where “nothing takes place but the place” must 
appear for Laclau as a sort of transcendental structure. Excluding this possi-
bility, Laclau maintains that “the social terrain is structured, in my view, not as 
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completely immanent or as the result of some transcendent structure, but 
through what we could call failed transcendence. Transcendence appears within 
the social as the presence of an absence.”566 In other words, if a system consists 
of differences (the meaning of an element is determined by its relations to other 
elements), then the fullness, the closure or the systematicity of the system is 
unachievable because of the structural inability to signify its limits (which is the 
moment of radical violence in terms of this thesis), but, as Laclau states, “the 
impossibility of an object does not eliminate its need: it continues, as it were, 
haunting the structure as the presence of its absence” (in the political terrain, the 
guilt for this absence of fullness is attributed to one or other political force or 
enemy).567  
To think of the “blank” as a transcendental place waiting there to be filled in 
with a content certainly diverges from what Derrida had in mind. Derrida says 
that this “place” “is not a site fixed and predetermined,” but “that ‘place’ is 
everywhere.”568 For that reason, the “blank” (and in the same way, the “prin-
ciple”) is always already represented: 
 
This surplus mark, this margin of meaning, … has to be inserted there [as a 
valence among others in the series] to the extent that it does not exist outside the 
text and has no transcendental privilege; this is why it is always represented by a 
metaphor and a metonymy.569 
 
In the same way, what has been dubbed in this thesis as “radical violence” is 
itself nothing but a metaphor (or catachresis), and this thesis could have not 
approached and recognised the radical violence otherwise than on the field of 
representation. But having located the situation and meaning of radical violence 
(by recourse to the metaphor), the radical violence interrupts and “suspends the 
equation between the mark and the meaning.”570 In this suspension, it appears 
that there is nothing prior to radical violence, for which reason the latter is also 
termed by Derrida as “preethical violence,” or “previolence.”571 It is here where 
Laclau’s and Derrida’s trajectories of thinking start to diverge. The suspension 
means, in terms of the supplementary mark that: 
 
This surplus mark, this margin of meaning, is not one valence among others in 
the series, even though it is inserted in there. [and] we will try to show that this 
position of the supplementary mark [the structurally necessary position of a 
supplementary inscription] is in all rigour neither a metaphor nor a metonymy 
even though it is always represented by one trope too many or too few.572  
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In contrast, Laclau and Mouffe place the hegemonic relation on the metaphor-
metonymy plane, even if it does not equate with either side in their purity; in 
“The Politics of Rhetoric” Laclau asserts that “hegemony is always suspended 
between two impossible poles,” i.e. between metonymy and metaphor.573  
For Derrida, what is revealed in this suspension remains not representable, 
not even as the presence of the absence of fullness – if nothing (has been yet), 
then what exactly can be absent? For Laclau, on the other hand, “the failure 
inherent to representability … becomes itself representable, even if only 
through the traces of non-representability within the representable.”574 This 
means that, for Laclau, what is revealed in the suspension is accounted for 
through a distorted representation; a particular content in representing the 
fullness of a system always appears as split between the general form of fullness 
and its own particular content, but due to the radical contingency, the 
particularity can never fill in the general form of fullness. Therefore, as much as 
“there is no order [no particular content] that can claim a monopoly of the 
ordering function [i.e. a general function of filling, or the general form of 
fullness, which functions like a horizon], emptiness is at the heart of the 
structure.”575 Now, this emptiness is here that should represent what is 
irrepresentable and Laclau proceeds that “‘irrepresentability’ acquires a certain 
form of discursive presence through the production of empty signifiers which 
… name an absent fullness.”576 However, the emptiness is never in this formu-
lation, even if it results from the “irrepresentability,” as Laclau says, absolutely 
empty, but it is an emptiness of fullness, and therefore, it is a content. Hence, 
the presence of absence also bridges the aporia of irrepresentability, and it 
cannot be a way to “deal” with it.577  
The following passage from “The Double Session” seems to catch neatly the 
difference of deconstruction (in its second movement) from hegemony:  
 
This is why, while it [the mark-supplement] cannot constitute a meaning that is 
signified or represented, one would say in classical discourse that it always has a 
delegate or representative in the series: since the blank is the polysemic totality 
of everything white or blank plus the writing site (hymen, spacing. etc.) where 
such a totality is produced, this plus will, for example, find one of these 
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representatives representing nothing in the blankness or margins of the page. But 
for the reasons just enumerated, it is out of the question that we should erect such 
a representative – for example the whiteness of the page of writing – into the 
fundamental signified or signifier in the series.578 
 
In Laclau’s case, an empty signifier is the representative that represents/names 
nothing in the blankness or margins of the page. This inadvertent reliance on the 
presence manifests in thinking the radical rupture at all levels of the theory of 
hegemony. On the discursive level, there are three terms that have been 
proposed to capture the radical exclusion at different stages of the development 
of the theory of hegemony. In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, “the limit of all 
objectivity” was expressed by the concept of antagonism in which “the presence 
of the ‘Other’ prevents me from being totally myself.”579 However, Laclau 
admits in the Critical Reader that “antagonism is not equivalent to radical 
exclusion. What it does is to dichotomize the social space, but both sides of the 
antagonistic relation are necessary in order to create a single space of represen-
tation.”580  
From New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time onward, a more pri-
mary exclusion is proposed under the name “dislocation:” “Every identity is 
dislocated insofar as it depends on an outside which both denies that identity 
and provides its conditions of possibility at the same time.”581 But, against this 
prioritisation, Oliver Marchart argues: “The whole point is that, at the very 
moment we do encounter dislocation in our social experience, we have already 
constructed it in a certain way. Dislocation will therefore always occur within 
the horizon of being (the social).”582 And indeed, Laclau himself says in New 
Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time that “a structure must be there for it 
to be dislocated. The situation of dislocation is that of a lack which involves a 
structural reference.”583 
The third, the latest term for the task is “heterogeneity,” which refers to 
exclusions which “cannot be assimilated to the inclusive exclusion of 
antagonism,” i.e. it refers to all forces “inside/outside” society that have no 
access to the field of representation.584 Now, heterogeneity results from the fact 
that the empty signifier cannot be entirely empty (in which case the signifying 
chain would expand infinitely), but it contains a residue of its particular content. 
Therefore, on the one hand, it is free for all to link itself to the chain (or to 
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access to the field of representation), in the sense that any demand (value, 
content, political force) can create a link to the existing chain of equivalences 
(i.e. demands, values, contents, etc.), if it subscribes to the opposition to the 
antagonistic other (it is the condition to create the link, in so far as this 
opposition creates the chain). But on the other hand, “some new links would 
simply be incompatible with the remainders of particularity.”585 This is not then 
much different from Arendt’s position described above in that it ultimately 
thinks what is conformable with principles of the field of representation, rather 
than what is radically inaccessible, or what is the other in its otherness. We 
might say that the inability to account for the radical rupture on the discursive 
level is due to the thinking that relies on the presence as its ground. 
Above all, however, the decision itself that the theory of hegemony is 
proposed to theorise remains haunted by the presence in the form of the subject 
of the decision. On the one hand, Laclau recognises that the decision cannot be 
made by a pre-constituted subject, in which case there were no decision but 
simply a calculation,586 but on the other hand, there is no other means in the 
theory of hegemony for depicting the moment of the decision as an instance of 
“impersonating a God;” “we ‘mortal Gods’ … simulating being Him and 
replacing with the madness of our decisions an omniscience that will always 
elude us.”587 Rubenstein aptly remarks that “‘acting as if’ one were a subject is 
tantamount to ‘being’ a subject, insofar as the myth of subjectivity has always 
been a myth.”588 Also, Derrida argues in response to Laclau’s text in Decon-
struction and Pragmatism that: “The decision announces itself from the 
perspective of a much more radical alterity,” which means that “I decide in the 
name of the other … the other is the origin of my responsibility without it being 
determinable in terms of an identity.”589 In other words, hegemony requires 
deconstruction, not because the latter only reveals contingency, but because it 
thinks, how the decision and the beginning is possible without recourse to 
absolutes (or any presence). In this way, the relationship between decon-
struction and hegemony is not describable as a succession of phases, but 
deconstruction permeates hegemony in its very functioning. 
The radical violence is thinkable in the framework of hegemony only as a 
repetition. This means that the radical violence would manifest in the sys-
tematics of Laclau’s theory not when a particular content fails to fulfil the role 
of incarnation of the general form of fullness, but when a particularity, 
emptying of its content, arrives to the position of representation of the fullness 
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of the system (forming a possibility of the beginning), nevertheless fails to 
“initiate” (or uphold) the horizon of fullness (which at the same time is 
absolutely necessary). If the general form of fullness is always already pre-
sumed, even if not as a transcendental ground, but as formed in splitting up of 
the particularity when it takes the role of representation, then the radical 
violence cannot be accounted. It is the same as said on infrastructures (that also 
account for the suspension), “one cannot think the trace – and therefore, 
différance – on the basis of the present, or of the presence of the present.”590 
Perhaps, this recalls Gasché’s question on the theory of hegemony of how the 
empty place is recognised: “What is it that makes it possible for all particu-
larities to relate to this empty place as the place of the universal, a place with 
respect to which they themselves come to understand themselves.”591 In 
response to this question, Laclau shifts the emphasis on the actor who performs 
the act of filling, and then is able to state that this question makes no sense, 
because “the act of filling a lack and the act of recognising the actor performing 
it as a true filler, are one and the same operation.”592 I would say that the 
question of Gasché was not about “a true actor,” but about the horizon of 
fullness, which perhaps cannot be presumed as an inevitable outcome of some 
internal logic.593 
In conclusion, it could be said that in case of the theory of hegemony, the 
supplementary mark, being reduced to one valence among others and mixed up 
with the emptiness, falls into the inside of the fold as an independent object 
feeding the desire for reappropriation. In the case of Laclau, this reappropriation 
means the decision that should bridge undecidability, or in other words, if the 
theory of hegemony theorises the decision to supplement deconstruction in its 
second movement, then it starts to function as an attempt of reappropriation of 
the aporia of undecidability. The bridging problem is aptly summarised by 
Mary-Jane Rubenstein:  
 
A number of scholars (Kearney, Laclau, Critchley) … supplement a “strictly” 
Derridean undecidability with something else (“an ethics of judgement,” 
hegemony, substitution) in order to account for the transition or passage between 
undecidability and the decision. Each of them, in other words, decides to provide 
a second, con-structive movement as a counterbalance to deconstruction’s first, 
de-structive movement.594 
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But, as said already above, there is no such gap, infrastructural undecidability 
presumes decision, or as Rubenstein puts it: “the height of undecidability and 
the ground of decision inhabit the same spatiotemporal instant.”595 
What the suspension of the mark and the meaning should have revealed is 
that beyond the lack of fullness understood as the presence of emptiness in the 
structure lies the lack of fullness understood as the not-yet-fullness, which 
cannot be represented by any presence.596 To treat the latter for the former 
means to fall into the theological trap, which is to take the emptiness of the fold 
for the radical rupture in the meaning, while the emptiness is part of the content 
(for nothing is seen) that shines through the “principle” as its own(most). 
 
6.3.2 The Case of Horwitz 
It was mentioned above that there also is another possibility of entrapment 
when the mark-supplement falls into the outside of the text; the mark-
supplement falls “outside of the text like an independent object with no origin 
other than itself,”597 which means, in terms of the fold that the fold folds into a 
different fold, or into a fold as such. One of the more recent texts that seems to 
fall into this trap is Noah Horwitz’s “Derrida and the Aporia of the Political, or 
the Theologico-Political Dimension of Deconstruction,” which also focuses on 
the founding act in the elaboration of its argument, and draws from Derrida’s 
“Declarations of Independence,” but also from “The Laws of Reflection: Nelson 
Mandela, in Admiration.”598  
On the one hand, Horwitz perceptively outlines all the movements of the 
deconstructive intervention; he educes the structural possibility by pointing out 
an inherent instability (or “structural undecidability”) in the founding act, due to 
the fact that “the event of foundation must always have recourse to something 
heterogeneous to what it founds;”599 he also points out the transcendental 
condition of possibility, which he develops on the basis of “the irreducible non-
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closure of context,” that Derrida speaks about in Limited Inc., which refers to a 
certain unconditional openness that is another name for justice to come;600 and 
finally, he also brings out the aporia as an “experience of impossibility and non-
passage” to which deconstruction has to arrive and which “must be endured as 
interminable in order for experience to take place.”601 Eventually, he concludes 
that “deconstruction takes its force and motivation from this unconditionality … 
as it does from structural undecidability and aporia.”602 Nevertheless, after 
bringing out all these moments, he states, in the very similar manner to 
Benjamin, that God “names not only an ultimate instance but also the very 
aporia of the act.”603 Giving to God this double status, Horwitz has no problem 
to maintain that “this transcendent reference opens up and informs the very 
aporia of political, making it always a theologico-political event. … In this way, 
what is founded always has in itself a religious dimension.”604 
However, if God names both, i.e. it names the radical aporia of decon-
struction (as Horwitz says: “it is precisely this reference to an ultimate instance 
that betrays the … abyssal structure of the act”605) and it names the ultimate 
instance without which no founding is possible, then it is God that binds 
everything, that remarks everything, remaining itself the outside(-fold). There is 
a pertinent passage in Derrida’s article “Différance,” which clearly shows, in 
view of deconstruction in its second “infrastructural” movement, the inadequacy 
of God’s position in Horwitz’s argument:  
 
If it [différance, or any “infrastructure”] is unnameable, it is not provisionally so, 
not because our language has not yet found or received this name, or because we 
would have to seek it in another language, outside the finite system of our own. 
It is rather because there is no name for it at all not even the name of essence or 
of Being, not even that of “différance,” which is not a name, which is not a pure 
nominal unity, and unceasingly dislocates itself in a chain of differing and 
deferring substitutions. “There is no name for it”: a proposition to be read in its 
platitude. This unnameable is not an ineffable Being which no name could 
approach: God, for example.606 
 
Horwitz’s misreading also manifests in mistaking what seems to be the 
ontological difference for a deconstructive undecidability.607 Drawing from 
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Derrida’s discussion of acts of revelation in Politics of Friendship, Horwitz 
marks out the need to theorise an undecidability that “arises between a 
particular event opening up a field of possibilities and what allows for a field of 
possibilities as such.”608 One might agree with this setting up of the problem, 
because it might indeed be said that beyond structural undecidability there is 
“another undecidability,” as it was already pointed out in reference to Derrida’s 
text Mémoires.609 But the undecidability that is proposed to be analysed is 
immediately closed in the next sentence, where he argues further that “this 
undecidability is best formulated … in terms of the undecidability between an 
event of revelation and a general structure of revealability and phe-
nomenality.”610 This undecidability is then described as a “play between the 
particular event and the general structure,” in which the particular “event 
precedes the general structure in priority; however, given that this general 
structure cannot be reduced to the event, the general structure also seems to 
have priority.”611 But clearly, this is simply one more turn of the so-called 
“structural undecidability.” In depicting it as an deconstructive undecidability, 
Horwitz misses Derrida’s qualification in a footnote at the very place quoted by 
him, where Derrida says: 
 
What I called elsewhere iterability might not dissolve this alternative but might 
at least give access to a structure of experience in which the two poles of the 
alternative cease to oppose one another to form another node, another “logic,” 
another “chronology,” another history, another relation to the order of orders.612 
 
This also relates well to what Derrida says in “Différance” about the ontological 
difference: “Since Being has never had a ‘meaning,’ has never been thought or 
said as such, except by dissimulating itself in beings, then différance, in a 
certain and very strange way, (is) ‘older’ than the ontological difference or than 
the truth of Being.”613 Thinking the undecidability on the level of the onto-
logical difference is a sign of entrapment into the theological trap.614  
In conclusion, perhaps, Horwitz’s interpretation of (and similarly, Laclau’s 
approach to) “undecidability” in terms of a particular event of revelation and a 
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general structure of revealability can be judged in the same way as Jean-Luc 
Marion evaluates Heidegger’s Being and Time: 
 
We thus end up with a double, paradoxical conclusion. On the one hand … Sein 
und Zeit does know an “ontological difference.” On the other hand … Sein und 
Zeit does not yet think the ontological difference due to the simple fact that it 
names an “ontological difference.”615  
 
In other words, the “another undecidability” that Horwitz as if opens but does 
not think aporetically, proves to be one more turn of undecidability, inseparable 
from a desperate need for an ultimate decider, God.616 
In both cases of entrapment, whether fold folds inside or outside, whether 
immanence and transcendence is bound by neither or and, deconstruction is 
understood as what it is in its first “phase,” i.e. as opening a possibility for 
critique. This affects Horwitz’s reading of Derrida’s text “The Laws of 
Reflection: Nelson Mandela, in Admiration” in the same article explored above 
(i.e. “Derrida and the Aporia of the Political”). It is because the text of “The 
Laws of Reflection” moves beyond the scope of “Declarations of Inde-
pendence” and marks out what the incision (or inscription) of deconstruction, as 
being different from mere opening a possibility of a critique, means in the 
political sphere. In the following, on the one hand, I point out Horwitz’s limited 
analysis of “The Laws of Reflection,” but on the other hand, the analysis of 
Derrida’s text on Mandela serves also as a bridge to the next section, in which 
the marked out “site” of deconstructive incision in “The Laws of Reflection” is 
thought on the basis of legitimacy. 
The question Horwitz poses to deconstruction in his analysis of “The Laws 
of Reflection” is when the incision of deconstruction is justified. Apparently, 
Derrida’s formulations in his essay on Mandela give a good ground for such a 
question. Recalling themes analysed in the text “Declarations of Independence,” 
namely that every state is founded on a certain “coup de force,” a self-authori-
sation, Derrida argues in the text on Mandela that the coup of force which 
established the state of South Africa “remained a coup de force, thus, a bad 
blow – the failure of a law that is unable to establish itself. Its authors and 
beneficiaries were only the particular wills of a part of the population, a limited 
number of private interests, those of the white minority.”617 In other words, the 
founding violence could not be hidden by a constative fable and remained 
visible: “In the case of South Africa, certain ‘conventions’ were not respected, 
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the violence was too great, visibly too great, at a moment when this visibility 
extended to a new international scene, and so on. The white community was too 
much in the minority, the disproportion of wealth too flagrant.”618 This 
description allows for Horwitz to put up a problem:  
 
Derrida wishes to argue that the coup of force remains constantly visible and 
undercuts what has been brought into being. But given that such a coup of force 
is found in all events of foundation, by what right does Derrida call into question 
the South African state in particular? … how is it that the coup of force in this 
instance can be contested whereas elsewhere it remains forgotten? … by what 
right does one judge that in a particular case a minority is too much a minority, 
especially if a coup of force is necessarily at work in any event of foundation?619  
 
The answer Horwitz proposes is that if a coup of force produces a declaration, 
then the latter contains in itself inevitably a legal fiction, a set of principles (like 
“a state of and for all”) that has to be honoured by all subsequent acts, but “if 
the prescriptive value of its [the state’s] founding act is not respected, then this 
coup of force will remain visible and never fully dissimulated.”620 Hence, on the 
one hand, the incision of deconstruction is always possible due to the con-
stitutive discrepancy between a legal fiction and an actual state of affairs, but on 
the other hand, if the discrepancy is judged small then the founding violence is 
forgotten and if it is judged as big then it remains visible, in which case an 
argument can be made against legitimacy of the state. However, the judgement 
itself, which also is the incision of deconstruction for Horwitz, remains “a 
matter of judgement,” as he says himself: “The decision to hear and answer to 
this unconditional opening and to recall the coup of force at the event of 
foundation remains a matter of judgement.”621 As deconstruction cannot offer 
any a priori rule to make this judgement (about making a judgement), it remains 
“a political decision to recall the coup of force,” which, in Horwitz’s mind, 
“undercuts the relevance of deconstruction for politics.”622 
The truth is that such exposition of the matter does not do justice to the 
aporia of the founding act. The founding declaration is possible only on the 
assumption that it is not perceived as directly violent against those whose 
freedom it seeks to establish. Therefore, there cannot be such situation where 
visibility or non-visibility of founding violence is decided after the coup of 
force has already founded a state with its prescriptive legal fiction, as Horwitz 
seems to argue. If such decision is thought possible, then it can take place only 
on the level of undecidable violence, which concerns deconstructive inter-
vention only in its first “phase” as a critique of an already existing system. In 
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line with this, Horwitz argues that “the aporia of the political, that is, … the 
structurally undecidable declarative act … offers the resource for critique and 
questioning.”623 This is indeed correct, but if the whole aporia of the founding 
act and deconstructive intervention is thought on the level of the first “phase” of 
deconstruction, then Horwitz really is not asking about the incision of 
deconstruction, but merely when one is entitled to a critique (to say that South 
Africa has excluded groups that has to be included); the answer is: always, of 
course. It is absurd to think that excluded groups (as much as they are groups) 
do not know about their exclusion, though, perhaps, it is possible that on certain 
circumstances, those who are left outside the field of representation (unable to 
link to the chain of equivalences, put in Laclau’s terminology) abide to reasons 
produced to justify their exclusion (so that they believe their lot to be the natural 
course of things, for example). But deconstruction is always already in progress, 
creating through undecidability between the performative and the constative, 
between a creation and a confirmation of freedom incessantly possibilities for 
critique, and this is, indeed, what Horwitz explicates by referring to “the 
prescriptive value of a legal fiction and the unconditionality of the very aporia 
of the political,” which is understood as a structural undecidability by him.624 
However, as it was argued above, deconstruction has to pass through the first 
critical “phase,” and does not coincide with it. 
The result of Horwitz’s analysis is expected, as the text on Mandela is 
understood in the framework of the text on the Declaration, but in fact, the 
former moves beyond the scope of the latter. First of all, one should pay 
attention to the context of the text – it is homage to Nelson Mandela, to his 
resistance to the regime of apartheid of South Africa. Derrida follows 
Mandela’s resistance and intervention into the law, and he argues that 
Mandela’s questioning of the law is deconstructive; he repeats in several places 
in the text that Mandela’s reflection brings “the invisible into visible,” which is 
the same formula used in Of Grammatology in pointing out that the task of 
deconstructive reading in producing infrastructures is “to make the not-seen 
accessible to sight.”625 So, strictly speaking, the deconstructive incision in this 
text is Mandela’s, not Derrida’s. This changes the context of the question of 
visibility of founding violence. Derrida does not say that the founding violence 
as violence remained visible for those for whom the state was founded, i.e. for 
the white minority; it is exactly the task of Mandela’s reflection to make 
“visible what was no longer even visible in the political phenomenality 
dominated by whites… It tries to open the eyes of whites.”626 But for Mandela, 
who was among the excluded, the violence was visible without saying. It relates 
to what Derrida says on states that are founded on genocide or quasi-extermi-
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nation, where violence cannot be forgotten, and the state, remaining mistrustful 
of its fables of rightfulness that go with all acts of founding, has to “imitate 
right in a legislative apparatus,” which, however, always leads to contradictory 
results.627 
So, by stressing visibility of violence, Derrida merely says that the scene is 
set for a deconstructive critique and intervention, because the undecidable 
violence is always already undoing the system of hierarchy. In this sense, what 
makes Mandela’s case exemplary for Derrida is that Mandela’s resistance did 
not consist only in critiquing the regime for excluding those who should have 
been included (by, let us say, pointing out the discrepancy between a legal 
fiction and the state of affairs), nor he proposed to replace the existing law or 
founding act with another in a revolutionary action, but Mandela wanted to 
bring (or to make it possible to bring) altogether different (beginning) into the 
same, which is attested as much by his following of the Freedom Charter,628 
which, by words of Derrida, “does not annul the founding act of the law, [but] 
intends to refound it” than by his trial (his defence speech).629 
The most defining moment in respect to Mandela’s actions lies in his (and 
his people’s) experience of non-response from the state; we might imagine that 
in situations of hesitation, of potential misreading one asks guidance, but in case 
of South Africa, such questions (his correspondence with the state) were not 
responded; by Derrida’s rendering of Mandela’s words:  
 
For white power does not content itself with not answering. It does worse: it does 
not even acknowledge receipt. … Not to acknowledge receipt is to betray the 
laws of civility but first of all those of civilization: a primitive behaviour, a 
return to the state of nature, a presocial phase, before the law. Why does the 
government return to this non-civilised practice? Because it considers the 
majority of the people … to be non-civilised, before or outside the law. By 
acting in this way, by interrupting the correspondence in a unilateral fashion, the 
white man is no longer respecting his own law.630 
 
So, the state gave orders, but did not respond; therefore, and this is important, as 
there was no response of law to follow, they followed their conscience, the call 
of conscience. Derrida quotes from the defence speech of Mandela:  
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All lawful modes of expressing opposition to this principle had been closed by 
legislation, and we were placed in a position in which we had either to accept a 
permanent state of inferiority, or to defy the Government. We chose to defy the 
law.631 
 
But something important is here revealed – it shows that law starts from 
response; without it, there is no law to follow; hence, the response is the source 
of law and prior to law. At the same time, following their conscience, defying 
the law and resorting to (limited) violence in order to overthrow the regime of 
apartheid, they still remain bound to law, as they aimed at only bringing the law 
to respond. 
For this demand for a response, which itself can be dubbed as law of laws, to 
appear, to intervene into a law, it cannot be thought as becoming itself another 
law prior to responding; therefore, it can only appear in answering to the law, 
i.e. reflecting on itself before the law: “this conscience presents itself, gathers 
itself, collects itself by reflecting itself before the law,” as Derrida puts it. This 
appearing in front of law is a paradox at least for two reasons. First, it poses a 
problem, how one can answer (to be answerable) to the law that does not 
respond, that does not exist (or for whom you do not exist). Secondly, showing 
up in answering to such law inevitably involves risks for them who are 
summoned, because they remain outside the law and all acts of conscience by 
them are reduced to criminal acts. And indeed, Mandela was summoned to 
appear before the law, at his trial, at so-called The Rivonia Trial that took place 
in South Africa in 1963−64, in which leaders of the African National Congress 
were tried for acts of sabotage. 
So, how he appears in the court – by understanding of Derrida, Mandela 
appeared in the court in admiration of law; not of the law of South Africa, but 
“a higher law, the one he declares to admire and before which he agrees to 
appear.”632 In this way, “he will thus be able to speak to them [his judges], 
while speaking over their heads.”633 As much as the law he responds to, does 
not exist yet – either he stands in front of the law that does not exist or prior to 
the law, Mandela’s response takes the form of reflection; “Mandela lets himself 
be fascinated by what he sees being reflected in advance, by what is not yet to 
be seen, what he fore-sees.”634 This means that, on the one hand, he sets up an 
ideal law for his people, which accords with his conscience, against the existing 
law, on the other hand, he reflects (keeps, suspends, accounts for) his own 
position before the law, which is the position of altogether other beginning. For 
that reason, we could say that he reflects, reflecting the law of laws, or 
reflecting a law that would reflect law of laws. Reflecting on himself, in giving 
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account of himself for his people, he (and his admiration and fascination) makes 
law to differ in itself, of itself; the law of laws becomes then as if law-law, so 
that the law that appears in responding, nevertheless, cannot appear as having 
responded already, because the response cannot be given once and for all, but it 
is the promise to respond again (in yes-yes) whoever might ask for an altogether 
other law to come: “his reflection lets us see … the promise of what has never 
yet been seen or heard.”635 
In that way, by setting “himself against the code in the code, by reflecting 
the code, and thereby making visible what the code in force makes unreadable,” 
Mandela marks the place or movement of responding not only to this or that, 
but to the other in general, in which the law appears.636 
Keeping in mind present day political developments, I think it is appropriate 
to finish this analysis of Derrida’s “The Laws of Reflection,” in a call to reflect, 
with the following quote from Derrida: 
 
Thus the exemplary witnesses are often those who distinguish between the law 
and laws, between the respect for the law that speaks immediately to conscience 
and submission to positive law (historical, national, instituted). Conscience is not 
only memory but promise. The exemplary witnesses who make us think about 
the law they reflect are those who, in certain situations, do not respect the laws. 
They are sometimes torn between their conscience and the laws; at times they let 
themselves be condemned by the tribunals of their country. And there are 
witnesses of this kind in every country, which proves that the place of 
appearance or formulation is for the law also the place of the first uprooting.637 
 
Derrida marks out these reflections that take place prior to any law with a 
proper name, Nelson Mandela. Gasché remarks: “‘Mandela,’ as the proper 
name of the Law of reflection, stresses that all synthetic accounting [via infra-
structures] begins as response. It takes place in admiration of the Other.”638 A 
proper name might or might not (be sufficient to) replace an infrastructure – the 
question that is not addressed here – but the following chapter proposes an 
alternative route over the (deconstructed) concept of legitimacy to account for 
this “place,” which in Derrida’s text, I would say, is marked out by the name of 
Nelson Mandela. 
 
 
6.4 Legitimacy as Resigning 
This chapter will be a continuation of a Derridean reading of the “principle,” 
which was already started above as the vouloir-dire of Arendt’s theory. Above 
all, I focus on the idea of legitimacy, because the way legitimacy is brought into 
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Arendt’s theorising, allows us to develop, what I call, a post-structuralist, or 
deconstructed “concept” of legitimacy. 
First of all, in order to see the place of legitimacy in Arendt’s theorising, I 
recall how Arendt relates different dimensions of action with each other, i.e. the 
space of appearances, power, and promising. It is possible to construct the 
following sequence: people gather together in the space of appearances, which 
is kept in existence by power that is produced by the togetherness of people 
acting in concert and the latter is assured by the force of promising.639 Now, in 
addition to this, Arendt says that power needs legitimacy, which is derived from 
“the initial getting together rather than from any action that then may follow.”640 
By the latter, Arendt asserts her non-foundationalist paradigm and excludes the 
possibility that legitimacy could be educed from the value or content established 
in reference to a transmundane source. 
Thus, she states that legitimacy resides with power and shares with power its 
inherent fleetingness, and as such, it also becomes part of what has been called 
an “inerasable potentiality” of action, or its transcendental condition of possi-
bility. However, on closer inspection, this leaves the concept of legitimacy into 
a peculiar position in Arendt’s theory. The question is what legitimacy exactly 
refers to if its function in relation to power is to be something different than is 
promising, for the task of promising is to potentiate the possibility of power by 
ensuring the togetherness of people, or as Arendt puts it: “The power [is] 
generated when people gather together and ‘act in concert.’”641 But then it 
remains unclear in Arendt’s formulations, what role is left for legitimacy. 
Developing further the possibilities that Arendt’s theorising perhaps entails, 
it might be argued that power needs legitimacy in the sense that any inadvertent 
proximity of people is not sufficient condition for making promises; in other 
words, power remains impotent when people rather than to gather together 
meaningfully, only encounter each other accidentally. So it seems that, on the 
one hand, as much as legitimacy also is not some predetermined principle 
(which would mean a kind of stabilisation before the fact), its function can only 
be to mark this difference between meeting (or being together) accidentally and 
getting together to act in concert. 
However, on the other hand, if consider the matter fully, the difference 
between gathering together and accidentally being together is not discernible 
prior to the beginning, because the fleetingness of all action hides the difference 
from sight – as much as all action is possible (as potentiality) only for a fleeting 
moment (i.e. without a constative to guarantee some perpetuity), then the 
possibility to discriminate between accidental and purposeful gathering together 
can appear only after something has already been founded (with support of a 
constative). As a result, there emerges an aporia; power requires a differen-
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tiation between gathering together and meeting in accident for the act of 
founding could be possible (for power is constitutive of the transcendental con-
dition of possibility), and at the same time, this differentiation cannot be made 
before the beginning has taken place.  
In that case, legitimacy cannot be situated neither on the side of transcen-
dental nor structural conditions of possibility of the (republican) founding act, 
but as a “place” (or a “blank”) where these conditions themselves are made 
possible, i.e. legitimacy can only be thought as itself producing the difference, 
as differentiation within “gathering” itself. This differentiation makes every 
value underlying the gathering (i.e. what gathers) to be (its own) repetition, so 
that the difference between gathering and an encounter would be an effect of the 
beginning. 
If to follow Derrida’s thinking on the supplementary mark delineated above, 
the “logic” of the “blank” and the fold, then it could be said that legitimacy 
marks, while differentiating, all principles that the beginning is based upon, but 
also their “space of reception and production.”642 In other words, it “occupies 
the position of a supplementary valence, or rather, it marks the structurally 
necessary position of a supplementary inscription that could always be added to 
or subtracted from the series.”643 Then, legitimacy “is” what “prevents any 
semantic seriality from being constituted, from being simply opened or closed,” 
but at the same time it “actually liberates the effect that a series exists; in 
marking itself out, it makes us take agglomerates for substances,” i.e. it allows 
us to take accidental encounters for meaningful gatherings, though, as said, 
without lending any full meaningfulness or meaninglessness to them.644 
In contrast, legitimacy as correspondence to (the repetition of) the value that 
gives stability to a performative is simply a manifestation of the “theological 
trap” as it was explained above; it is as if legitimacy as a supplementary mark is 
thought falling inside or outside the fold as an independent object demarcating 
the desire for binding together what is separated, for reappropriation. This 
becomes apparent if we once more evoke different movements or “phases” of 
the founding act in the context of Arendt’s “principle.” 
Arendt’s argument was that the “principle” is coeval with the beginning, 
which was taken to mean that the content (or the value) that underlies the 
gathering together of people and that shines through the “principle” as its 
own(most) appears as what the beginning always already repeats. But if 
attention is paid only to this movement, then it would mean that legitimacy (as a 
difference) is taken to be as part of the content that shines through the “prin-
ciple;” for example, as in Arendt’s case who makes it part of the transcendental 
condition of possibility (and which does not allow for Arendt to develop a more 
radical take on the “principle” and on legitimacy in line with the post-struc-
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turalist thought). In that case, legitimacy is understood as an accord between the 
act of founding (and any act thereafter) and the value or principle that brings 
about stability and creates the possibility of the founding act. This follows non-
foundationalist course of thinking, but nevertheless, it would correspond to 
deconstruction in its first movement only, because the content that shines 
through the “principle” replaces the “principle” as an empty place, introducing 
the presence into the thought that aims to think the other in its otherness (and 
makes it fail in its attempt). 
By understanding legitimacy as a differentiation, we arrive at another move-
ment that precedes in an a-temporal way the movement described: the principle 
at the moment of appearing in whatever shines through it, differentiates from 
itself, i.e. from whatever shines through the “principle.” This creates repetition 
outside temporality, which “takes place” prior to (in a-temporal way) the split 
between the performative and the constative dimensions, and makes the 
beginning possible (by creating repetition). The beginning turns now to be not a 
repetition of the principle, but the repetition of repetition, whereas this a-
temporal repetition and differentiation is legitimacy itself. In this sense, 
legitimacy is not a repetition of some long ago happened beginning (or a settled 
principle), but takes place in one moment (as if outside time), creating 
possibility of the beginning and withdrawing from it at the same moment.  
“Legitimacy” as a term has its definite history and baggage of meanings and 
associations related to it, which hold its deconstructed version hidden. For that 
reason, next I relate legitimacy to the other trajectory also outlined in this 
thesis – to the signature, and I argue that the structure of legitimacy is resigning, 
i.e. that deconstructed legitimacy is resigning. Still, before I show how 
resigning would capture legitimacy’s paradoxical “nature,” a small detour must 
be made to consider the usage of the same concept by Thomas L. Dumm in his 
article “Resignation,” which to certain extent notices and conceptualises the 
same movement in “resignation” that I am going to relate to legitimacy.645  
His starting point is an act of resignation, for example, from an office. He 
uses Richard Nixon’s resignation from the Office of President of the United 
States in 1974 as an example. Taking resignation as an act, allows him to 
understand resignation on the same level as the founding act; he says, “resig-
nation mirrors founding,” but it does it in an inverted form: “The resignation 
inverts the fabulous character of the founding act; it is parting that attempts to 
achieve its end by an assertion which repeats that of founding, namely, that all 
that has gone before is to be of no account for the future.”646 His guiding 
question is: “how does resignation operate in the world?”647 
It seems to be quite a different approach compared to the one developed in 
this thesis, but in the course of his text, Dumm, to certain extent, arrives at the 
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point very similar to what will be developed below as resigning. He argues that 
“every resignation marks a rupture, a quitting, the ending of something, that 
places someone Nowhere in respect to where they were before.”648 This 
Nowhere is taken from Stanley Cavell’s philosophy and marks, as he cites from 
Cavell, “the central secular place, in which the human wish to deny the 
condition of human existence is expressed; and so long as the denial is essential 
to what we think of as the human, scepticism [the place of Nowhere] cannot, or 
must not, be denied.”649 Dumm, analysing resignation on the level of an act, 
finds a way to say that this experience is something that brings the nowhere, the 
radical rupture, or, we could say, radical violence, into every moment of the 
presence:  
 
Resignation might be understood as an act that gives shape to an important onto-
political category, that is, as an act that connects different aspects of human 
existence to each other, that constitutes public and private spaces through the 
institutions it helps to shape and break down and through the moods it 
encourages and elicits.650 
 
In the course of the text, he outlines different undecidable meanings of resig-
nation that problematise its univocal meaning – it is a private but also a public 
act,651 it means taking control of your fate but also accepting “the fate that has 
meted out to one,”652 it is a singular act, but also a plural act, happening all the 
time because promises are made in public as well as in private life, and this 
reveals that resigning entails both, resigning to office as well as resigning from 
office.653 Eventually, he arrives at the situation, where resignation cannot not to 
take place, because it would mean a resignation to not to resign, which is a 
certain reconciliation with the situation, a passivity, “an unsigned resig-
nation.”654 Explicating his thought by recourse to Henry David Thoreau’s book 
Walden; or, Life in the Woods,655 which describes a life in solitude in the woods 
(a sort of resignation), he claims that this kind of situation of exclusion of 
resignation would be a sign of closing “oneself upon oneself [but] a self so 
enclosed substitutes consumption for experience, and is less than fully alive.”656 
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So it is that resignation (like Thoreau’s), “the practice of resignation out of 
necessity,” is the very condition to be alive.657 
Nevertheless, in his account, resignation remains thought on the basis of the 
presence, because eventually, for him, resignation is always a resignation to 
language, which “gives us a sense of return, a turning back to that which we 
may try to repudiate in our traumatic dislocation.”658 This return is guaranteed 
for us already ahead. In that case, Nowhere that resignation should preserve for 
us, acquires a certain positive value, which manifests in Dumm’s celebration of 
waiting and stillness, from which, miraculously, “we return to lead new lives, to 
come over to the condition of thinking and acting that might mark us as the 
bearers of something better than what we were before.”659 In this, I think, 
Dumm’s approach on the level of an act reveals its limits, and it remains 
different from the ideas proposed in this thesis. I would say that resignation, if it 
is to bring us to the experience of Nowhere, generates a sense of urgency and 
responsibility, which disrupts all stillness and waiting, and resignation, from 
within. 
My approach to resigning diverges from Dumm’s in that it proceeds from 
linguistic properties of the word, i.e. it pays attention to the stem of the word – 
“sign” and signing. In the following, first, I situate the question resigning in the 
framework of the thesis, after which I outline its specific “logic.”  
The problem of the signature takes us back to the text of “Declarations of 
Independence,” which ended with the question marking the radical rupture in 
the founding act – “who signs?;” there is a signature under the Declaration, but 
as God fails to (counter)sign conclusively, then the signature as if falls out of 
the text or into the text, and is unable to sign the declaration; everything stands 
in suspension.660 This situation reveals what has been called in this thesis as 
radical violence, “nothingness or pure non-sense.”661 As shown above, any 
thinking of deconstructive resistance has to be able to account for this radical 
violence, because it also is what disrupts the return of the same (and opens up a 
possibility for altogether other (beginning) to come). At the same time it has to 
be done without recourse to the presence, which posits every “solution” to 
radical violence as if prior to it, pacifying it beforehand. Deconstruction 
accounts for the radical violence via “infrastructures,” some of which have been 
mentioned already above, like iterability, undecidability, re-mark, hymen 
(blank, fold), yes-yes. Infrastructures do not solve the aporia of radical violence; 
they do not bridge undecidability that they contain while accounting for radical 
violence – rather, its maintenance is its “solution.”  
Infrastructures can be said to form chains of substitutability, in which no 
infrastructure represents the whole chain or takes precedence over any other 
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infrastructure; rather, their relation to each other is described by their another 
“name” – “non-synonymous substitutions.”662 Now, as much as each infra-
structure is bound to a specific context, these chains are constitutively open, 
and I argue that resigning, the deconstructed “concept” of legitimacy, adds itself 
to the infrastructural chain with différance, re-mark, iterability, yes-yes, etc.663 
Next, in the concluding part of the thesis, I will outline the “logic” of resigning, 
pointing out some overlaps and intersections with a “non-synonymous 
substitution” yes-yes at the same time. Yes-yes is developed in Derrida’s text on 
James Joyce’s Ulysses, “Ulysses Gramophone: Hear Say Yes in Joyce,” and it 
well relates to signatures and declarations that are the theme of this thesis.664 
In order to trace all the same movements in resigning that were outlined in 
the context of legitimacy, it is necessary to return to the moment of suspension 
of the signature. In the context of the analysis of the Declaration, it was shown 
that the signature delays and reveals its inadequacy to itself; it turns to be 
insufficient to sign the text, or as Derrida puts it “writing out one’s name is not 
yet signing.”665 Nevertheless, it might be said that the signature first “appears” 
(in this suspension) as just a mark, a name written down, or a content suspended 
in passing through the “principle,” which then is like “the minimal, primary yes, 
the telephonic ‘hello’ or the tap through a prison wall, [that] marks, before 
meaning or signifying: ‘I-here’, listen, answer, there is some mark, there is 
some other. Negatives may ensue, but even if they completely take over, this 
yes can no longer be erased.”666  
In order for a name to turn into a signature (i.e. for a signature to appear in 
fact), it requires re-signing, i.e. as if “another signature,” which reads or stitches 
the signature back to the text; in other words, it needs to be signed anew. This 
movement corresponds to the idea of legitimacy taken back to its Latin root 
“legere” (legō, lēgī), which means, among other things, “to collect, gather, bring 
together; read (aloud), recite,” and to its Ancient Greek’s cognate λέγω (legō), 
meaning “I gather, pick up, collect, count, tell.”667 These meanings allude to the 
traditional function and place of legitimacy, i.e. to bring together, to read 
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together or unite the “signature” and the text. Derrida puts the same movement 
in “terms” of yes-yes as follows:  
 
You sign when the gesture with which … you inscribe your name again, takes on 
the sense of yes, this is my name, I certify this, and, yes, yes, I will be able to 
attest to this again. I will remember later, I promise, that it is really I who signed. 
A signature is always a yes, yes, the synthetic performative of a promise and a 
memory conditioning every commitment.668 
 
However, it is not that the second yes, which is in some sense the first yes, 
makes the second yes possible in all its absolute identity:  
 
With or without a word, taken as a minimal event, a yes demands a priori its 
own repetition, its own memorizing, demands that a yes to the yes inhabit the 
arrival of the “first” yes, which is never therefore simply originary. We cannot 
say yes without promising to confirm it and to remember it, to keep it safe, 
countersigned in another yes, without promise and memory, without the promise 
of memory.669  
 
This means that there is not simply one yes to another, but yes-yes, which 
divides every yes from the beginning, while making it possible to say yes. 
Gasché puts it as following: “The yes of response, by answering the call, 
remains and, while enabling the system of identity, resists its own identification 
by it. … It is intelligible, but of an intelligibility that includes undecidability.”670 
In terms of the signature, we could say that, at the moment of its appearance by 
re-signing, the “re-signature” has to withdraw, to resign, because it does not 
replace the signature by itself, by “re-signature.” Re-signing signs the void 
between the text and the signature, and in doing that, it erases the necessity for 
itself. Therefore, resigning never “is:” it never arrives (though, it still is abso-
lutely necessary that it will come). This is its paradoxical synthesis: resigning 
re-signs, signs again, but at the same time, it resigns, it withdraws, from what it 
has made possible. 
So if resigning does not produce a resignature, then the signature has to sign 
itself twice (with/in the same signature). It is the “re-” of the resigning that 
prevents, in the same way as “the two sign” in yes-yes, “the signature from 
gathering itself together.”671 The signature, the yes “can only call up another 
yes, another signature. And, on the other hand, one cannot decide between two 
yeses [or signatures], that must gather together like twins, to the point of 
simulacrum, the one being the gramaphony of the other.”672 This points to a 
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certain undecidability between passivity and activity – on the one hand, yes 
repeats itself in a certain automatism, in the same way as the signature signs 
itself again, (as if) without interference, but yes (or the signature) is also divided 
in itself and lets an other to affirm with yes, to sign itself. For that reason, the 
repetition before the beginning, or resigning before (and also after) the signature 
“appears monotautological or specular, or imaginary, because it opens up the 
position of the I, which is itself the condition for performativity.”673 But 
nevertheless, “the self-positing in the yes,” or in the resigning, “holds open the 
circle that it institutes. In the same way, it is not yet performative, not yet 
transcendental, although it remains presupposed in any performativity, a priori 
in any constative theoricity, in any knowledge, in any transcendentality.”674 
As much as resigning withdraws from what it makes possible, in differen-
tiation in itself, it amounts to an “infrastructure;” being necessary and 
impossible at the same time. This aporetic nature of legitimacy proves that legi-
timacy should be subtracted from the same semantically associated series of 
terms with law and legality. And as it can be seen now, this “concept” of 
legitimacy explains well the observation made in the beginning of the thesis and 
in which the thesis found its impetus – that it withdraws from what it makes 
possible.  
 
6.5 In Conclusion (of the argument) 
Conclusions are written in the end and they have to return to the beginning to 
give account of what has changed about it, what new perspectives were 
invented, what problems solved. However, having arrived at the end of the 
argument by demonstrating legitimacy as an infrastructure, as resigning, yet, I 
have arrived not at the end, but at the beginning, for everything said was said in 
suspension of the beginning, to show what precedes (in a-temporal way) every 
beginning, every founding. Thus, there cannot be any returning, and in this 
sense, the “concept” of legitimacy as resigning cannot change much about this 
beginning. In the beginning of the thesis the relevance of legitimacy was 
exemplified by cases of crises, where enforcement of laws was perceived as 
violence. Legitimacy as resigning does not return to show how legitimacy and 
order can be restored in this or that particular crisis, or how governments can be 
more legitimate in general (and more forgetful about it at the same time, for 
every time when legitimacy is believed, or known, to be in place, it is forgotten, 
allowing for takeover of a self-possessed order or system of laws). However, 
this does not mean that resigning does not intervene, for if in the end we are 
arriving at the beginning, it cannot be also the same beginning we started with: 
if something previously not apparent was made apparent as preceding (and in a 
way conditioning) every beginning, it cannot leave the beginning untouched; it 
creates the possibility (a haunting possibility) for another future (and another 
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past and present). It can be said that if legitimacy as resigning cannot change 
anything about the beginning, it changes everything about the beginning – it 
changes or overwrites the very beginning itself.675 
What this different beginning (and also an answer to the “vicious circle”, 
which was the paradox we found describing every republican foundation) looks 
like is to certain extent anticipated by Honig’s reading of Rousseau and Freud in 
her Democracy and the Foreigner. According to Honig, “the lawgiver of 
Rousseau’s Social Contract is a foreign-founder,” for it should come from 
outside the community; he should not be one of the people in order to maintain 
impartiality and preserve equality of the people before the law.676 Honig’s point 
is that the law produced by such a lawgiver cannot avoid a “sense of the law’s 
alienness,” but this alienness must not be suppressed or healed, because: 
 
The positive side of “alienation” is that it marks a gap in legitimation, a space 
that is held open for future refoundings, augmentation, and amendment. That gap 
is closed by those who read alienness out of Rousseau’s text (whether by 
ignoring or domesticating the foreignness of the lawgiver), are blind to the 
haunting opacity of the people to one another in Rousseau’s polity, and are 
inalert to the ambiguity of the law that both is and is not the product of the 
General Will, produced both by public deliberation and by silence, generated by 
the people but also imposed by the lawgiver. 677 
 
The phrase Honig uses in the text that the founder’s “alienness is a poorly kept 
secret,” reflects quite well the “solution” to the “vicious circle” that is entailed 
in the “concept” of legitimacy developed in this thesis.678 Indeed, under this 
“concept,” the “vicious circle” remains vicious in that the violence of the 
founding is never quite overcome, but it needs not be. It maintains a certain 
vigilance, which is presumed by any decision.679 We might to link this to the 
thought of Derrida on the decision of the other in me: 
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In the case of culture, person, nation, language, identity is a self-differentiating 
identity, an identity different from itself, having an opening or gap within 
itself. … It is because I am not one with myself that I can speak with the other 
and address the other. That is not a way of avoiding responsibility. On the 
contrary, it is the only way for me to take responsibility and to make decisions.680 
 
Thus, the decision of the other (in me and for me) will not exonerate me from 
any responsibility for this decision, which I must make mine (to be able to 
decide in the first place). It follows that, in some sense, people co-found the 
state even if the founding act appears to be prior to the identity of what is 
founded, and given or declared by a foreigner, for in all our decisions, it is the 
other who decides first, which, however, does not mean that this exonerates us 
from any responsibility for it. 
On the “concept” of legitimacy as resigning, that goes further than “a gap in 
legitimation” admitted by Honig,681 this responsibility does not mean the 
responsibility before the government or to an order of things (which would be 
the situation of the same beginning, the beginning we started from), but 
responsibility which is more like conscience, haunting us after every decision of 
oneself (and of the other), neither entirely the matter of knowledge nor totally of 
non-knowledge. In that way, this co-founding (of the rulers and subjects alike) 
becomes also the formula of the lesser violence. It is because resigning, as the 
“structure” of legitimacy, means that legitimacy is never present – it is 
suppressed into one moment; it is a momentous “thing,” which means that it 
happens, it has to happen, but it does not exist; it does not extend over time; it 
exists only in disappearing. On the one hand, there must be legitimacy, and 
procedures that somehow mediate it, but after these procedures are performed, 
there is no legitimacy transferred over to rulers, who cannot claim in no point of 
time to own legitimacy, though, of course, there has to be legitimacy.  
In other words, neither rulers can be said to be able to possess legitimacy 
over time nor can the people rely in their contentions against governments on 
dreams of the final and ideally perfect legitimacy: legitimacy cuts in both ways. 
No ruler can have a position (of legitimacy) to demand from the people to act 
responsibly as they are supposed to. In this way, this concept of legitimacy 
responds to worries that have become more and more pertinent in recent times 
that democracy has been hijacked by corporate interests and party bureaucracies 
that make decisions in their back rooms, excluding all public discussion, for 
under this “concept” of legitimacy there can be no presumed legitimacy of 
decisions without responding, without discussion and discourse. But equally, if 
rulers do not possess it, the people have no more power to restore it. This, in 
turn, does not lead to an inevitable agreement with the state of affairs, for there 
is no legitimate state of affairs in itself to agree with. At the same time, there 
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must be legitimacy, for the people in its entirety cannot rule over themselves 
without any mediation, or representation (if this were the case, there would be 
but a rule of everyone over oneself only). In sum, legitimacy as resigning keeps 
“legitimacy” in suspension, in-between, and lets it be there, which can be 
related to the law of reflection, which Derrida speaks about in his text on 
Mandela; this suspension is what makes us reflect (with urgency), and this 
reflection, in turn, can be associated with the workings of the public sphere, the 
sphere of responding in discussion (and action). One might say that actual 
recognition of the value of the idea of the public sphere is sustainable on 
legitimacy “made” into a law of reflection (by suspending it) – and this law 
concurs with accepting the other in its otherness, which always entails the 
possibility to take other as other to itself, i.e. with lesser violence. By revealing 
legitimacy as “resigning,” this thesis sets up an “imperative” to live under “the 
experience of the impossible,” which makes all decisions and judgements to be 
haunted by the possibility of lesser violence.682  
If we started in the beginning from legitimacy that arises as a question when 
something is wrong, and is forgotten in situations where everything is well, 
then, under this different “concept,” legitimacy becomes differently relevant – 
as much as it cannot be known or determined for certain, but also not ignored 
entirely, legitimacy remains to haunt incessantly. It cannot be lacking or 
missing, but it cannot be present. Under these conditions, legitimacy does not 
return to the same beginning we started with, but by way of haunting, it grounds 
the possibility for something entirely different. 
If this “concept” of legitimacy is to intervene into the worldly affairs, then it 
occurs not primarily by explaining, but by procuring an understanding. The 
thesis attempted, by its reasoning, if it is to hold, to make a contribution to 
bringing about (a possibility for) a change in awareness of both citizens and 
rulers – towards “responding responsibly” (which is not an application of some 
ethical ideal, but the very possibility of any ethical principle) and towards an 
appreciation of the value of the free public sphere (which is not the same as the 
space of protestations and demonstrations, which always are to some extent 
expressions of impotence and disability). 
So, having been not able to conclude, I really finish the thesis with a 
summary that re-states what has been said so far. 
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Chapter 7: Summary 
This thesis was an investigation into the concept of legitimacy. It proceeded 
from an observation of a peculiar behaviour of legitimacy in political life: when 
legitimacy is considered not present in some particular political circumstances, 
it is immediately demanded as a constitutive attribute of a system of laws or a 
political order, but when it is present, it withdraws from what it makes possible, 
so that what appears is simply law and order. This “movement” remains 
unaccounted by any theory of legitimacy in so far as its starting point is the 
question “what is legitimacy?,” for it reduces the aspect of non-presence in how 
legitimacy functions to a presence (i.e. it excludes the question altogether). 
According to the argument of the thesis, if legitimacy is to be something more 
than just an evaluative concept that intervenes after the fact, but something that 
“underlies” all political life as its condition, the movement of self-erasure of 
legitimacy must be brought to bear on the concept of legitimacy, which this 
thesis has tried to accomplish by forging what was called a post-structuralist 
“concept” of legitimacy. 
This new “concept” of legitimacy could not have been thought to replace a 
traditional concept of legitimacy as a more complete concept (again submittable 
under the question “what is?”), but it had to be demonstrated (or inscribed) as 
already working in it, without at the same time abolishing it. For that reason, the 
strategy employed in this thesis was that of deconstruction, rather than that of 
re-grounding legitimacy by a direct critique, and it consisted in a sort of 
displacement of the ground on which legitimacy has been thought.  
Following the fact that prior to any incision of displacement or of decon-
struction, that which is to be revealed in the displacement, being already in 
operation in what will be displaced, manifests itself in aporias and paradoxes, 
the thesis focused on the most obvious paradox of legitimacy that has accom-
panied it from the very moment it turned into a political problem in the 17th 
century – the so called “vicious circle.” The paradox draws attention to the fact 
that there are no subjects who could have authorised a republican founding act 
prior to its having taken place; i.e. the legitimacy of the founding of such a state 
always appears as if retrospectively. This, in turn, raises the problem of how and 
by whom the unavoidable violence of the founding act is simulated, in order for 
the founding could occur in the first place. The paradox can be considered as an 
inevitable result if legitimacy is understood via the question of “what is?,” for it 
reduces legitimacy into an addendum that presumes an agent of the last resort to 
guarantee its possibility, like God, nature, subject, etc. But in the case of the 
republican act of founding, there is no such source assumed to exist, which 
leaves us an aporia with regard to how legitimacy and authority of a founding 
act becomes possible. 
The thesis examined two seminal accounts that propose their interpretations 
on how a republican founding act could deal with the “vicious circle” – these 
accounts were that of Hannah Arendt in On Revolution and Jacques Derrida in 
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“Declarations of Independence.” Their approaches have in common that they 
both unfold in the non-foundationalist perspective, and also, that they both 
proceed in their analyses from the American Declaration of Independence as a 
first and exemplary case of the republican founding act that needed to solve the 
paradox of the “vicious circle.”  
Arendt and Derrida both also take a stance in relation to the concept of 
legitimacy, though, in passim, and for both, in some sense, legitimacy does not 
play any role in their “solutions” to the “vicious circle.” What made these 
accounts interesting for the purposes of the thesis was that there still is a 
discernible difference in their view on legitimacy: while Derrida clearly treats 
legitimacy together with law, legality, prescriptions, rules, etc., Arendt relates 
legitimacy to power (which is still in need of stabilisation to be able to establish 
law of laws). This makes possible the strategy of the thesis, which is to play, in 
close reading, these accounts against each other in such a way that the 
inadequacy of their takes on the “vicious circle,” each on its own way, would 
become apparent, allowing, at the same time, to demonstrate how their 
exclusion of legitimacy could explain the inadequacy or incompleteness of their 
approaches. This, in turn, allowed us to educe an unaccounted role of legitimacy 
in thinking of the political. 
The thesis was divided into two parts: in the first part, Arendt’s theory was 
read to displace Derrida’s account, and in the second part, it was done in the 
opposite way. After the first preliminary overview of Arendt’s and Derrida’s 
accounts of the Declaration and the “vicious circle” in the second chapter, the 
first substantial discussion of these accounts was introduced via Bonnie Honig’s 
comparison of these authors.  
On the first hand, the thesis followed Honig in establishing a common 
ground of comparison between these authors on the concepts of performatives 
and constatives. In this regard, the second chapter also explicated John Austin’s 
theory of performative and constative utterances, which discriminates between 
utterances that perform an action and utterances that describe a state of affairs. 
Derrida’s account on the Declaration utilises this distinction by describing the 
declaration and the signature that signs it as a performative in its intention. 
However, the second chapter also delineated Derrida’s objection to the possi-
bility of such pure distinction between performatives and constatives on the 
ground of the “logic” of iterability, which is always already in progress in this 
distinction. Therefore, as much as performatives and constatives remain always 
contaminated by each other, the declaration, for Derrida, cannot come to exist 
or found a state without some recourse to a constative statement that describes 
the people as already independent and free. This statement, simultaneous with 
the performative declaration, needs a guarantor, the best of which, as Derrida 
says, is God: by grace of God, the people are already independent and the 
declaration merely confirms that freedom.  
Although this thesis agreed with Honig on the need of the common ground, 
it also disagreed with her translation of this conceptual framework on Arendt’s 
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theory, because for Honig, Arendt’s “solution” for the “vicious circle” is a 
theory of pure performativity: what makes the Declaration of Independence of 
the American Revolution unique, is that it draws all authority from the act of 
founding itself. Honig’s account, although emphasising the non-foundationalist 
character of Arendt’s theory, contrasts Arendt and Derrida. But if the task of the 
thesis was to displace Derrida’s take on the Declaration on the basis of Arendt’s 
interpretation of it, then Honig’s reading of Arendt clearly counteracted against 
this aim. Therefore, the thesis took Honig’s account under critical examination, 
which showed that in her interpretation of Arendt’s concepts of “augmentation” 
and resistibility, these concepts did not measure up to the task they were 
supposed to accomplish. The theme of resistance arose here because theorising 
of the republican founding act that does not rely on any absolute outside of the 
human realm, requires thinking the possibility of resistance in it, for otherwise 
the founding act would turn itself into an absolute beginning. If Arendt’s idea 
was that the possibility of augmentation in the founding act preserves the spirit 
of its first initiation (which is also a resistance), then the thesis shows that 
Honig’s interpretation of it does not think the resistance radically, as equal to 
the founding act, but it remains in the service of the existing founding act.  
Honig’s resistance, it was argued, indeed reveals violence in the founding 
act, but this violence is undecidable, and in fact, it does not intervene into the 
founding act, but is part of it. Such violence is always re-interpretable whether it 
is used against “us,” or against “them” (outsiders, enemies, etc.). This concept 
of violence was elucidated in the chapter 3 on the basis of Walter Benjamin’s 
critique of violence. 
On the basis of these considerations, the thesis situated Honig’s deconstruc-
tive intervention into the first “phase” of deconstruction, which amounts to a 
critique rather than deconstruction. Inadequate theorisation of the concept of 
resistance in the founding act prompted the thesis to move on with another take 
on Arendt as well as to look for another concept of violence that is presumed by 
thinking on resistance. 
The next chapter offered a reinterpretation of Arendt’s account of the 
Declaration. The reinterpretation started with locating Arendt’s concept of 
“promising” as one of the internal dimensions of Arendt’s theory of action, i.e. 
in addition to speech, space of appearance, and power. It followed that action, 
an ability to start something new, always exists, but it remains a fleeting 
moment, if it does not find a stability in authority, i.e. in a constative dimension. 
Hence, even if Arendt rejects the possibility that the republican founding act 
could rely on absolutes (e.g. God, Nature), it nevertheless, does not mean that 
she does not recognise a need for a constative dimension. By this, the thesis has 
brought Arendt’s account closer to Derrida’s so that the former could displace 
the latter. This interpretation also allows us to see that Arendt addresses the 
question of what I call “radical violence,” i.e. a violence that, if thought in the 
founding act, does not permit any resistance to return to the service of the same 
existing founding act. The radical violence was situated in her reading of the 
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American Revolution in the situation where absolutes were perceived as violent 
because they are compelling without reasoning, but their function (of stabili-
sation) remained absolutely necessary to uphold the revolution and the founding 
act. 
This reinterpretation of Arendt allowed (re)locating the radical violence in 
Derrida’s analysis of the Declaration in the aporia of time. The latter relates to 
the so-called countersignature of God, which creates the simultaneity of pro-
claiming and confirming the independence of a people. It was shown that God, 
by guaranteeing that the people are already free, creates in the same instant the 
eternal time of the people, which divides the instant and delays it. Now it 
appears that God’s signature does not sign conclusively and the question “who 
signs?” marks the suspension of the entire founding act. While explicating the 
thought of the delay of the signature, the thesis simultaneously traced conditions 
of possibility of the deconstructive intervention, in order to show that the 
question “who signs?” in marking out radical violence, designates the line of 
rupture along which deconstruction can be incised, but the incision itself, the 
inscription of deconstruction was not completed in this text (or by this 
question). 
Having established the possibility of an alternative route in thinking on 
legitimacy inside the deconstructive approach, the second part of the thesis, 
starting with chapter 5, examined possible “solutions” to the radical violence. In 
chapter 5 and 6, Benjamin’s and Arendt’s theories were re-examined in view of 
how they address the problem of radical violence. Deconstruction proceeds 
from an understanding that the relation to the absolutely other (beginning, for 
example) cannot be thought on the basis of the presence, which would be an 
appropriation of the other, i.e. the other (beginning) is accepted not as other (in 
its otherness), but as the same (founding act, for example). The analysis of 
Benjamin’s and Arendt’s accounts on radical violence revealed that they 
inadvertently bring the presence to their attempts to “deal” with the radical 
violence, and therefore, they reduce it to the undecidable violence, in which 
case, the resistance in the founding act remains in the service of the existing 
founding act. In Benjamin’s case, the radical violence was located in his 
concept of “divine violence,” but as it was shown in the analysis, in Benjamin 
the radical violence becomes pacified in God, who not only guarantees the 
possibility of a solution to the problem of radical violence, but also the radical 
violence itself. This means that God unites all sides and becomes a fate, which 
falls under the concept of undecidable violence.  
For Arendt, the solution to the radical violence and to the “vicious circle” 
consisted in drawing authority from the “principle,” which she characterises as 
coeval with the beginning. In this chapter, it was delineated how the “principle” 
could be read in a post-structuralist manner, interpreting it as a “pure” opening 
(to the other), but nevertheless, it was eventually argued that Arendt’s theory 
does not support this interpretation, and Arendt understands the principle as an 
empty place, which is filled in by various concrete principles that start to control 
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every subsequent action and resistance. In that case, again, the radical violence 
is thought on the basis of the presence and is eventually reduced to undecidable 
violence. 
The last chapter of the thesis demonstrated how deconstruction meets this 
challenge of thinking the other in its alterity. Briefly, this is done by way of 
forging the so-called infrastructures in the second “phase” of deconstruction. 
With the help of the analysis of the “blank,” the “fold,” and the “principle,” the 
thesis explicated the so-called second movement of deconstruction consisting in 
a certain reduplication, remarking, or differentiation, which “takes place” before 
the beginning. In regard to the “principle,” which was brought from Arendt’s 
account but expanded and developed further in a deconstructive fashion, it was 
put as follows: at the moment when whatever shines through the “principle” 
(understood as pure opening) in the form of difference, the “principle” differen-
tiates from whatever shines through it, forming a repetition before the begin-
ning. This movement was then exemplified by “infrastructures” like remark and 
yes-yes. Deconstruction was further explicated by marking out a trap of thinking 
which allures thinking to reduce deconstruction to what it is only in its first 
“phase.” The workings of the trap were explicated with reference to Ernesto 
Laclau’s and Noah Horwitz’s takes on deconstruction. 
The final section of the thesis, drawing on all previous stages of the 
argument, proposed what was called as the post-structuralist “concept” of 
legitimacy. In the previous chapters, on the one hand, an unfinished route of 
thinking on legitimacy inside deconstruction was revealed that offered a 
possibility of an alternative take on legitimacy. On the other hand, Arendt’s 
ideas of the “principle” and legitimacy, although inadequately theorised by 
Arendt, offered a possibility of deconstructive interpretation. In this section, 
these two lines of thought were combined together, and the idea of legitimacy as 
a Derridean infrastructure was developed. It was argued that the deconstructed 
“concept” of legitimacy is best captured in the “logic” of resigning, which 
synthesises in a deconstructive manner signing anew by re-signing and with-
drawing by resigning – with this, however, the thesis has explained and 
answered its initial observation on the behaviour of legitimacy that it is present 
in its non-presence. 
It was concluded that under this “concept,” legitimacy becomes a momen-
tous affair, so that legitimacy, on the one hand, has to be brought to existence 
by different procedures that mediate its transfer, but on the other hand, if these 
procedures have been performed, no legitimacy has been delivered; no ruler can 
rely on it as its possession for however short a time. This is a law of responsible 
responding and reflection. 
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Post-strukturalistlik legitiimsuse „kontseptsioon” 
Antud väitekiri käsitleb legitiimsuse mõistet, mis kõige üldisemas tähenduses 
märgib kellegi õigust valitseda. Uurimisprobleemi püstitus on ajendatud tähele-
panekust legitiimsuse omapärasest toimimisest poliitilises elus: kui mingis 
poliitilises olukorras tekib kahtlus, et poliitiline kord ei ole legitiimne, siis 
otsekohe kerkib üles nõudmine legitiimsuse järele, just kui legitiimsus oleks 
poliitilise korra konstitutiivne element. Samas, kui ollakse veendunud, et poliiti-
line kord on legitiimne, siis mis kehtib, on poliitiline kord oma seaduspärasustes 
ning legitiimsus ei ilmne mingil nähtumuslikult äratuntaval viisil. Legitiimsus 
just kui teeks midagi võimalikuks ning seejärel kustutaks end selles, mille ta 
tegi võimalikuks.  
See dünaamika jääb traditsioonilistes legitiimsuse teooriates tähelepanuta, 
kuna lähtudes küsimusest, „mis on legitiimsus?”, nad välistavad legitiimsuse 
mitte-kohalolu legitiimsuse mõistest. Sellise lähenemise tulemusel taandub 
legitiimsus omaduseks, mis „lisandub” poliitilisele korrale, kui leitakse, et see 
vastab teatud paikapandud tingimustele. Seega, ühelt poolt, legitiimsuse olulisus 
tuleneb sellest, et seda käsitletakse kui tingimust poliitilise korra tekkimiseks, 
samas, teiselt poolt, küsimuse „mis on?” aluselt kontseptualiseeritud legitiimsus 
ei suuda seda rolli täita, eeldades poliitilise korra olemasolu, millele ta rakendub 
tagantjärele. Käesoleva uurimistöö väite kohaselt peaks selleks, et legitiimsus 
osutuks poliitilise korra esmaseks tingimuseks, legitiimsuse kontseptsioon 
sisaldama endas legitiimsuse n-ö enesekustutust. Sellist legitiimsuse kontsept-
siooni, mille välja töötamine on käesoleva väitekirja eesmärgiks, nimetatakse 
selles töös post-strukturalistlikuks legitiimsuse „kontseptsiooniks” (niivõrd kui 
seda saab kontseptsiooniks nimetada). 
Tulenevalt probleemiasetusest on antud uurimuse lähenemine dekonstrukti-
vistlik. Kuigi uurimistöö seab eesmärgiks jõuda teistsuguse legitiimsuse „kont-
septsioonini” ei saa see asendada traditsioonilist legitiimsuse kontseptsiooni kui 
rohkem täielikum kontseptsioon (mis jällegi alluks küsimusele, „mis on 
legitiimsus?”), vaid seda saab ainult mõista kui midagi, mis alati juba töötab 
traditsioonilise legitiimsuse kontseptsiooni sees, tekitades selles paradokse ja 
apooriaid, aga samas ilma et ta seda täielikult hävitaks. Dekonstruktiivne ana-
lüüs sobib antud uurimisprobleemile, kuna võimaldab apooriate esile toomise 
kaudu nihestada dominantne legitiimsuse diskursus, näidates selle sõltuvust 
sellest, mida ta välistab või mis ei mahu tema loogika alla. 
Käesolevas väitekirjas keskendutakse ühele põhilisele paradoksile, mis on 
saatnud legitiimsuse mõistet alates 17. sajandist, mil ta kerkis esile poliitilise 
probleemina – nn. „nõiaringi” paradoksile, nagu see on saanud tuntuks Abbé 
Emmanuel Sieyès’i töödest Suure Prantsuse revolutsiooni päevilt. See paradoks 
seisneb selles, et igasugune riigi asutamisakt, mis ei toetu metafüüsilisele 
autoriteediallikale, näiteks vabariiklik iseseisvusdeklaratsioon, osutub illegitiim-
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seks, kuivõrd see akt alles loob poliitilise (id)entiteedi, mis võiks legitimeerida 
selle asutamisakti. Seega saab selline riik olla legitimeeritud ainult tagantjärele, 
mis tõstatab küsimuse, kuidas ja kelle poolt asutamisakti vägivald neutrali-
seeritakse sellisel viisil, et asutamisakt saaks toimuda. 
Töö võtab aluseks kaks keskset kaasaegset käsitlust „nõiaringi” paradoksist, 
mis pakuvad oma lahenduse küsimusele, kuidas vabariiklik asutamisakt ületab 
selle paradoksi. Esimene neist kuulub Jacques Derridale, kes on dekonstruktiiv-
selt analüüsinud vabariiklikku asutamisakti ja selle paradoksi, kuid viisil, mis 
asetab legitiimsuse ühele poolele seaduse, legaalsuse, ettekirjutuste, reeglitega, 
s.t tõlgendades legitiimsust seaduse poolel, mis vajab dekonstruktsiooni, mis on 
dekonstrueeritav. See komplitseerib uurimistöö ülesannet, kuivõrd töö peab 
suutma leida alternatiivse lähenemise dekonstruktiivse analüüsi sees. Teine 
käsitlus „nõiaringi” paradoksist, mis pakub uurimistöö seisukohast huvi kuulub 
Hannah Arendtile. Arendti analüüs seostab legitiimsuse võimu tekkimisega 
(kuid mitte selle püsimisega), mis mõnes mõttes haakub paremini uurimistöö 
eesmärgiga, kuid lähenedes küsimusele fenomenoloogilise traditsiooni pinnalt, 
ei leia legitiimsuse mõiste sellist edasiarendust, et antud töö saaks sellele otse-
selt toetuda. Mõlemad käsitlused võtavad aluseks Ameerika Iseseisvusdeklarat-
siooni kui ühe esimese juhtumi, kus riigi asutajad seisavad (suuremal või 
vähemal määral) teadlikult silmitsi vajadusega ületada „nõiaringi” paradoks 
saavutamaks legitiimsust. 
Töö strateegia seisneb Derrida ja Arendti lähenemiste võrdlemises selliselt, 
et Arendti käsitlus seab küsitavaks Derrida legitiimsuse asetamise ühele pinnale 
seadusega ja samas Derrida dekonstruktsioon seab küsitavaks Arendti feno-
menoloogilise käsitluse. See tähendab, et töö jääb ühelt poolt derridaliku 
dekonstruktsiooni pinnale, aga jõuab legitiimsuse kontseptsioonini, mis lahkneb 
Derrida omast. Teiselt poolt jääb töö Arendti legitiimsuse kontseptsiooni 
pinnale, kuid arendab seda edasi dekonstruktivistlikult. See viib võimaluseni 
näidata, et mõlemad käsitlused jäävad tegelikult lõpetamata ja Arendti legitiim-
suse kontseptsiooni ja derridaliku dekonstruktsiooni kokku viimise ja edasi 
arendamise tulemusel on võimalik jõuda teistsuguse legitiimsuse kontsept-
sioonini. 
Post-strukturalistliku legitiimsuse „kontseptsiooni” võimalikkuse tõenda-
miseks käsitleb töö peale Arendti ja Derrida veel mitmeid erinevaid teemasid ja 
kõrvalautoreid. Uurimistöö esimeseks ülesandeks on leida ühine alus Derrida ja 
Arendti käsitluste võrdlemiseks. Selles järgib töö Bonnie Honigi eeskuju, 
tõlgendades mõlema autori käsitlust performatiivide ja konstatiivide terminites. 
Väitekirja teine peatükk selgitabki John Austini performatiivide ja konstatiivide 
teooriat, mille järgi performatiivid on lausungid, mis teevad midagi ja 
konstatiivid on lausungid, mis sedastavad midagi. Samas toob väitekiri välja ka 
Derrida kriitika sellele eristusele tema puhtal kujul. Seejärel analüüsib töö 
Bonnie Honigi võrdlust Arendti ja Derrida vahel, mis tõlgendab Arendti teooriat 
kui puhast performatiivsust. Ehk teisisõnu, Honigi käsitluses seisneb Arendti 
lahendus „nõiaringi” paradoksile vabariikliku iseseisvusdeklaratsiooni perfor-
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matiivsuses (asutamisakti kogu autoriteet tuleneb asutamisaktist enesest), samas 
kui Derrida jaoks sellist puhast performatiivsust ei ole olemas ja lahendus 
„nõiaringi” paradoksile seisneb selle otsustamatuses – pole üheselt selge, kas 
iseseisvusdeklaratsioon loob iseseisvuse või ainult kinnitab juba tegelikult 
(näiteks Jumala armust) olemasolevat iseseisvust. Honigi käsitluses seisab 
Arendti ja Derrida vahel vastuolu. 
Uurimistöö ei nõustu Honigi Arendti tõlgendusega ja selle põhjendamisel 
tõuseb kesksele kohale vastupanu ja vägivalla teema. Töö argumendi loogika 
kohaselt saab sellest teemast üks legitiimsuse post-strukturalistliku „kontsept-
siooni” ülesehitamise põhitelgi, sest teooria, mis selgitab „nõiaringi” paradoksi 
ületava asutamisakti võimalikkust sõltub sellest, kuidas see mõtleb vastupanu 
asutamisakti sees – see vastupanu ei saa olla sama asutamisakti teenistuses ega 
olla välistatud sellest kui asutamisakti asendada püüdev revolutsioon. Vastu-
panu selline mõtestamine on hädavajalik, sest vastasel korral võtaks asutamisakt 
ise absoluudi rolli, millest ta samas püüab end distantseerida. Teisisõnu, 
vastupanu küsimus tähendab küsida, kuidas mõelda Teist (algust) või võõrast 
teisena (võõrana), ilma taandamata Teist endale, esimesele, või samale (algu-
sele). Seetõttu on teiseks oluliseks teemaks, mida jälgitakse kogu uurimistöö 
jooksul, dekonstruktsioon ise, tema sekkumise tingimused, sest sellelt aluselt 
näidatakse lõppkokkuvõttes, kuidas dekonstruktsioon mõtleb Teist teisena ning 
milles seisneb selle erinevus Hannah Arendti ja Walter Benjamini lähene-
mistest. 
Analüüsides kriitiliselt Honigi teooriat tuuakse sisse Walter Benjamini 
vägivalla kriitika. Honig teoretiseerib vastupanu kui midagi, mis toob nähtavale 
asutamisakti vägivalla, kuid antud väitekiri näitab, et Honigi vägivalla kontsept-
sioon ei ole radikaalne, vaid „otsustamatu,” mis jääb asutamisakti teenistusse. 
Seda vägivalla kontseptsiooni selgitatakse Walter Benjamini vägivalla kriitika 
abil. Seega kui jääda Honigi tõlgenduse pinnale, ei suudaks Arendt teoreti-
seerida radikaalset katkestust, mitte-kohalolu, asutamisakti sees. Käesolev 
uurimistöö pakub teistsuguse Arendti tõlgenduse, mis näitab, et kuigi Arendt 
välistab asutamisakti toetumise absoluudile (näiteks Jumal), siis see ei tähenda, 
et ta ei peaks vajalikuks konstatiivi olemasolu, mis seda stabiliseeriks. See 
annab Arendti käsitlusele teise suuna ja võimaldab näha, kuidas Arendt püstitab 
küsimuse asutamisakti radikaalsest katkestusest (või vägivallast). Pärast Arendti 
ümbertõlgendust tõstab uurimistöö Arendti küsimuse asutamisakti vägivallast 
Derrida käsitluse konteksti ja näitab, et Derrida oma „Iseseisvusdeklarat-
sioonide” tekstis küll püstitab radikaalse vägivalla küsimuse, kuid ei paku 
seejuures selle „lahendust.” See avab võimaluse alternatiivseks legitiimsuse 
käsitluseks dekonstruktsiooni pinnalt.  
Töö jõuab viimases osas välja post-strukturalistliku legitiimsuse „kontsept-
sioonini” võttes vaatluse alla viisi, kuidas dekonstruktsioon „mõtleb” radi-
kaalset katkestust asutamisaktis. Ühelt poolt analüüsitakse Arendti ja Benjamini 
lahendusvariante ja näidatakse nende ebapiisavust, teiselt poolt selgitatakse 
dekonstruktsiooni „loogikat,” kritiseerides seejuures Ernesto Laclau ja Noah 
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Horwitzi tõlgendusi sellest. Kõige lõpuks, viies kokku dekonstruktsiooni ja 
Arendti idee „printsiibist” pakutakse välja legitiimsuse „kontseptsioon,” mille 
võtab kokku infrastruktuur „resigneerimine” – ühes „mõistes” või „liikumises” 
on sünteesitud tähendused „uuesti signeerima” ja „resignatsioon” ehk omaenda 
kustutus selles, mis on tehtud võimalikuks. 
Sellise legitiimsuse „kontseptsiooni” kohaselt on legitiimsus ühelt poolt 
absoluutselt vajalik ja peab eksisteerima koos kõigi protseduuridega, mis seda 
vahendavad, aga teiselt poolt, kuigi poliitilise korra legitiimsus just kui on 
kinnitatud vastavate protseduuride läbimise kaudu, siis poliitiline kord ei ole 
pärast seda rohkem legitiimne selles tähenduses, et sellest saaks tuletada õiguse 
mingile konkreetsele käitumisele. Keegi ei saa legitiimsust omada, sest legi-
tiimsus „eksisteerib” ainult hetkes. 
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